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New England Journal of Public Policy

A Journal of the
John W. McCormack
Institute of Public Affairs

University of Massachusetts
at Boston

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University of Massachusetts at Boston

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Editor's Note

by Padraig O'Malley

The failed coup in the USSR and its consequences: the collapse of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the emergence of voracious ethnic nationalisms in the form of newly proclaimed nation states; the civil war in a Yugoslavia that teeters on the brink of dissolution; the continuing rumblings of discontent in a Czechoslovakia that is trying mightily to hold itself from falling apart, the shifting patterns of realignment in much of Central and Eastern Europe — each of these events seems to be counterintuitive in some fundamental sense. After all, hasn't the world become a global marketplace? Hasn't interdependence become the catch cry of the 1990s? Aren't nations acknowledging their mutual needs and interests and surrendering their sovereignty to transnational superstructures such as the European Community, the new paradigm?

Besides, almost all that happened in those tumultuous months occurred with a suddenness and completeness that defied analysis. In the end the old order didn't die a slow, lingering death, it simply dropped dead. The transformation of Eastern and Central Europe and the USSR mocked conventional shibboleths. Events caught us off guard not only in their happening but in the manner of their happening: volumes of exquisitely crafted theory, decades of arcane analysis, libraries of wisdom, multiplicities of social models, and volumes of behavioral simulations were all found to be woefully wanting. In the end, change had more to do with the undoing of the long-suppressed aspirations of indigenous peoples; and because they were long repressed, they were assumed to be nonexistent. In the postmodern world, "nationalism" was, well, a dirty word. The virtues of diversity were, of course, extolled, for who would not extol diversity as an expression of difference? But the flip side of diversity is division, which is not so quick to be acknowledged because it is not so readily amenable to remedy.

Which brings us, in a roundabout way perhaps, to this issue of the *New England Journal of Public Policy*. It is an eclectic mix. Its range and diversity, however, illuminate one of the less considered aspects of public policy: the fact that policy itself, despite the efforts of policy theorists, and on occasion policymakers and practitioners, to invest it with the trappings of rational, scientific method, rarely if ever is defined in politically or culturally neutral terms. The pretense that this is not so suggests that there exists some set of objective criteria that are impervious to either political or cul-

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tural dictates. In reality, of course, nothing could be further from the truth; policy is the product of our particular circumstances, of the normative yardsticks and values that imbue our political and cultural discourse, often with unforeseen impacts on and dislocations to its intended beneficiaries. In short, we often kill or at the very least maim with kindness.

In his reflective essay, "Professing American Literature: A Report from Brazil," Arnold Gordenstein, who taught American literature at a Brazilian university, makes this point. "My own academic politics, a blend of old liberalism and 1960s radicalism, constituted a cultural imperialism of its own," he says. "I made certain choices in my teaching that were meaningful to me but . . . less meaningful to my students." Accordingly, he developed courses "that privileged texts by the underdogs and the minorities" and presented them "as free from assumptions about manifest destiny." "I tried to suggest," he writes, "an approach to the Brazilians' own racial and sexual problems by indirectness and by modeling, by displaying the United States, warts and all, and then the U.S. response, warts and all."

Brazilian students, however, were unwilling to aspire to the American dream and unable to see the social dimensions of the failure portrayed in the books Gordenstein had selected for study. "My Brazilian students," he observes wryly, "usually did not see the fates of these fictional characters as socially resonant catastrophes but mainly as personal disappointments" — the values these "canons" of education "once represented in the United States were never assumed in Brazil." In a culture like that of Brazil, "where you begin with a more relaxed and tolerant attitude to individual foibles based on a deeper skepticism about the possibilities of social improvement through a chronically, almost acceptably corrupt central government, the largest discernible values have to do with family and blood loyalties." In short, Brazilian life and literature, he concludes, reflect "a flight from social issues to a concern for smaller nuclei like the family." In the end, Gordenstein comes to a disturbing realization: the easy socially conscious assumptions he brought to his work were an anathema to the authoritarian military regime, noteworthy for its murderous excesses, which ruled the country: "I had been encouraging catastrophe. For if my students absorbed and acted on Thoreau in the way I was suggesting, they might land not in Concord jail but in an unmarked grave."

Gordenstein's larger thesis — that the values at the core of our cultural composition cannot easily be universalized — is the implicit theme of three other essays — Sharlene Voogd Cochrane's "Compelled to Speak: Women Confronting Institutional Racism, 1910–1950," Paul L. Atwood's "The Vietnam War Memorial and the Gulf War," and Richard A. Hogarty's "Searching for a UMass President: Transitions and Leaderships, 1970–1991."

Cochrane's article is close in form to a case study. She explores the efforts by women both within and outside the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) to make the organization confront its own racism. Her focus is the Boston YWCA, and she unfolds the study by drawing on the experiences of Lucy Miller Mitchell, the first woman of color to be elected to the Boston YWCA board. The YWCA moved more quickly than other similar institutions to shed its racism. One important reason for this, Cochrane contends, was "the power of women speaking out in an institution that encouraged them to make connections between their faith and their daily lives." Their strategy, writes Cochrane, "was a profound commitment to connecting talk and action. They kept issues alive and raised points at every opportunity. They constantly

set a context for and educated others to see the connections between YWCA rhetoric, ideals, and practices.” This sense of being compelled to act gave women an intensity, a fervor, which overcame other powerful cultural messages of racism and silence and gave them a clarity of purpose and courage to act. Their voicing of the moral argument was “unending, coherent, and powerful.”

Some of Cochrane’s data makes painfully clear the extent and scope of racism in institutional form that set the context for race relations in Boston: no students of color were allowed to live in any of Boston’s college dormitories until the 1920s; women of color looking for lodging in Boston in the late twenties were denied access to the YWCA. In the words of one of its board’s presidents: “It is part of our job to fit the girl into the proper environment.” For women of color that meant boarding in private homes because “we [the board] believe they will be happiest among colored people”; no nursing schools or hospitals accepted women of color for nurses’ training until 1929; and the YWCA swimming pool was not open to all women of color until the 1940s. Who are we to throw the first stone at South Africa?

Paul Atwood discusses the debate over the “meaning” of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., and relates this to the revision of the “Vietnam syndrome” as it has been played out in recent U.S. armed interventions overseas. Considerable political struggle over precisely which values the monument should enshrine occurred during the design phase of the memorial. Some proponents wished for a contemplative, antiwar message, while others believed the memorial should embody traditional martial themes. This division, Atwood argues, continued and extended the debate over the Vietnam War itself. The issue in the Gulf, Atwood postulates, was substantially the same as in Indochina — the United States attempted to foster its hegemony in both regions, to protect its dominance from indigenous threats, and to promote the continued rule of native elites friendly to U.S. interests. Throughout the eighties, Atwood contends, substantial cultural productions helped to erase the real memories of the tragedy and divisiveness of the war by “normalizing” the Vietnam veteran and portraying his role in standard heroic terms, thereby assisting in the manufacture of a new public consensus that employment of military options should be subject to the “will to win,” the use of maximum firepower, and an “acceptable” number of U.S. casualties. This “historical and cultural revisionism,” he says, “contributed to public willingness to employ devastating force against Grenada, Panama, and Iraq.”

Richard Hogarty’s article on presidential searches is a sequel to his essay “The Search for a Massachusetts Chancellor: Autonomy and Politics in Higher Education” (*New England Journal of Public Policy* 4, no. 2). In his current article, he examines the tension between cultural constructs and value systems in a context that juxtaposes the pristine requirements of the academy and the pragmatic demands of the polity. Hogarty quotes from *Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints*, a seminal study of presidential searches by Judith Block McLaughlin and David Riesman: “Like perhaps no other event in the life of an institution, the search for a president reveals the politics, protocols, and promise of the American academic enterprise.” They might also have added “and the cultural relativism of the major players in the selection procedure.”

Reviewing five presidential searches that have taken place at the University of Massachusetts since 1970, Hogarty concludes that “because of the culture of the state, the search becomes political, no matter what committee structure or procedural safeguards are employed. Consequently, the key to a successful search depends to a large

extent on the 'representativeness' of the process and the participation of all parties-at-interest. For the search to be considered legitimate," Hogarty concludes, "it must include the major stakeholders within the university community." Exclusion of faculty members from search committees frequently causes antagonism to the searches. "Such antagonism tends to generate suspicion and mistrust, which in turn undermine the effectiveness of the incumbent."

John C. Berg looks at value structures in a different framework in what he calls "Beyond the Party-Group Continuum." Studies in the 1960s found that Massachusetts was a state with strong parties and weak interest groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Republican Party shrank, party competition declined, conflict within the Democratic Party grew, and interest groups became more important — and will probably remain important, Berg suggests, despite the Republican gains of 1990. However, while interest groups are now much stronger than the parties, they do not dominate Massachusetts politics. They are kept from doing so not by the parties, but by intergroup conflict.

Interest groups, according to Berg, "are a big and growing business in Massachusetts." The number of registered lobbyists continues to rise, as do both interest-group spending and campaign contributions. Until 1990, Massachusetts seemed to be growing more and more similar to a traditional one-party state, with the Democrats holding a dominant electoral position but with little or no coherence on policy issues. As in the old one-party South, this made interest groups more and more important as the organizing force in policymaking.

But Massachusetts, says Berg, differs from the old one-party states of the South in that it has strong labor unions, environmental organizations, women's groups, and grassroots groups such as MassPIRG. These interest groups are not strong enough, singly or collectively, he posits, to overcome the economic weight and political power of the state's businesses, but they are strong enough to prevent the development of the kind of single-interest business dominance common in the Old South and West. Moreover, there are also important divisions within the business community. The situation in Massachusetts, therefore, might better be characterized as one of interest-centered conflict rather than interest-group dominance.

Bruce Wundt outlines the consequences and policy implications of the large cuts in defense expenditures on the economy of Connecticut. That state's economy enjoyed considerable prosperity during the 1980s as a result of its reliance on the defense industry. Now that defense expenditure is being cut back, Connecticut is faced with the task of diversifying into new markets and products. Two industries in particular — aircraft and aircraft parts and ship- and boat-building — have averaged greater than 21 percent of total manufacturing employment in Connecticut during the twenty-three years between 1964 and 1987. In contrast countrywide, these industries account for about 4.2 percent of total U.S. manufacturing employment. When the multiplier impact of these two industries on output and employment is taken into account, these two industries either directly or indirectly account for one in four jobs in Connecticut. Furthermore, a one percent reduction in employment in these two crucial industries will result in a four tenths of one percent drop in total manufacturing employment.

For the entire 1964–1987 period, total manufacturing employment in Connecticut fell; however, increasing federal expenditures on defense and its concomitant impact on employment in defense-related industries, particularly from 1977 on, largely offset this loss so that employment fluctuations were relatively mild. Correspondingly, in recent years the state has experienced greater instability in manufacturing employ-

ment. The implications for policymakers, says Wundt, are that Connecticut should not direct its efforts toward replacing the defense industry with another dominant industry. Rather, the state must encourage the expansion of industries that would not only increase the manufacturing base but also provide stability in employment. Given this objective, he suggests that state policymakers focus their efforts on promoting the expansion of industries that are compatible with the state's economic structure, such as certain medical instruments, printing, chemicals, and textiles and apparel industries.

"Representativeness" is also the theme of Shaun O'Connell's essay, "Representative Men." Reviewing six books, one about an actual man and five about fictional men, O'Connell sees them as attempts to define "representative men" of the 1980s, "an era," he observes, "when the worst were full of passionate intensities, particularly among men." Each antiheroic man in these books, he concludes, was "selfish, domineering, dangerous to women, and deceitful, yet each man was also committed to a system of values and ideas that made him an interesting case history — values which, in some instances, redeemed his failings."

As usual, O'Connell, in his understated way, challenges us to relate literary and cultural values to public policy issues, and, as usual, they invariably illuminate the elastic dimensions of public policy with more clarity than more rigid socioeconomic dogmas. 🐼

Searching for a UMass President

Transitions and Leaderships, 1970–1991

Richard A. Hogarty

This article traces the history of the five presidential successions that have taken place at the University of Massachusetts since 1970. No manual or campus report will reveal the one best way to conduct a presidential search. How to do so is not easy to prescribe. Suitably fleshed out, the events surrounding these five searches tell us a great deal about what works and what doesn't. It is one thing to offer case illustrations of past events, another to say how they might be put to use by other people in another era with quite different situations and concerns. In evaluating these transitions and leaderships, this article also raises the question of what is the proper role of the president in university governance. The hard question for us is not that the public land-grant university is an integral part of state government. It is, rather, How integral should it be? To the extent that these examples provide for broad understandings of the system, they are valuable for heuristic purposes.

When a college or university president departs from office, the problem arises of picking a successor. During this critical period of transition, the academic community spends a great deal of time and emotional energy in trying to find a suitable replacement. Looking for the particular kind of leadership required is a very challenging and difficult assignment. Because the presidency is conceived to be the cardinal position in the academic enterprise, and as such the initiating and driving force in the decision-making process, the trustees view the selection of a new president as their ultimate responsibility. Within the total scheme of things, it is probably the single most important act that they perform. For their part, it is a thoughtful exercise in judgment. Nothing is more steeped in institutional protocol nor more sensitive politically. As a result, the search for a chief executive officer is accorded top priority and shrouded in relative secrecy.

From Henry Flagg French, who took office in 1864, to Elbert K. Fretwell, the current incumbent, twenty men have served as president of the University of Massachusetts.¹ All have been white males, mostly of Anglo-Saxon Protestant extraction.

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None has been a woman or a person of color. Nor has a Catholic or a Jew held the presidency.² Be that as it may, the achievements and careers of these presidents, and the development of the office they served, provide a fascinating panorama of the growth of the university. Evaluating the leadership of a single president is no simple undertaking, and gathering evidence of changing conditions is infinitely more complicated. Fortunately, because of the limited scope of this inquiry, my task has been greatly simplified. Throughout its history, the office of president has gradually increased in authority and prestige, although this has varied somewhat according to the character and leadership style of each president.

In the years since a systemwide office of president was created for the University of Massachusetts in 1969, there have been five presidential successions, each with its unique search. That there are differences between the five searches is hardly surprising, but those differences are complemented by a number of striking similarities. Through a comparative examination of each, I have classified them accordingly: (1) a corporate-style search; (2) an insider search; (3) a national search; (4) an heir-apparent search; and (5) a politicized search. While not universal, these categories are intended to illustrate the way presidential searches — at least at the University of Massachusetts — shift with changing social, economic, and political conditions.

A special word: governors and legislative leaders, along with trustees, faculty, students, and alumni, react in some significantly similar ways to the problem of presidential succession, but in other equally significant ways they perform in a markedly different manner. These wide disparities reflect sharply contrasting philosophies about the sort of person needed as president and sharply contrasting methods of selection. It is the purpose of this article to identify some of those variations and similarities and suggest their importance for tomorrow's transitions in leadership.

Background: Searching for Success

There is no magic formula for conducting a presidential search. A lot depends on the innate wisdom and collective experience of those involved. The procedures are fairly simple and straightforward. Ideally, the board of trustees appoints a broadly representative search committee, whose primary function is to identify a pool of potential prospects and narrow the field to a slate of finalists. Consultants who specialize in executive recruiting are often hired to help in this endeavor. If compliance with affirmative action does not always place the competition on a level playing field, it occasionally gives constituencies the opportunity to make the claim of virtue by appointing either a woman, a black person, or a Hispanic person. Adherence to the sunshine laws in various states guarantees the openness of the search and exposes it to full public view, but these statutes cause more problems than they solve. The search committee, which is advisory in nature, eventually makes its recommendations to the appointing authority. In the last stages of deciding among the serious contenders, the governing board selects the person who, in their judgment, is best suited for the job.

Few contemporary searches follow this ideal. Many, if not most, are beset with tensions and controversy. Much can go wrong and often does. Mistakes and unforeseen circumstances are almost bound to occur. Some searches are disrupted by leaks to the press and the hazards of premature publicity, while others suffer from political intrusion and manipulation. Some suffer from the folly and foibles of human judgment usually ending in dismal failure. This is what happens when the trustees

pick the wrong incumbent, who inevitably will prove unsuitable. Still other searches are notably successful, resulting in an admirable choice that satisfies nearly everyone. Failures are dramatic and illuminating; despite the best of intentions, the most thoughtfully planned and carefully executed searches do not always succeed.

Successes, however, add to understanding. They provide a mandate or sense of legitimacy to the person chosen. In 1990, Judith McLaughlin and David Riesman published a definitive study entitled *Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints*. As they argue, “The best searches serve to legitimate the final choice of the search committee and trustees so that a new president can have a smooth entrée to the presidency. Many searches, however, are fraught with missteps that leave constituents on the campus enraged about the search and hostile to its outcome. The search ends up an abysmal failure, not because the wrong person has been chosen, but because someone who might have been right for the institution is rendered ineffective by the traumas connected with his or her succession to the presidency.”³

McLaughlin and Riesman’s research included the investigation of more than two hundred presidential searches. During the ten years of their collaborative effort, they interviewed numerous presidential candidates and search committee members, including trustees, faculty, students, and alumni. Their comparative study covers a broad spectrum of American colleges and universities — public and private, large and small — along with a good geographical spread. Throughout their book, the authors discuss questions about the search process, such as how members of the search committee are chosen, what committee size is most desirable, what procedures help prevent breaches of confidentiality, and how search committees go about choosing a consultant and evaluating candidates. All in all, they are persuaded that the search process at many public and private institutions more closely resembles a political contest than the corporate method of picking a chief executive officer.

This situation is especially true in Massachusetts, which is a highly political state. One would be hard pressed to find a state where the battles in public higher education are waged more fiercely. These conflicts are characterized by intense competition from the private schools and by the underlying issues of money, class, and ethnicity. Historically, the prestigious elite institutions have always held a most favored position. Their hegemony can be attributed in large part to the fact that the state legislature had subsidized Harvard as a provincial college over two hundred years before the public came into existence.⁴ Consequently, the latter have always been treated as “academic orphans,” to use Charles Radin’s felicitous phrase. In his words, “Public higher education in Massachusetts got a late, weak start. Born in the shadow of Harvard, its development was hampered at every subsequent stage by the dominance of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and by the struggle of institutions such as Boston University and Boston College to develop themselves.”⁵ Unless one understands these dynamics, one cannot fully comprehend or appreciate the policy environment in which the scrappy battles are fought.

It is natural then to ask: Do searches really make a difference? This central question is addressed squarely by McLaughlin and Riesman. They frame their question more broadly by asking a series of other related questions.

Just as there is argument as to whether presidents make a difference, so there is corresponding debate as to whether searches matter. Can a search be organized so that it will identify the person most appropriate for the institution? Does a

“good” search produce a “good” president? Or is the outcome of a search basically random? Is the search merely a ceremonial activity, having little or no bearing on the quality of the person selected at its conclusion?⁶

The answers to these questions not only convey important messages about the obligations of trustees to each other and to the faculty, students, and alumni, but they also require us to think hard about the role of the search itself. How does one predict the future leadership potential of a particular candidate? The relative effectiveness of a president’s leadership involves such things as his or her personal qualities, his formal as well as informal authority, his communication skills, the reputation he acquires, the funds he raises, and the respect he commands both inside and outside the academic community. Indeed, the modern president is as much a power broker as he is an overseer of administrative operations. As one UMass report says, “The president’s role is enormously varied, especially in a multi-campus system. He is part leader, part diplomat, part broker, part manager, part negotiator, part cajoler, part commander, part spokesman, and part of many other things as well.”⁷ Whether a president will prevail in a dispute over policy (or even whether he or she will be significantly involved) is the result of a subtle combination of factors, not of any single determinant.

Contemporary presidents at UMass tend to remain in the job for a longer period of time than many of their counterparts elsewhere. It is estimated that 40 percent of college presidents nationwide have a tenure in office of about three years. Burnout and political interference are the principal factors that account for the high rate of turnover, which are aspects of the problem that make the search doubly difficult.

Other factors include the fears of different groups that come into play. Suspicious faculty members are often fearful of trustee collusion. They tend to be wary that the selection may already be predetermined, or afraid that trustee priorities will be at variance with theirs. By the same token, trustees tend to underestimate the pragmatism and common sense of faculty. Given the culture of the academy, faculty usually prefer someone who has earned his or her professional spurs in academia. But faculty factions on most campuses are usually so fragmented that it is difficult for them to achieve consensus on a specific candidate. The same sort of political fragmentation occurs among student and alumni groups.⁸

It is well to remember that the search process is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. This activity has many salutary effects in energizing trustees, faculty, alumni, and students alike. A presidential transition provides them with a unique opportunity for institutional learning. They must examine the problems and priorities the institution faces, consider what sort of leadership is desired, and evaluate the credentials and experiences of candidates accordingly. There are also dangers, however. The most important of these is outside political interference that may rob the academy of its autonomy. There is also a tendency to look for an absence of negatives in candidates rather than the presence of positives, which leaves the search committee guessing about their real strengths and weaknesses.

Conditions and constituencies often change substantially between presidential transitions. So even when we want to do better, we know less than we should about what works and why. And what works in the private sector does not necessarily work in the public sphere. Seeking an appropriate balance between process and outcome

is a constant but healthy challenge. In the end, of course, that is what really matters; the pivotal question is not what mistakes we have made in the past, but what we have learned from them.

The Development of the UMass System

Founded in 1863 at the height of the Civil War, the state university began as an agricultural school, when Massachusetts was primarily a farm state. A year earlier, Vermont's Justin Morrill had sponsored a bill in Congress to grant public lands to the states for the promotion of higher education in "agriculture and the mechanic arts." The second mission of this dual federal mandate was assigned to MIT. The success of the land-grant college movement was attested by the later development of first-class institutions in many states and world-famous universities at Berkeley, Ithaca, Madison, Minneapolis, and Urbana.

The trustees in Massachusetts appointed Henry Flagg French as the first president on November 29, 1864. They chose rural Amherst as the site for the new school, and classes began in the fall of 1867. Popularly known as Mass Aggie, the fledgling institution remained a relatively small but important school for nearly seventy years. In the late nineteenth century, nine field research and experiment stations were set up across the commonwealth from Deerfield to Nantucket. Under the presidency of Kenyon Butterfield (1906–1924), the cooperative extension service flourished in rural areas and provided technical assistance to countless farmers and their families. In 1924, Butterfield left to become president of Michigan State University.

In 1931, when Roscoe Thatcher presided over the agricultural school, it was upgraded to the rank of a state college. In 1947, when Ralph Van Meter was at the helm, it emerged as a full-fledged university. By this time, however, Massachusetts ceased to be a farm state. With the onrush of urban industrialism and the rapid growth of its cities, its people had become more urban than rural.

After World War II, change came rapidly. Returning military veterans, with their GI benefits, provided the first large influx of students. Andrew Greeley points out in his memoir, "The Crooked Lines of God," that the GI Bill brought Irish and Italian young people to college in as high, or higher, numbers as any ethnic group. A generation later, their college-age sons and daughters followed in their footsteps. These demographics profoundly altered campus life.

By the end of the 1960s, the land-grant university had grown in size and prominence. Enrollment figures had more than tripled. Several academic departments at Amherst gained national distinction, and the number of graduate programs increased sharply. A new urban commuter campus opened at Boston in the fall of 1965, when the tidal wave of high school graduates was at its crest and the need to provide quality liberal arts education at low cost at its strongest. During this era of euphoria the original academic plans of the Boston campus were formulated as six colleges of a size intended to provide some intimacy and largely established on the traditional liberal arts pattern. At the same time, a medical school was being built in Worcester and admitted its first class of sixteen students in 1970. With this enormous growth came an increased diversity of students and faculty.

In 1969, the UMass board of trustees followed the recommendations of the Marcus report and restructured the university into a system of co-equal campuses. This reorganization placed the president in overall charge of the system and made the chancel-

lors responsible for managing their own respective campuses. Up to this point, both Boston and Worcester had operated as branch campuses with the direction and control flowing from the original “flagship” campus at Amherst. The location of the president’s office was shifted in 1970 from Amherst to Boston, which is the capital city and the locus of political power in the state. A decade later, in 1983, Boston State Teachers College was merged with UMass/Boston. In July 1991, the state legislature passed a reorganization bill that added two more free-standing public universities, the University of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University, to the multicampus system.

This latest consolidation, which unified the entire public university sector in Massachusetts, enlarged the system to five campuses. The same statute also abolished the board of regents and replaced it with a higher education coordinating council.⁹ This brief chronicled history provides a broad overview of the institutional mosaic and sets the stage for exploring the period under consideration.

A Corporate Old-Boy Search

In 1969–1970, the university conducted a search for a successor to John Lederle, who had been president for ten years and was soon to retire. As it turned out, this search was characterized by two separate and simultaneous activities. Because the board of trustees assumed that the selection was exclusively their prerogative, they began the search process in a manner marked by informality and discretion: two hallmarks of corporate executive recruitment that academe adopted as its own. At the same time, the faculty at Amherst began a search process that was more open and democratic.

The trustees hoped to recruit an academic star who would bring the university greater academic respectability, perhaps someone with national stature and visibility. While scouting around for such prospects, they focused their attention primarily on Robert C. Wood, an MIT professor of political science with a national reputation. Wood was a very bright, hard-driven, and ambitious person. He had recently worked in Washington as under secretary and then as secretary of HUD in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. A vigorously public man, Wood first learned the ways of the political world while working as an assistant auditor in the Florida state government. Later he worked as a management organization expert in the federal bureau of the budget in the Harry Truman administration and as a housing expert in the John F. Kennedy administration. So he had a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of politics.¹⁰

The son of a traveling shoe salesman, Robert Wood was born in Saint Louis, Missouri, and grew up in Jacksonville, Florida, where he attended public schools. He then went to Princeton, which introduced him to the cultural elitism of the Ivy League — something new for this southern young man who was more used to life as a street fighter. After World War II, in which he served as an army sergeant, he went to Harvard, where he earned a master’s degree in public administration and a doctorate in political economy.

Returning to Cambridge in 1969 from his Washington sojourn, he reentered academe by resuming his duties as chairman of the Political Science Department at MIT and director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. Governor Francis Sargent soon appointed him chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. In spite of these diverse assignments, Wood found the readjustment to be trying.

Prior to Wood's return to the Northeast, three years earlier, in late 1967, UMass trustee Robert Gordon and president John Lederle had flown to Washington to see if they could interest Wood in the chancellorship at the Boston campus. But Wood was totally absorbed in helping Lyndon Johnson design and implement his Great Society programs. Spurning their overtures, he turned them down flatly. His work in Washington was too important for him to leave.

But this rebuff did not cool the ardor of trustee Bob Gordon, who continued his energetic courtship of Wood. During the late winter of 1970, Gordon visited Wood again to see if he could interest him in taking on the presidency. As residents in the town of Lincoln, the two men had known each other since the mid-1950s. Gordon informed Wood that Lederle, who had devised the strategy of growth at the university during the 1960s, would soon announce his intention to retire. This courting, unlike the previous one, rekindled Wood's enthusiasm. He was restless at MIT and did not want to become strictly a fund-raiser.

When Wood first began to consider the UMass presidency, he explored the position very carefully. He talked with James Killian, who was chairman of the board of trustees at MIT. As a favor to Wood, Killian visited the Amherst campus for the purpose of checking it out for him. This was an intriguing way of learning about an institution without lifting the veil of confidentiality. Killian came back favorably impressed both with the caliber of its faculty and with the quality of its science and engineering programs. He told Wood that he was particularly impressed with the recognition the faculty had achieved in the field of polymer sciences. Their conversation convinced Wood that UMass could quickly become a much more nationally visible institution, thanks to the distinction it had already achieved and the willingness of the state legislature to provide the necessary funding. With the emerging campuses at Boston and Worcester, it showed greater growth potential and a special capacity to do even better.¹¹

Wood signaled Gordon that he would be interested in talking about the job. Gordon then introduced him to Joseph Healey, who was chairman of the board of trustees. Together, the three men discussed the position during lunch at the Marriott Hotel in Newton. Healey was very persuasive and so was Gordon. After lunch, Wood indicated that he wanted to talk to his wife, Peggy, and to think about it some more, but he was very attracted to the idea of taking on this new responsibility. Moreover, because he was assured that the president's office would be located in Boston, the thought of their not having to move another time was appealing to them. One of the most attractive features of the job was the opportunity to work with leaders in other fields and to shape public policy.

A few days after the meeting, Wood contacted Healey and told him that he would be interested. Healey then arranged for a meeting with the executive committee of the board at the Parker House in Boston. They talked at great length and got along well, after which the committee was ready to go to the board. That night, Healey called Wood to say that if he was willing to accept the presidency, they could talk about specific terms. And so they did. They offered him a starting salary of \$50,000. At the next meeting of the full board, on May 13, 1970, Wood was named president of the University of Massachusetts. The vote was unanimous.

Meanwhile, no one had informed Wood about the ongoing search at Amherst. Once he learned that a search committee existed, he immediately decided to go meet with the faculty. In the meantime, the story of his selection broke in the press

before Wood could have this meeting. The situation was as embarrassing as it was awkward. Wood later described the cold reception he received from the faculty:

Now all that time, no one had told me that there was a search committee going on and that the faculty was strongly represented on the search committee, and particularly the Amherst campus. There had been a sociologist who had been a faculty advisor to the committee. He was Charles Paige and his specialty was sports sociology and he was an able counsellor. Anyway, he had not been consulted and apparently the search committee continued to identify people and I had never met them. In the meantime, I said that I'd be glad to be part of the university and to take the presidency, and the executive committee so voted.

But the fact remains that I still had not met a search committee and they were quite angry. Healey phoned me to tell me about them after the news had come out, and I said that maybe I'd better meet with them. I had an engagement down at Yale in their urban studies program with Kingman Brewster, so I drove up to the campus. Oswald Tippo, who was then chancellor, put me up in a small motel near campus and I went in to see a very frosty and very cold search committee. I think Professor Stone, the great mathematician, was either on it or the chairman of it and the first question was, "What is your concept of the university?" And it was as if we were playing a record prior to any recommendation.

At any rate, that was a complication, reflective probably of Joe Healey's style of liking to work informally and getting everything settled before the formal mechanisms had finished their work. And I became his great admirer for the eight years that I worked with Healey during some turbulent times. But nonetheless, from the Amherst perspective, it started my time off on an awkward foot.¹²

Not surprisingly, the trustees had abruptly halted the faculty search. The board simply decided that Wood would make an excellent president for the university. Their preemptive action caused suspicion and mistrust. Also not surprisingly, the Amherst faculty felt betrayed and immediately protested. Years later, reflecting on how the trustees had handled the matter, Chairman Healey reportedly exclaimed, "We did it backwards. We got the right guy, but the wrong way."¹³ When Wood was appointed president in mid-May, the trustee meeting was picketed by students protesting his stance on Vietnam and by people protesting the bad service on the MBTA's Green Line. Many faculty thought that Wood had obtained the job solely because of his friendship with powerful leaders in the state. Uppermost in their minds was Joe Healey's close identification with the Kennedys, the dominant political family in Massachusetts. Wood was one of the few Cambridge intellectuals who had supported Edward Kennedy for the U.S. Senate in 1962 and continued to maintain a relationship based upon mutual high esteem.

A Transformational Leader

Anxious to get to work, Wood took office on July 1. He brought to the presidency an unusual combination of talents and a grand concept of what he intended to do. He was formally installed as president on December 9, 1970, at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in Boston. In his inaugural address, Wood asserted that he had no desire to lead "cookie-cutter campuses" and called for substantial autonomy and flexibility in developing academic goals and missions. Although Wood was animated by this vision, the issue of whether he adhered to such an approach would soon become a matter of intense debate.

Wood had the personal qualities indispensable to leadership — a driving will to succeed, the capacity to inspire loyalty, the ability to communicate, and a genuine interest in people. He assembled an unusual staff, which caused some concern. Outside people who lacked previous academic experience, like Nan Robinson, Peter Edelman, and Edward Lashman, were brought in. This recruitment pattern stood in sharp contrast to that of Ernest Lynton, the vice president for academic affairs, who had had an adventurous experience as dean at Livingston College of Rutgers. The staff was fiercely competitive, yet they got along well and were of central significance to Wood's success.¹⁴

Wood quickly moved to center stage and emerged as one of the most influential national players in public higher education. A tireless president with a first-rate mind, one who set his goals and pursued them relentlessly, he pressed his faculty hard and worked his staff to exhaustion. Moreover, his political instincts were extraordinary. He possessed a shrewd sense of political maneuvering, inherited, no doubt, from his experiences in Washington, where he had built a reputation for political acumen. On top of all his other duties, he managed to teach an undergraduate seminar in urban politics. Few university presidents keep in touch with students through teaching the way he did.

Initially, Wood enjoyed much success. He made a series of moves — some highly publicized — on the future directions in which he thought the university should be headed. In 1971, he appointed a special blue ribbon committee to examine the university's role in modern society and lay the groundwork for executive action.¹⁵ Laudable in its intent, the committee's subsequent report was controversial and was greeted by faculty with healthy skepticism. Nevertheless, Wood used it to great advantage. Armed with the committee's recommendations, he helped pave the way for the university's transformation into a major academic institution. In all, he was seen as a master builder who played by his own set of rules.

But the rules of the game were soon to change as the college-age population began to change. Preoccupied during the 1970s with the tasks of restoring campus peace, sorting out student demands, and reuniting fiercely divided faculties, Wood was quick to recognize that the demographic prospects were unpromising. Demographic changes meant smaller numbers in the college-age population. Enrollment projections based on the 1970 census data contributed to decisions to scale down the size of the campuses. In place of a projected 40,000 enrollment at Amherst, the trustees fixed a ceiling of 25,000. They likewise modified the planned size of the Boston campus from 15,000 to 12,500.

Undaunted by this, Wood pushed for curriculum reform and launched a broad range of innovative academic initiatives designed to improve the undergraduate learning experience. Student internships flourished, as did field-based education projects such as the University Year for Action Program and the University Without Walls. One such innovation was the creation of a College of Public and Community Service in Boston. Although these educational programs broke new ground, they also upset traditional faculty, who were concerned about maintaining academic standards and the limits of the university's service capacity. Occasionally, in his haste to get his "ducks in line," Wood grew impatient with delay and ran roughshod over the formalities of university governance. On some issues he met firm resistance from faculty leaders, but he usually got his way in the end. Yet the price exacted proved costly.

Despite quarrels with his chancellors, Wood profited from the expanding mode of the university and used it as a convenient excuse for centralizing power in the president's office. To offset the growing criticism of his heavy-handed style of management, he justified this centralization by saying, "I believe that academic missions properly begin at the initiative of the campuses, subject to availability of resources and to considerations of redundancy. I appreciate that no academic community places high priority on administrative activities, but I am persuaded that effective administration can do much to improve academic performance and enrich the lives of students and faculty alike."¹⁶

Beset with conflicting demands, Wood pulled off a major coup for the university by bringing the Boston and Worcester campuses on line well ahead of schedule. Concern for the university's neighbors in both cities led to decisions that softened campus impact on the surrounding neighborhoods and made it responsive to local community needs. While working at HUD during the mid-1960s, Wood had experienced firsthand the consequences of what had happened in New Jersey when the trustees of its state medical college failed to reach out to the black community in Newark. He was determined not to make the same mistake in Massachusetts. As an expert in housing and urban renewal, he engineered plans for redeveloping the Columbia Point peninsula, the site of the Boston campus, and for converting its beleaguered public housing project into a mixed-income family development. A savvy mix of city planning and good public relations helped to defuse community opposition.

As a veteran of the Great Society programs, Wood was process oriented. In 1972, he appointed a group of senior faculty to study university governance. Headed by Professor Robert Wellman, this group produced some workmanlike procedural results. They drafted a plan that outlined areas of primary responsibility for initiating action and for faculty consultation and participation in governance.¹⁷ The trustees adopted the Wellman report on April 4, 1973. The language of this trustee document with regard to conducting presidential searches is quite specific. It reads as follows:

When appointing the president, the board will seek nominations from a broadly representative search committee appointed by the board. The board will determine the charge to and composition of the search committee after seeking the recommendations of the appropriate campus governing body(s) and, when appropriate, other components of the university. The board will appoint faculty and student representatives to the search committee upon nomination by the appropriate governing body(s).¹⁸

Meanwhile, by the mid-1970s, with the Arab oil embargo and soaring inflation, surrounding conditions began to change dramatically. The state faced a serious economic downturn. University expansion suddenly turned into university retrenchment. In November 1974, Michael Dukakis, a liberal reform Democrat, defeated the Republican incumbent Frank Sargent for the governorship. During his election campaign, Dukakis announced that he intended to cut 30 percent from the public higher education budget, news that distressed Wood. On December 12, 1974, Wood spoke out on the issue and declared that adoption of the proposed budget would "strike at the heart of the university." In keeping with his style, he did not intend to let this happen and decided to fight back.

Desiring to confront Dukakis directly, Wood took him on when he insisted on imposing across-the-board budget cuts. He found Dukakis adamant and unwilling to

compromise in the least. The two adversaries began to wage a fierce budget battle. Wood saw the episode as a substantial effort to subvert the fiscal autonomy and independence of the university and to bring it under the direct control of the executive branch of state government. Adept at political bargaining and compromising, he reluctantly yielded to administration pressure and reduced the original budget request of \$118 million to a bare-bones request of \$103 million. The Dukakis administration recommended \$90 million, a budget which, if enacted, would have required major layoffs and program curtailments. Maneuvering behind the scenes and contacting other Democratic party leaders, Wood managed to get most of these cuts restored by the legislature, which passed an appropriation of \$101 million.

This did not end the matter. The outcome of the budget battle placed the governor's office on the defensive against what it perceived as an expansionist university. Wood saw the executive incursion as political interference and questioned the governor's commitment to public higher education. This conflict put them on a collision course. At the time, the salient question was, Who has the power? Dukakis could ill afford to be upstaged by a university president. To recoup his position, he needed to teach Wood a lesson and assert executive control. It was a rivalry of gigantic dimensions that was played out in the public realm.

Another sore spot was the luxurious suite of offices that Wood maintained at One Washington Mall (at an annual rental of \$146,000), something that irritated the parsimonious Dukakis, who rode the subway to work. Students complained vociferously that while their educational programs were being cut, Wood continued to sit in the lap of luxury. This issue escalated when the Boston campus moved into its new facilities at Columbia Point, thereby leaving the vacated building at Boston's Park Square with plenty of space available for the president's office. Nevertheless, Wood stubbornly refused to give up his Washington Mall offices on the grounds of fiscal autonomy and a valid lease. Such goading made Dukakis furious. Dynamic personalities polarized this controversy even more than the situation warranted. It is worth remembering that disputes over offices and presidential mansions have been a characteristic source of unseating or unsettling presidents.

Despite these troubles, Wood scored a second major coup by persuading the Kennedy Corporation to build the John F. Kennedy presidential library at Columbia Point instead of at Harvard, where it was originally scheduled to be erected. For several years the project had been thwarted by resisting local groups in Cambridge, which complained about the traffic congestion that it would cause. While Harvard dallied, Wood acted. He not only brought Jacqueline Onassis to view the oceanfront location at sunset, but also paid a well-publicized call upon Robert McNamara at the World Bank in New York City and convinced him that the site would make a fitting memorial for the slain president. Wood saw the favorable decision as a catalyst for the development of programs related to public policy at the Boston campus as well as offering the prospect for new development to the entire peninsula.

Emboldened by success, Wood enjoyed exercising power and knew how to use it. He allied himself with local politicians and was not unwilling to utilize patronage to achieve his ends. Bitter toward a governor who did not assign a higher priority to the land-grant university, he went over his head and appealed for public support. In the eyes of Dukakis, however, Wood seemed overly ambitious and desirous of too much power. Their already impaired relations were not improved by Wood's support for a plan to reorganize higher education, which was sponsored by Senate president Kevin

Harrington. These two disgruntled leaders represented the foremost political dangers to Dukakis. Of the two, Harrington posed the greater threat because he seemed likely to become the Democratic nominee for governor in 1978. Liberal Democrats, like state representative Barney Frank, were outraged by the behavior of their party leader. They did not intend to let Dukakis forget that he owed his election mostly to them. In a stinging rebuke, Frank chastised the governor by calling him “the perfect political ingrate.” While Dukakis was perceived by the electorate as a liberal, it is not entirely clear that he played a liberal role in all this.

In March 1976, in keeping with his process mode, Wood organized a forum of the higher education establishment in an effort to achieve consensus on reorganization. He lobbied hard for Harrington’s plan, which was opposed by John Silber, the president of Boston University, who hoped to obtain public funds for private schools. At this point, Dukakis suspected that Wood wanted to become the czar of public higher education. The governor tried in vain to promote his own reorganization bill. After much public wrangling, including accusations against Wood for overreaching, the fight ended in a stalemate with both plans being shelved. The governor seemed strangely indifferent. Instead of straightening things out, however, this indifference in some respects made them worse.

If Wood had trouble dealing with Dukakis, the same cannot be said of his relations with other leaders. He had the ability to work with partisans of a different persuasion for the common cause. Not surprisingly, Wood struck a deal with John Silber and worked with private Catholic institutions like Boston College and Holy Cross.¹⁹ In return for Silber’s support of Harrington’s reorganization plan, Wood agreed to hold the development of graduate programs at the Boston campus. This action infuriated many faculty members who had been recruited with the expectations of teaching at the graduate level. They accused Wood of having “gone to bed” with Silber.

Meanwhile, trouble loomed at the Amherst campus. In what was described as a “love-hate relationship” between Wood and the faculty, the president encountered stiff resistance.²⁰ Some of his difficulties stemmed from his having gotten off on the wrong foot at the time of his search. He also locked horns with Chancellor Oswald Tippo in a running battle over the university budget. A former provost, Tippo, who was cut from the “old aggie” mold, was a beloved figure on campus. He engaged in a heated dispute with Wood over the use of trust funds at the school of agriculture. Given the university’s strong tradition in this area, Wood hit an exposed institutional nerve. This invoked a storm of protest and Tippo resigned in a huff. His resignation triggered a rebellion against Wood, who became increasingly unpopular at the flagship campus. This confrontation was as much an institutional struggle as it was a clash of strong personalities. It was a classic case of the fear of change and what would happen when funds were diverted.²¹

More fundamentally, the Amherst faculty objected to the president’s centralization of power and his micromanagement of the university. At one point they sent Wood a memo urging him to allow them more leeway in managing their own affairs and permit greater campus autonomy and decentralization.²² Beyond that, they suspected that Wood suffered from Washington fever or what amounted to an infectious yearning to move back on the national scene. From their perspective, he seemed more interested in pushing his own political agenda than in promoting the academic missions of the university. They viewed his behavior as a threat to the stability of the institution.

That Wood aroused heated opposition at Amherst is not surprising when one considers the strong leadership he exercised. A vote of “no confidence” by its fac-

ulty required Wood to swallow an extra large slice of humble pie. This action undermined his presidency and hastened his demise. Yet Wood had always claimed that he would stay in the job a minimum of five years and no longer than ten. After the no-confidence vote his position became shakier than ever.

Almost simultaneously, Dukakis was close to gaining control of the board of trustees. In the end, it was clear that the governor had the ultimate power. It seemed only a matter of time before Wood would be removed. His ego bruised, he hoped to regain glory by entering the political arena and running against Dukakis for governor. But this spoiling strategy did not work out for him. The attempt to promote a Wood boom fizzled. Calculating that he could not stop Dukakis without raising substantial campaign money, he decided to bow out gracefully.²³

In retrospect, Robert Wood was a venturesome and risk-taking president. In a bold break with tradition, he blazed a new trail and made something different out of the president's office — he turned it into a tool for vigorous leadership. Viewed in this context, he was a transformational leader during a very turbulent era. As such, he was regarded as one of the university's strongest presidents, a man who greatly enhanced its reputation and quality.

Picking an Insider

When Wood submitted his letter of resignation on June 17, 1977, the board of trustees resorted to a different style of searching for a successor and a different mode of leadership. They agreed to recommend that an interim president be recruited and take it on themselves to identify someone who would serve in this capacity.²⁴ In fact, they already had someone in mind — Franklin Patterson, a political scientist who had served as secretary of the university since 1973. Because of his work with the board, Patterson had gotten to know the trustees intimately. Obviously, he had won their trust and confidence and was an alternative leader for them to put in place.

Before coming to UMass, Patterson had taught at NYU and Tufts. He directed the Lincoln Filene Center at Tufts, was the founding president of Hampshire College (1966–1971), and board chairman there from 1971 to 1974. Drawing upon this experience, he knew how to run things during the interregnum.

In sounding out Patterson, board chairman Healey asked him if he could accept the interim presidency with the stipulation that he would be unable to become a candidate for the permanent position. Patterson had no problem in accepting this condition.²⁵ The rationale for exacting this limitation was to prevent an inside candidate from gaining an unfair advantage over outside candidates. It was an important episode because it set a precedent.²⁶ Patterson was named to the interim post without any faculty consultation or participation. He declared that he would not be a candidate for the permanent position. The trustees made the announcement quietly and as a fait accompli.

If anyone could pacify the Dukakis trustees, Patterson was the man. A caretaker executive, he kept things running smoothly and did not go off in any wild directions. Patterson made similar efforts to pacify other critics and to smooth ruffled feathers. During his brief nine months in office, he maintained a steady course. Indeed, the university did not lose any momentum while the trustees were searching for a permanent replacement.

A Textbook National Search

With Patterson securely at the helm, Chairman Healey saw no need to rush to appoint a new president. Again the trustees adopted a different approach. The search officially began with the establishment of an ad hoc committee headed by trustee Ruth Morgenthau. This small group of trustees, which met on June 25, 1977, was asked to draw up the charge and composition of the search committee, plus a timetable for completing the search. They completed their assignment that same day.

Based on the advice of the Morgenthau committee, the board established a search committee consisting of six trustees, three faculty members (one from each campus), and two students (one from Amherst and one from Boston). In addition, there were faculty advisory committees at each campus and student advisory committees at Amherst and Boston.²⁷ Indeed, the trustees not only faithfully adhered to the spirit of the Wellman report, but they also scrupulously followed the search procedures outlined in their governance document.

The 1978 presidential search began with high hopes of recruiting the “outstanding candidates in the nation.” By this time, the nature of the constituencies had changed dramatically. Stephen Breyer, a trustee and a faculty member at the Harvard Law School, chaired the search committee. Instead of hiring an executive recruiting firm, the trustees named Dorothy Marshall to serve as its senior consultant. She had extensive experience in academia as a professor at Bryn Mawr, as provost at UMass Boston, and in recent years as a trustee of Bryn Mawr, Holy Cross, and Smith, where she chaired the board. Obviously, Marshall did not need a “headhunter” to tell her and the search committee where to look for possible candidates.

For his part, Breyer was a skilled chair in the activist mode. He threw himself into the search with the requisite energy. Under his leadership, the search committee did its own analysis of the major problems facing the university. They held hearings on each campus, meeting with administrators, faculty members, and students. Based on what they heard, they identified six problems: (1) level funding and the need to maintain stable financial support; (2) the need for a planning process concerned with educational objectives and emerging from the university community, not simply reflecting administration dictates; (3) the need for a president qualified to deal with collective bargaining; (4) the issue of reorganization of public higher education; (5) the relationship between the public and private sectors in a period of declining enrollments and financing; and (6) the role of the medical school in providing health care in the commonwealth.²⁸

After discussing these issues with the full board, the search committee developed a set of qualifications for the new president. These included the ability to administer a \$200-million-dollar budget, to manage the educational responsibilities of the university, to obtain governmental funding, and to relate to the private sector of higher education.

Meanwhile, the search committee was seeking to identify prospective candidates. It sent letters to many educational institutions and placed advertising in leading journals, including those aimed at women and minorities in higher education. It also tracked prospects through a variety of networks, then actively sought them through telephone calls and visits. These included both traditional and nontraditional networks. Such efforts involved meeting with officials of the Ford Foundation, the State University of New York, the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, the Legal

Defense Fund, and others. Moreover, committee members interviewed people from the business, scientific, government, legal, and health communities. They made telephone calls to individuals who might provide additional information.

Their networking activity produced about 300 nominees, from whom they received 197 actual applicants. Some of the names that turned up were those of perennial applicants. The search committee sifted through these files and reduced the field to 30. Since most of the 197 were not senior administrators, they were disposed of easily. Visits were paid to individuals who could serve both as resources concerning academic leadership and likely prospects for the presidency. Breyer and a few other committee members flew to the West Coast and interviewed David Saxon, the president of the University of California, and Albert Bowker, the chancellor at Berkeley. Neither of them, however, showed any interest. They also contacted Vartan Gregorian, then provost at the University of Pennsylvania, but he decided not to pursue the matter. According to Richard Lyons, the Boston faculty member on the search committee, these efforts were not very productive. He commented, "The smart ones detected some structural difficulties inherent in the office and politely declined."²⁹ Such difficulties had to do mainly with the relationships of the presidency to the trustees and to the Massachusetts board of higher education.

Despite these extensive efforts, many faculty members were sorely disappointed in the list of candidate names because it was shy of college or university presidents. At any rate, the search committee produced a short list of five candidates whom they considered serious contenders. These included Randolph Bromery, a black and chancellor at Amherst; Charles Foster, dean of the Forestry School at Yale; Marilyn Gittell, associate provost at Brooklyn College; David Knapp, provost at Cornell; and James Vorenberg, associate dean at Harvard Law School. With one minority and one female candidate, this list barely met the affirmative action criteria. In late April, these finalists made campus visits and were interviewed by various constituencies.

Earlier, Lewis Mainzer, the Amherst faculty member on the search committee, had contacted David Knapp to see if he might be interested. They had done their graduate work in political science together at the University of Chicago in the early 1950s. Knapp initially said no, but later changed his mind, so he entered the search late. As a late prospect, he had to have special qualities. He made a good impression on students and alumni because they felt that they could trust him. Students sensed that Knapp had an appropriate concern for the rising costs of education. He also had strong supporters among the Amherst faculty members on the advisory committee who felt that he was a traditional academic who would give academic concerns top priority. In addition, they saw the Cornell provost as an academic insider, an experienced administrator with a long record of accomplishment.³⁰ The result was to place David Knapp among the finalists.

On May 13, the search committee met for seven hours to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the finalists. While there was support for each of them, the consensus of the committee was to recommend to the board the top three, namely, Marilyn Gittell, David Knapp, and James Vorenberg. Some wished to offer all five names to the board for consideration.

Two days later, on May 15, 1978, the full board met at Boston's Copley Plaza Hotel to make a final selection. They decided to consider the entire slate of finalists. After Chairman Breyer gave a summary of the search, the trustees proceeded to a public

discussion of the professional competence of the candidates, in which the latter were openly criticized. Bromery was viewed as an insider who had dealt with many of the issues facing the university, but some trustees believed that he had brought some problems on himself and had not handled others very successfully. It was a time for healing and Bromery was not perceived as a unifying figure. There was little support for him at Amherst. Charles Foster, who previously served as a state cabinet member in environmental affairs, had sound experience as a public administrator, but he showed a basic lack of curiosity and enthusiasm for the job. Both Foster and Bromery were eliminated from further consideration.

Gittell, Knapp, and Vorenberg emerged as the front-runners. All three were praised by their supporters. Marilyn Gittell, who came across as a sharp, lively, and intelligent woman, conveyed the impression of very much wanting the president's job. In the early 1970s, she had been involved in the Ocean Hill–Brownsville controversy, which erupted in New York City over the decentralization of its public schools. This dispute had caused considerable tension between the black community and white Jewish teachers. For her participation in this controversy, Gittell had encountered intense opposition from the local teachers' union. A mover and shaker, she was a community activist who strongly believed that scholarship should be used as a tool in social activism. With Mario Fantini, she was coauthor of a left-liberal critique of urban public education.³¹ Her experience at Brooklyn College made her receptive to the idea of open admissions. To some members of the committee, Gittell appeared brash and aggressive. In fact, she polarized the search committee, which split along the lines of the old guard versus the Dukakis loyalists. The latter saw her essentially as a female version of Bob Wood.

A promising candidate and faculty colleague of Breyer's at Harvard Law School, James Vorenberg had organized the Watergate special prosecution force under Archibald Cox. He impressed everyone with his intellect and ability, but some felt that he was disappointing in the interview. Vorenberg did not have a good sense of the university, nor did he seem anxious to tackle the job.

Given his strong base of faculty support, Knapp became a late favorite because he had covered so much administrative terrain in his years at Cornell as provost and as dean of the College of Human Ecology. Before then, he had spent ten years at the University of New Hampshire as a professor of government, assistant to the president, and dean of the College of Liberal Arts. While having dinner with the search committee at the 57 Restaurant in Boston, he had had a good discussion with them and later with the full board. The following day, trustee Paul Marks had taken Knapp to meet with Governor Dukakis, who inquired whether "this one" was their choice.

The main dynamic operating here was to avoid a repetition of Bob Wood. The political backlash was strong, especially among the Dukakis trustees. Such a reaction to a predecessor president is not unusual. As McLaughlin and Riesman remind us, "If this president was beloved, his or her clone is desired. If the president was unpopular, his or her opposite is sought: a calm, conservative individual if the former president was regarded as pressing the faculty too hard or being too flamboyant or eccentric, or an 'exciting' figure if the past president seemed dull or staid."³²

After the trustees finished discussing the character and reputation of the candidates in executive session, they returned to open meeting. Chairman Healey then stated that, unless there was objection, the vote for president would be taken by secret ballot, a move that would come back to haunt them. There was no objection. This was the

procedure traditionally used by the board for matters of great moment. Furthermore, the legality of this procedure had been upheld by Attorney General Edward Brooke in 1965 in a formal opinion concerning the board's voting by secret ballot in selecting Worcester as the site for the medical school.

Of the trustees in attendance, twenty were eligible to vote. On the first ballot, the count was Bromery 2, Gittell 7, Knapp 10, Vorenberg 1. On the second ballot, Gittell received 8 votes and Knapp 12. Stephen Breyer then moved to elect Knapp by acclamation, and his motion passed unanimously.³³

After the trustees had made their selection, Breyer telephoned Knapp and offered him the job. He wanted an immediate yes or no answer. There was a sense of urgency in Breyer's voice, which no doubt reflected the political division on the board.³⁴ His appointment was the last fling of the old guard. In the negotiations that followed, Knapp was offered a salary of \$58,000, plus a housing allowance — about the same compensation he had received as provost at Cornell.

The secret ballot was a mistake on the trustees' part because of statutory changes since the attorney general's 1965 opinion. Their vote was promptly challenged by the Associated Press, which filed a complaint that the trustees had violated the state's open-meeting law. The issue, however, was settled out of court. As part of the settlement, the trustees agreed to a roll call vote in open meeting, whereupon Knapp picked up an extra vote that was in dispute.

A Professional Academic Administrator

An academic traditionalist, David Knapp considered himself to be a pragmatic idealist. He was no Robert Wood. The two men were a study in contrasts. In many respects Knapp was the antithesis of all that Wood represented. He was essentially a quiet, scholarly man who listened well. He was less flamboyant and aggressive. Knapp was always gentle and soft-spoken in his dealings with people. While he was less of a communicator and much less personal, he understood the inner workings of the university better than Wood did. If the two men shared anything in common, it was that they were both political scientists and both cared deeply about their children.³⁵ Although Knapp was utterly different in personality and outlook from Wood, he was nevertheless similar in the sense that he, too, became a very effective leader. Paradoxically, Wood's legacy both helped and hurt him.

At the time of his inaugural, which was held at historic Faneuil Hall in Boston on October 29, 1978, Knapp frankly confessed that if he survived the presidency for ten years, he would consider himself a success. He was first and foremost a professional academic administrator. As a person who had come up through the ranks in academia, he was the quintessential insider, seeing himself as an integral part of the institution. While he had less natural ability than Wood in dealing with conflict over turf issues, he knew instinctively how the academy works. He was a most unusual man, efficient at his work, a quality one might expect from a highly capable administrator. He knew how to make choices and put together a cohesive multicampus system. This is where he made his mark and must be judged accordingly.

Faced during his first days in office with the same problem that had wrecked the Wood administration, Knapp was determined that it not ruin his. He soon became convinced that the dispersal of power was necessary, useful, and desirable. Quickly grasping the situation, he responded by decentralizing university governance. Steering

clear of any conflict and capitalizing on the desire for stability, he set about making the university, in his own words, “an academic institution, where academic values had top priority.”³⁶ As fate would have it, he assumed office in the throes of state electoral change.

In September 1978, Michael Dukakis was defeated for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in a startling political upset by the upstart Edward King in a bitter party primary. King then went on to win the governorship against the Republican candidate, Frank Hatch. The circumstances at the corner office of the State House had changed dramatically. The mood of the times was also partly responsible. No longer was the university being disrupted by antiwar protests and campus disorders.

Most large public organizations experience cycles of administrative centralization and decentralization that succeed each other regularly and produce their own counter-effects. It is true of all massive bureaucracies, including the university. Knapp experienced this phenomenon in many different ways. Before long, he had recruited a new team of chancellors and given them plenty of room to maneuver. These included Henry Koffler at Amherst, Robert Corrigan at Boston, and Robert Tranquada at Worcester.³⁷ True to form, Knapp showed a great deal of respect for both faculty and institutional autonomy. Indeed, he was much more of a team player than Bob Wood. He delegated responsibility and much discretion — some thought too much — to certain of his subordinates. As might be expected under these circumstances, the campus chancellors asserted strong leadership in managing their own campuses. They did not always cooperate with one another or with the president.

Despite his efforts to decentralize, Knapp was soon forced to assume a defensive posture. In 1980, state senator Chester Atkins, who chaired the Senate Ways and Means Committee, cut the funding for the president’s office by 50 percent. This hostile legislative action prompted the resignation of senior vice president Ernest Lynton in protest. He believed that the debilitating budget reduction would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the president’s office to function properly and viewed these formidable constraints as punitive and unwarranted.³⁸

This disturbing development was an accurate omen of things to come. When Atkins put the final touches to the appropriations bill for 1981, he attached “an outside section,” which created the powerful state board of regents. This peculiar legislation also abolished the board of higher education along with the governing boards for the state colleges and the community colleges. This sweeping change not only superimposed a new layer of bureaucracy, but also submerged the authority of the UMass trustees in a complex maze of bureaucratic power. Such centralization came in stages. Working with a board of regents commonly regarded as authoritative, Knapp and the trustees found themselves acting as a rubber stamp for many of its policies. Frustrated in their attempts to maintain their own autonomy, they chafed under these institutional arrangements. Virtually every key decision they made was second-guessed by one state agency or another. Faced with this kind of bureaucratic nightmare, it was little wonder that the trustees felt “impotent.”³⁹

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1982, Michael Dukakis had regained the governorship. Prior to that, he had beaten his nemesis Ed King in a much publicized “rematch” that pitted the two of them against each other in another bitter Democratic primary. With the resurgence of the economy and the birth of the so-called Massachusetts miracle, tax revenues gradually replenished the state treasury. The whole dynamic had changed.

No longer was the question Who has the power? but rather Who has the money? Unlike Wood, Knapp did not present a personal threat to Dukakis and was no match for the governor in the game of politics. Nor did he pretend to be. He chose the safer course of conciliation and nonconfrontation, another important difference between Knapp and Wood as university leaders.

With the board of regents in control of the entire public higher education system, many politicians concluded that the president's office was no longer needed. This is about the only reasonable explanation for the sporadic sorties that were made to disband the office. Chester Atkins, who was also chairman of the state Democratic Party, led the assault. Even state senator John Olver, who had once taught chemistry at UMass/Amherst, wanted to abolish the president's office. The motive force of this drive was the concentration of power in the board of regents. These crosscutting pressures made Knapp's life miserable, but he endured them for several more years. As a pragmatic realist, he reluctantly accepted what had to be accepted.

Despite all this, Knapp steered a steady course. His accomplishments were many. Foremost among these would be the creation of the Center for Polymer Science Research at Amherst and the Biotechnology Research Park at Worcester. Under his leadership the university became an internationally recognized research institution and an integral component of the state's economic development efforts. Through his tenure at Cornell and the University of New Hampshire, Knapp fully understood the land-grant mission and fostered a wide range of public service activities.⁴⁰ He spearheaded pioneering efforts in industry-university partnerships and the development of corporate relations and patent policies. He oversaw the initial steps in building private support for the university and the development of modern computerized management information systems and a state-of-the-art telecommunications system. Concerned about education at all levels, Knapp emphasized the need for collaboration with the Boston public schools and helped produce a breakthrough on graduate education at the Boston campus. He also actively supported faculty and student foreign exchange programs.⁴¹

These halcyon days in the mid-1980s seemed to mark a pinnacle of UMass success. Its academic reputation continued to improve, as evidenced by the quality of its undergraduate applications, the academic achievements of its student body, and its ability to attract faculty of the highest caliber. By 1986, the Boston campus was listed in *Time* magazine as one of the nine "hot colleges" in the country. Similarly, the Amherst campus had improved its image from a three-star to a four-star university in the 1988 edition of Edward Fiske's "A Guide to Colleges." This ranking was based on the quality of its academic, social, and campus life. It had surpassed both Penn State and the University of Maryland. The most dramatic change at the university came in the area of increased salaries for faculty and administrators. Over 200 faculty members earned in excess of \$60,000. In August 1987, the trustees approved a \$20,000 pay raise for Knapp, which brought his annual salary to \$119,000.⁴²

Despite its increasing national recognition and growing attraction to students, Knapp knew that the institution still had a long way to go if it was to become a world-class university. In 1988, he persuaded the trustees to appoint the special blue ribbon Saxon Commission, which outlined a plan for achieving this goal. As they took stock of the situation, they realized that it would require a bold strategy to overcome the bureaucratic stranglehold of the regents. In order to make the state university truly

independent and internationally competitive, they recommended the merger of the three existing public universities along with a formula for stable funding and greater trustee autonomy.⁴³ They spent a year working on the assignment.

No sooner had the Saxon Report rolled off the presses in March of 1989 when Franklyn Jenifer, the regents chancellor, came out with a plan of his own. This pre-emptive strike was a blatant attempt to circumvent the work of the Saxon Commission. Knapp was appalled. In a rare display of public anger, he spoke out on the issue saying, "The regents' proposal in no way changes the current system of centralized governing authority and weak boards of trustees. Indeed, it would carry centralization further. The proposal's principal object is to break up the University of Massachusetts system. It would isolate the Boston campus under a weak board of trustees, and make the Medical Center a branch of the Amherst campus."⁴⁴ Chancellor Jenifer's counterplan, which was put together in three weeks, went nowhere. For that matter, it would take another two years before the Saxon Report was finally implemented.

To add to Knapp's woes, the much heralded "Massachusetts miracle" collapsed. The causes of the fiscal crisis were complex. Following nearly seven years of dramatic growth, the regional economy took a nosedive between 1989 and 1991. At the same time, the federal government was withdrawing from many areas of domestic policy, except for Medicaid, leaving it to state and local governments to pick up the vacated program and funding responsibilities. The state budget became unmanageable. Given a Dukakis administration, which had no respect for the land-grant university, and difficult internal adjustments to meet a future of diminishing resources, Knapp faced some agonizing problems. Among the worst was the lack of revenue; there simply was not enough money to do things that seemed absolutely necessary, such as providing for heating fuel and building maintenance. Although Knapp clamored for more funds, he rarely complained, rarely quarreled with associates, but went ahead and did the job with the resources at hand. Such a low-key posture, however, made him an easy target for criticism. His sharpest critics were fellow state educational officials.

Some regents, including Edward Lashman and Paul Tsongas — along with state higher education chancellor Franklyn Jenifer — tried to abolish the president's office. Jenifer, a black, allied himself with local politicians to maximize his power and gain more funding for public higher education, but he did not stay around very long. He left in 1989 to accept the presidency of Howard University. These officials developed a jaundiced view of Knapp, and they were harsh in their judgment of him. Essentially, they saw him as a colorless and competent bureaucrat. The most searing attack was launched by Paul Tsongas, who proclaimed that Knapp appeared to do nothing but "hang on" and "hole himself up in the office."⁴⁵ This accusation contained little if any truth; indeed, it was most unfair. But the steady barrage of criticism about his low profile and the fact that he became more isolated politically played a part in the growing disenchantment with Knapp. Some trustees wanted a leader with more vigor and boldness.

In his last years as president, Knapp seemed to lose interest in his pressure-filled tasks. Many faculty wondered if the trustees might be thinking ahead to his resignation. If Knapp was a man of practicality who did not undertake risky ventures, he was also a man of ideals and integrity. Above all, he was a survivor. He lasted for twelve years — two more than he originally had anticipated. By his own definition,

he was a success. It was much to his credit that he did not blame subordinates for his shortcomings and that he ushered in major structural changes before announcing his resignation.

Tapping the Heir Apparent

Apart from its timing, Knapp's departure came as no surprise. Under increasing fire to step down, Knapp wanted to be able to pick his own time to avoid the appearance that he was being forced out. In the fall of 1989, Governor Dukakis was still thinking about abolishing the office of president, but the trustees at UMass persuaded him otherwise. Delicate negotiations along these lines were worked out with the governor's office. While this was going on, Knapp was visiting the University of Hokkaido in Japan, where former UMass president William Smith Clark had helped to establish an agricultural college in 1876.

The trustees had in mind the person they wanted to succeed Knapp. He was Joseph Duffey, the Amherst chancellor, whom they considered the heir apparent. To close observers, it was evident for some time that Duffey was being groomed for the job. A confident and charming individual, he had served as chancellor at Amherst since 1982. For these eight years, he had been an effective campus leader as well as a national spokesman for public higher education. His gracious manner and personal charm put everyone at ease. But more important were his close political ties with Governor Dukakis. They were best friends. Duffey had skillfully used his relationship with the governor to help the university during the early stages of the fiscal crisis. While Duffey waited in the wings, his reputation soared while Knapp's plummed. However, Duffey was seen by some faculty as being smooth but indecisive.

Born in 1932, Duffey, the son of a West Virginia coal miner, was ordained as a Southern Baptist minister at the age of eighteen. He graduated from Marshall University and received a doctoral degree from the Hartford Seminary in 1969. While still in divinity school, Duffey entered politics in Connecticut and campaigned for Eugene McCarthy during the 1968 presidential campaign. In 1970 he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate, losing to Republican Lowell Weicker. Six years later he worked in Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign, which led to a job in the state department. He then served as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

The trustees sensed that other schools might lure Duffey away before Knapp officially stepped down, a prospect that worried them. In 1989, word of Duffey's candidacy at Northeastern University had appeared in the local press, which put the trustees on notice. He was then considered for the presidency of the University of Delaware. Reading these newspaper stories, some trustees questioned Duffey's loyalty, especially since the fiscal situation turned sour at the university. Others contemplated taking unilateral action and putting him in office without any faculty participation or consultation.

Rumors about Duffey leaving to accept a job elsewhere continued to circulate and heightened the trustees' anxiety. The trustees assiduously courted Duffey and informally asked him to become president. It was common knowledge that he wanted to be near his wife, Anne Wexler, an influential Democrat who worked as a lobbyist in Washington. The couple had what is known as a commuter marriage. The trustees now made it convenient for him to travel there on long weekends. To make things even more attractive, they agreed to boost the president's salary to \$130,000.

No word was said of any search during the fall of 1989, which aroused suspicion in some faculty members. Those at Amherst surmised that board chairman Gordon Oakes was not anxious to conduct a full-scale search. Others speculated that Oakes and the rest of the trustees were ready to cut a deal. Although the Amherst faculty for the most part was favorably disposed toward Duffey, they were distressed that a national search was not being undertaken and because they were not being consulted. As in the cases of Bob Wood and Franklin Patterson, they feared that the trustees would make a preemptive strike and announce their selection as a fait accompli.

As things turned out their fears were well founded. By the time the trustees met on February 22, 1990, they had definitely made up their minds. Joe Duffey was their choice to succeed Knapp. At this meeting, Knapp, in a gracious gesture, stepped aside for the sake of the university and announced his plans to retire effective on March 16, a date he deliberately chose for symbolic reasons. March 17, Evacuation Day in Suffolk County, celebrates the anniversary of the British troops evacuating Boston. On this satirical note, the trustees accepted Knapp's resignation and announced that they were consolidating the positions of university president and chancellor at Amherst.

Some faculty, however, were not pleased with the idea of Duffey. A few of them from the Boston campus attended the trustee meeting to protest his appointment. They pleaded their case, but to no avail. It was already a done deal. Still, they argued that such a move would favor the Amherst campus and penalize Worcester and Boston. As an alternative, they asked the trustees to create a rotating presidency among the three campus chancellors. Moreover, they urged that their chancellor, Sherry Penney, be given proper consideration. In response to their pleas, Chairman Oakes flatly rejected the idea of a rotating presidency. While expressing understanding for their concerns, he replied, "A university cannot be run by committee. It needs a strong leader and a strong spokesman. Chancellor Duffey is the candidate we want to see in the presidency."⁴⁶ The trustees then voted unanimously to approve Duffey as the new president, resulting in the decision to continue with the leadership he had already demonstrated.

With the consolidation of the two positions, Duffey in effect wore two hats, serving both as president of the university and chancellor of the Amherst campus. This was a throwback to the situation that had existed prior to 1969. Quickly taking on the board of regents, Duffey, who had earlier remained silent on the issue, began to speak out. He strongly criticized the regents for its excessive centralization and blamed the agency for the stifling regulation of public higher education. After laying off many of Knapp's staff, Duffey operated mainly out of Amherst and was hardly ever seen at 250 Stuart Street in Boston. Moreover, he relied heavily on his provost, Richard O'Brien, to run things on campus.

Duffey's stay was stormy and short. With the deepening of the economic recession, the budget ax continued to fall and other emergency fiscal measures were quickly put in place. To add to his troubles, Duffey's good friend Michael Dukakis was about to leave the governorship. Having declared that he would not seek reelection, Dukakis was the lamest of political lame ducks whose power and influence had waned substantially. Without a forceful party leader at the helm, the Democrats in the state were in political disarray. Neglect of public services and evasion of costly financing of programs were the result. For all practical purposes, state government had become paralyzed.⁴⁷

In the fall of 1990, Republican William Weld, a Yankee Brahmin, was elected governor, defeating his Democratic opponent, John Silber, who was on leave as president of Boston University, in a bitter and closely contested election. Once in office, Weld called for draconian budget cuts in higher education and the possible closing of state colleges.⁴⁸ Naturally, his announced plans did not sit well with the educational establishment.

Shortly afterward, Randolph Bromery, Franklyn Jenifer's replacement as the interim chancellor of the board of regents, suddenly resigned in protest.⁴⁹ Three days later, both Bromery and regents chairman Paul Tsongas questioned Weld's commitment to public higher education.⁵⁰ At about the same time, a few other senior administrators announced that they were leaving Massachusetts to take jobs elsewhere.

Under these chaotic circumstances, the morale of the dejected faculty reached its lowest point. Suffering from four years of severe budget cuts, the faculty had become battered and discouraged. The fiscal picture continued to deteriorate as impending layoffs became inevitable. Student tuition rates and mandatory fees were raised repeatedly to offset the budget shortfalls. In the crisis atmosphere created by these setbacks during the winter of 1991, a sense of gloom and doom pervaded the university. Internal disaffection increased. With little possibility of state finances being put on a sound footing, the situation was dire.

In the best of all possible worlds, Duffey would have been motivated to improve the situation, but he did not have the resources to do so. Depressed in spirit, he decided that it was time for him to move on. On March 1, 1991, the local press broke the story that he had been chosen as president of American University in Washington.⁵¹ The UMass trustees were somewhat surprised by this news. Many of them were upset, because they felt that Duffey had used his one year in office to further his own career. Viewed in this context, they felt put down, hurt, and angry, because they realized that they had been exploited by him. While his resignation did not take effect until June 30, his quick exit was not appreciated.

Given the energetic courtship of Duffey, it is certainly understandable that the trustees might have harbored such feelings. After all, they had spent their entire political capital in bringing him aboard. In their eyes, he had jumped ship precisely when they needed him most to lead the university out of the crisis. In fairness, it should be pointed out that Duffey had devoted nine years of service to the institution. Upon calmer reflection, the trustees later acknowledged the overall contribution he had made.⁵²

A Politicized Search

No sooner had Duffey announced his resignation than a search for his successor began within a few weeks. The trustees met to discuss the issue on March 21 at the medical school in Worcester. At this meeting, they decided to separate the two positions of president and chancellor at Amherst and conduct separate searches for each post. It was further decided to retain the Boston location for the president's office. Since Duffey had spent most of his time at Amherst, there was some concern that it might be relocated there. When the question of an interim president was discussed, trustee Thalia Zervas promptly expressed her belief that the person so designated not be eligible to become a candidate for the permanent position. Other trustees disagreed, but the matter was left unresolved for the moment. Chairman Oakes asked for volunteers to serve on the presidential search committee. Nine trustees expressed their willing-

ness to be appointed. They included Judith Baker, James Carlin, Lawrence DiCara, Michael Foley, Robert Haynes, Gordon Oakes, Mary Reed, and Thalia Zervas. The ninth, James O'Leary, former general manager of the MBTA and an alumnus of UMass/Boston, chaired the presidential search committee.⁵³

The composition of the search committee came under immediate attack. Once again, no provision was made for faculty participation. Unlike the Duffey episode, however, the faculty was at least consulted. Deeply devoted to the university, Chairman Oakes was nervous about how to go about conducting a search that would avoid the blunders of the previous time. Prior to the search, he addressed the faculty senate at Amherst on March 14. Five days later, a few Boston faculty members visited him at his business office in Springfield to discuss their concerns. They were particularly disturbed by rumors that Joe Duffey might be grooming a successor. Word had it that he wanted to slip Thomas O'Brien into the position as quickly and quietly as possible. A capable administrator, O'Brien was dean of the School of Management at Amherst. He was well connected in Republican Party circles, supposedly having close ties with Governor William Weld and having previously worked in the Frank Sargent administration.

In any case, the Amherst faculty were furious at their exclusion from the search committee. On April 22, Professor Arthur Kenney, board faculty representative, wrote a letter to William Searson, the trustees' lawyer, protesting the fact that the faculty had not been accorded full membership on the search committees. He complained that the board had failed to comply with the precepts of the Wellman report.⁵⁴ So again the search began in a not uncommon atmosphere of suspicion between faculty and trustees.

On the same day that Kenney wrote his letter, the search committee met with senior administrators and faculty leaders from the three campuses. In anticipation of the pending merger under the Saxon Commission plan, their counterparts from SMU and Lowell were also invited. Everyone was asked to respond to a series of questions prepared by search chairman James O'Leary. These ranged from the qualifications and experience needed for the presidency to recommendations for the interim position.⁵⁵

Early in the search, the trustees decided to bar the interim president from eligibility for the permanent position, following the precedent they had set in 1977 when Franklin Patterson had been named interim president. At the outset, the search committee asked themselves the question: Who would be the ideal candidate under these circumstances? They concluded that it would probably be a retiring president who was familiar with a multicampus system. Hence they initially drew on a ready-made list of retired presidents and other high academic officers who could be counted on to manage well in an interim presidency without desiring the permanent post. They reviewed some twenty-five biographical sketches, including those of people like David Saxon, the chair of the MIT Corporation and president emeritus of the University of California; Derek Bok, the retiring president of Harvard; and Greg Adamian, the retiring president of Bentley College. Most of the prospects came from within Massachusetts.

After considering the biographical material, the search group narrowed its list to five candidates. Almost immediately, their names were leaked to the press by an unknown source. The list included David Bartley, president of Holyoke Community College, Randolph Bromery, former regents chancellor, William Hogan, president of the University of Lowell, Thomas O'Brien, dean of the School of Management at Amherst, and Sherry Penney, chancellor at Boston. Penney was the only female candidate, and with Duffey's expected departure, she was the most senior administrator at the university. She followed academic protocol in that she waited to be drafted rather

than actively campaign for the interim post. Penney allowed her name to go forward after several faculty members urged her to follow this course.⁵⁶

The news of Bartley's candidacy caused considerable consternation in some quarters. A Massachusetts native, he was viewed as a local candidate. The son of Irish working-class parents, Bartley was born in Holyoke in 1935. He had come up the hard way. His father, who worked at the local gas company, died when he was a freshman in high school. At the time, there were no pension or death benefits, so young Bartley knew what it meant to grow up poor. Before going to UMass on a basketball scholarship, he had attended Holyoke Junior College.⁵⁷

In many ways, Bartley presented a paradox. On the one hand, he had impressive political credentials, having served as speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1963 to 1975 and as secretary of finance and administration in the Ed King administration. On the other hand, he had proved himself to be an able administrator as president of Holyoke Community College and chairman of the public college presidents council. Unquestionably, he was the most visible and the most outspoken advocate for public higher education in the state. Furthermore, he had written a position paper in which he outlined his views on the future of UMass.⁵⁸

The paradox extended to Bartley's academic qualifications. A graduate of UMass/Amherst, he had obtained four degrees from his alma mater — a bachelor of arts, a master's, an earned Ed.D., and an honorary doctorate. To drive home the point, Bartley was highly touted in the press as being a "quadruple Minuteman," but his opponents were not impressed. They pointed out that he was president of a community college, not a major college or university. Since he did not come from the university world, they argued, he would not carry much weight with the faculty. Measured by the rigorous standards of the academy, Bartley did not pass the litmus test of quality, at least in the minds of some trustees.

Trustee James Carlin, who had supported Weld in his bid for the governorship, lobbied hard in behalf of Bartley and was his main sponsor. The supporters of Bartley argued that the former speaker could serve them well in the competition for state funding. In their minds, no one could match Bartley in terms of his familiarity with Massachusetts higher education and his knowledge of state politics and the budgetary process. These assets, as well as his personal relationships with various political and business leaders, made him an attractive candidate for president. With the devastating budget cuts that the university had suffered in recent years, Bartley's supporters were afraid that its premier position within the public higher education system would be jeopardized. They therefore wanted someone who could work well with the legislature and would stay in the presidency longer than Joe Duffey had. Since the university and its medical center received a great deal of federal money, they contended that Bartley's local Massachusetts ties would be very useful in securing such funding.

Bartley, playing to localist sentiment, steadfastly refused to accept the idea that this was a temporary appointment. He apparently believed that if he got the job, he could provide dramatic leadership that would make people forget about its being temporary. Given the original instructions to the search committee regarding the interim nature of the appointment, a few people wondered about the wisdom of his stance. This clumsy strategy eventually backfired and helped to seal his fate. Having gone this far, however, Bartley did not pull back. He was prepared to fight for the position in the face of mounting opposition.

Bartley's detractors then launched a smear campaign to discredit his candidacy. Some trustees felt that he was administratively qualified to do the job; others did not. Those in the latter category attacked him on various grounds. A prevalent theme in complaints about Bartley was his Democratic political connections. His opponents went after him for having once worked for conservative Governor King, who in the late 1970s was the most powerful symbol of opposition to Dukakis's liberal policies. This implied that Bartley was politically incorrect. Castigating him in these terms was a mode of communication that played well at the political extremes. It is useful to keep in mind that most of this smear activity occurred outside the board of trustees.

But the pressure to back away from Bartley grew almost irresistible. His adversaries wanted someone with an extensive background as a teacher and scholar as well as an administrator. In their view, Bartley did not meet these criteria. Prior to his political career, he had taught at a junior high school in Springfield and coached athletics at Holyoke Catholic High School. More serious was that Bartley had no scholarly record whatsoever. According to one trustee, committee members were attempting to measure him by the same standards that Harvard had recently used to measure Neil Rudenstine, its new president. They downplayed Bartley's legislative accomplishments, which were substantial. Four members of the search committee (Baker, DiCara, Oakes, and Zervas) preferred to go with a retired university president who was familiar with operating a multicampus system. Publicity about all of this buffeted people on both sides.

The search was filled with traps and surprises. On May 15, the same day that the UMass trustees were able to slide around the awkward problem of appointing an interim chancellor as permanent chancellor of the medical school, the trustees of Cape Cod Community College named former state senator Richard Kraus its new president.⁵⁹ Kraus was not an Irish politician, but he was well connected politically. He was a liberal Dukakis Democrat with Harvard credentials. The Kraus affair muddled the waters by suggesting that a double standard existed. The anti-Bartley forces, however, pointed out that being named to head a community college, even a particularly notable one, as Cape Cod Community College is, was not the same as heading a major university. By the same token, they contended that naming a community college president to become secretary of education (as Weld had in appointing Piedad Robertson) was quite different from appointing a person with this kind of background to head a "public Ivy" university like the one at Amherst.

Governor Weld finally intervened. In early May, he wrote a letter to the trustees asking them to delay their appointment of a president until they had conducted a national search. Weld was stalling for time. Bartley surmised that these tactics were an effort to derail his candidacy.⁶⁰ In retrospect, he was correct in his appraisal.

At this point, the search committee hired the executive recruiting firm of Korn/Ferry International, which was directed to identify three to five out-of-state candidates. But Massachusetts's fiscal troubles had been widely publicized, making it difficult for the firm to attract good candidates. It initially approached John Brademas, the president of New York University, but Brademas declined. In the face of mounting pressure to appoint someone from Massachusetts, the search firm was able to persuade three out-of-state prospects to apply. They were Elbert K. Fretwell, former chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, James Norton, interim chancellor of the University of Maryland, and Lawrence Pettit, former chancellor of the University System of South Texas.

Fretwell was a highly respected administrator generally recognized for leadership talent. His slender six-foot-seven frame and urbane manner made him a commanding figure. Academicians typically are not fond of any administrators, but they are more willing to accept people with orthodox backgrounds as top executives. Fretwell's prestigious credentials (Wesleyan, Harvard, and Columbia) were accompanied by his real accomplishments, evidenced in his scholarship and his reputation as an academic administrator. Before going to North Carolina, he was president of SUNY College at Buffalo, one of the reasons, perhaps, he so actively and successfully sought national visibility. He had been a member of both the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education headed by Clark Kerr and its successor commission. Local custom in North Carolina had forced Fretwell to retire at age sixty-five, but he is not the retiring type. On the contrary, he is full of vigor and energy. Besides, he was no newcomer to the political realities of higher education in Massachusetts. In the summer of 1986, Fretwell had been a finalist in the search for a chancellor to the board of regents. As a result, he was battle-tested and combat-hardened, but according to him, hardly any scar tissue remained.⁶¹

In more ways than one, the current search was an almost identical replay of the fierce power struggle that had taken place in 1986. Many of the same themes resurfaced, especially with regard to issues of class, ethnicity, and quality. In the earlier encounter, Governor Dukakis had strongly opposed the selection of James Collins, a lawyer and a nonacademic. The governor immediately intervened in the dispute and soon removed Collins from office.⁶² Anyone comparing the events that transpired in 1986 and 1991 cannot help but notice the amazing similarities between the two searches. In fact, Bartley and Collins shared a great deal in common. Both came from Irish working-class backgrounds and were native-son candidates. Both were former state representatives and graduates of UMass/Amherst. Their experiences were incredibly similar.

So the search committee went back to its list of eight — the five in-state candidates and the three from out of state. They interviewed all of them one by one. As a gesture of good will, Alan Solomont and Robert Karam, who chaired the board of trustees at Lowell and SMU, respectively, were invited to sit in on these interviews. Both were adamantly opposed to Bartley.⁶³ The presidents of Lowell and SMU would probably not have agreed to enter a joint university system under the leadership of a man who was, in hierarchical terms, "below" them. Sherry Penney, the chancellor at Boston, presented a special problem. Her departure from her current post would cause instability at the Boston campus. The trustees were sensitive to this issue. Careful not to get caught in the political crossfire, she wisely stepped aside so as not to create the appearance of blocking Bartley. Most trustees felt that neither Randolph Bromery nor Thomas O'Brien interviewed well. To some, Bromery appeared tired and burned out, while O'Brien came across as arrogant. After the interviews, both were eliminated from further consideration. Desiring to remain eligible for the permanent position, William Hogan took himself out of contention, withdrawing from the search.

Politics continued to play a major role in the search. To counteract his opposition, Bartley got powerful people to support his candidacy, chief among them former governor Frank Sargent, Senate president William Bulger, and House speaker Charles Flaherty. In the print and electronic media, Bartley was endorsed by David Nyhan, a *Boston Globe* columnist, and James Coppersmith, the station manager of local WCVB-TV, Channel 5.⁶⁴ The UMass Alumni Association at Amherst also endorsed Bartley,

who obtained the backing of other prominent people. For example, Ronald Perry, the athletic director at Holy Cross, reportedly contacted trustee Ronald Teixeira, formerly a basketball athlete at Holy Cross, and convinced him that Bartley was a worthy candidate. These bold steps taken by Bartley were calculated to bolster his declining fortunes.

In addition, Speaker Flaherty played subtly upon the ethnic and class issue by alluding to Yankee elitism and snobbery. He contrasted Weld's Harvard education and upper-crust social background to Bartley's UMass schooling and blue-collar working-class upbringing. The patrician governor stood out as a symbol of privilege and wealth. Commenting on the anti-Irish bias involved, a spokesperson for Flaherty said, "It's clear that the only obstacle to David Bartley is not his qualifications, but his ethnicity. And the speaker is extremely angry and disappointed."⁶⁵

As the search process reached its climax, the discord among the trustees became more intense. It was now strictly a political contest, with the pro-Bartley forces pitted against the anti-Bartley camp. Those seeking to influence the trustees against Bartley played upon the bifactionalism within the state Democratic Party by portraying the power struggle as a King versus Dukakis fight. This representation was overdrawn and somewhat exaggerated. Only two trustees — James Carlin and James O'Leary — had previously worked in the King administration. In point of fact, all the trustees had been appointed by Dukakis. Yet the negative symbolism surrounding King was a powerful statement that was used to discredit Bartley.

Hardball politics was the order of the day as the crucial vote neared. Massive pressure and threatened resignations were brought to bear against Bartley. Three trustees — Chairman Gordon Oakes, Judith Baker, and Thalia Zervas — threatened to resign if the board appointed Bartley.⁶⁶ This last prospect had a powerful appeal, blunting, temporarily, Bartley's momentum. His opponents, who wanted anyone but Bartley, were forceful in their activism and mobilization of power. The battle became increasingly nasty; both sides acted excessively.

On May 31 the search committee met for six hours to discuss the finalists. Mary Reed was absent. At this point, they narrowed their short list to three, namely, David Bartley, E. K. Fretwell, and James Norton. After their lengthy discussion, there was a clear lack of a consensus candidate. In trying to arrive at their recommendation, the dynamics of the search committee led to a 4 to 4 deadlock. Carlin, Foley, Haynes, and O'Leary supported Bartley. Four days later, on June 4, the situation remained the same except that Mary Reed threw her support to Bartley. Thus, the search committee recommended Bartley to the full board with a 5 to 4 vote. Meanwhile, trustee William Bowman made a commitment to James Carlin that he would vote for Bartley. So on the evening before the climactic meeting of the board, the Bartley forces appeared to have the necessary votes to win.

On June 5, the time for a decision had come. Realizing that there was a delicate balance of power among the trustees, the anti-Bartley forces pulled out all the political stops. They sounded the alarm and summoned two trustees who had not planned to attend the meeting. Alice Huang flew in from New York and Richard Huguenin arrived from South Deerfield. After giving a brief report about the search, trustee O'Leary suggested that the board go into executive session to discuss the reputation and character of the candidate who was being recommended.⁶⁷ Tension tightened as they engaged in an intense debate over Bartley. Some argued that he did not have experience in managing a large public institution. Others attacked him on the grounds

that he was insensitive to the Hispanic community in Holyoke. One trustee declared that she could never support anyone who had served in the Ed King administration. Still others contended that if Bartley were appointed president, the university would be held up to public ridicule by journalists like Howie Carr, who writes for the *Boston Herald*. Carr had nothing but contempt for politicians and patronage politics. In rebuttal, the pro-Bartley forces argued that the former speaker knew the Massachusetts political scene better than any of the other candidates and therefore was best suited to win state support for the university.

These points were driven home as the trustees hotly debated their differences. After this lengthy and at times acrimonious discussion, the trustees voted while still in closed session. The vote was close. On the first ballot, the Bartley nomination was defeated by a slim majority (10 to 9). Whatever the reason, William Bowman reneged on his commitment to Carlin and switched his vote to Fretwell. Pressured by both sides, Angus McQuilken and James Canina, the student trustees from Amherst and Boston, changed their minds at the last minute and turned to Fretwell. By contrast, John Walsh, the Worcester student trustee, kept his word and stayed with Bartley.

Much to everyone's surprise, the trustees overturned the recommendation of their search committee by the narrow margin of one vote. On the second ballot, the vote to elect Fretwell as president was unanimous.⁶⁸ He was offered a contract with a flexible term of "no less than six months and no longer than two years." Fretwell's salary was set at \$123,500. Reporter Phyllis Coons of the *Boston Globe*, who attended the trustee meeting, described it as a "bare-knuckle political battle complete with grudges, threats, and last-minute arm-twisting."⁶⁹

The pro-Fretwell forces rejoiced in the outcome, but their victory turned out to be short-lived. Again the secret ballot came back to haunt them. Again the press played a major role as the vigilant defender of the state's open-meeting law. This time the *Boston Globe* filed a complaint with the state attorney general that the trustees had violated the statute.

Three weeks later, on July 1, Attorney General Scott Harshbarger responded to the complaint and ruled that the board was in violation. These violations included failure to notify the candidates of a discussion of their character and reputation while in closed session and taking a vote in secret. He therefore invalidated Fretwell's election and ordered that the June 5 votes pertaining to the interim position be rescinded and revoted in open session. A dismayed Gordon Oakes attempted to put a positive spin on things by saying, "Nobody was intent on violating any open meeting law. If there was any violation, it was only because people were not aware of the technical requirements."⁷⁰

The next act in this drama took place on July 9 as the board met to comply with the attorney general's order. At this final showdown, a few more wrinkles had been added to the scenario. Since the original vote on June 5, trustee Alice Huang had resigned, and three new student trustees had been elected to the board. Desperate to stop Bartley at all costs, Governor Weld appointed and swore in Daniel Taylor as a trustee that same morning. Taylor, who formerly served on the board of regents and was identified in the press as a Dukakis loyalist, replaced Alice Huang. Although the terms of trustees William Bowman and Richard Huguenin had also expired, they had not yet been replaced and were therefore eligible to vote. To add to the drama, the new Boston student trustee resigned the day before her term was to begin. She had returned home to India because of an illness in her family. Appar-

ently there was no provision in the student governance constitution for anyone to succeed her. All of which meant that the outcome was still in doubt when the board met to revote.

Like the previous meeting, this one was filled with tension and suspense. Dismayed at what was happening, trustee William Bowman set the tone of the meeting with a statement that appeared in the morning press. He was quoted as saying, "To bring in somebody from out of state and then invite him to go back home — we would look ridiculous. We'd be the laughingstock of the nation."⁷¹ After a few preliminaries, trustee Lawrence DiCara moved to rescind the votes taken on June 5 and to ratify the agreement confirming Fretwell as interim president. At this point, trustee William Mahoney offered a motion to substitute the name of Bartley for Fretwell. By a 9 to 9 vote, with Chairman Oakes casting the deciding vote, the Mahoney motion was defeated. Mary Reed, who had previously voted for Bartley, now switched her vote. She felt that they had made a contract with Fretwell and should not back out of it. The board then voted on DiCara's original motion, which was passed unanimously. Sober second thoughts prevented them from remaining deadlocked. It began to dawn on everyone that their efforts to find a president might end in abysmal failure. Putting aside their personal differences, they voted to approve Fretwell.⁷²

Fretwell's confirmation was a tremendous relief for Gordon Oakes. Because he believed that Fretwell was the best person for the job, the days since the attorney general's ruling had quite possibly been more agonizing for him than for Fretwell. Now Oakes could put his mind at ease. His choice had prevailed.

The next day, Fretwell received an unexpected dividend, praise of his appointment by the *Boston Globe*. Its editorial read: "It wasn't easy or even very pretty, but the UMass trustees did the right thing yesterday in reaffirming their decision to appoint E. K. Fretwell as interim president of the school. Bartley might have done well, but to the outside world the appointment of a man steeped in local politics would have sent a discordant signal. On that basis alone, Fretwell, an outsider with big-time experience as an academic manager, was the superior choice."⁷³ On this positive note, the latest chapter in the ritual of presidential succession at UMass was concluded.

A day later, on July 11, 1991, Governor Weld signed into law the historic piece of legislation creating the new five-campus university. In the end, the power of those who favored the Saxon Commission plan had prevailed over the power of those who favored the regents, who were now defunct.

A Comparative Analysis

In retrospect, it is clear that these five presidential searches carry different meanings for the different participants and observers. Indeed, the activity surrounding each search has served as a barometer of how the trustees, faculty, students, and alumni feel about their institution, revealing their aspirations and their misgivings. To quote McLaughlin and Riesman again: "Like perhaps no other event in the life of an institution, the search for a president reveals the politics, protocols, and promise of the American academic enterprise."⁷⁴ Even more revealing is the distribution of power among the major players, including the governor and legislative leadership. Depending upon how this power gets played out, the outcome will be influenced accordingly.

As happens regularly, because of the culture of the state, the search becomes political, no matter what committee structure or procedural safeguards are employed. Consequently, the key to a successful search depends to a large extent on the “representativeness” of the process and the participation of all parties-at-interest. For the search to be considered legitimate, it must include the major stakeholders within the university community. Exclusion of faculty members from search committees, as we have seen, has frequently caused antagonism to the searches. Such antagonism tends to generate suspicion and mistrust, which in turn undermine the effectiveness of the incumbent.

Because of the brevity of their terms and the lack of stakeholder participation in their eventual appointment, both Franklin Patterson and Joseph Duffey were handicapped in establishing their legitimacy. To some extent, this was also true of Robert Wood, who found himself in an embarrassing situation through no fault of his own. In his case, however, UMass astounded itself, for the flawed search produced an altogether unexpected outcome. Wood was a topflight choice for president. The late Joseph Healey was probably correct in his assessment when he said, “We got the right guy, but the wrong way.” Given this mood, Wood was literally the right person in the right job. Yet he was never able to overcome the perceived illegitimacy of his presidency, at least not at Amherst. On the other hand, David Knapp was the product of a procedurally flawless textbook search in which the trustees followed both the letter and spirit of their governance document. As a result, Knapp was not only assured a smooth transition, but was also more readily accepted by the entire university. This contrast illustrated an important lesson that the trustees had learned.

It is also worth noting that the presidents who have become the most effective leaders have been men of driving ambition and fierce concentration who pursue their goals relentlessly. Wood was such a personality and in a different way so was Knapp. Wood set his sights on achieving national recognition for the university and spared no one, including himself, in his drive to get there. His determination never flagged. Knapp pursued his goal of a first-class university in a much different way. His academic experience, his conciliatory tactics, and his capacity to persuade all help account for his tangible achievements. Neither Patterson nor Duffey remained in office long enough to realize their dreams. Both of them were insiders who parlayed that advantage to the top. They were both short-termers and their mundane records reflected as much. Because Duffey left so soon, he did not live up to expectations.

In the search that produced Fretwell, the trustees acted throughout as if it was a political contest between the King and the Dukakis forces. In what turned out to be a clamorous and public spectacle, it seemed clear enough that the emphasis was on power and conflict. But in this King versus Dukakis, Irish versus non-Irish, or whatever, combat, how did the concerns of faculty get factored into it at all? Their concerns seem to have gotten lost in the heat of battle. Similarly, what about the students for whom this political issue might not be salient? Their interests also got buried. Both students and alumni were represented on the board of trustees. The faculty, who were not even represented on the search committee, were in effect disenfranchised.

The decision rested between a consummate political insider versus an academic insider from out of state. In a judgment call that was much too close for comfort, the trustees opted to go with Fretwell. He now faces a formidable task, because the university is in a very delicate position. Fretwell’s tact and diplomacy will be sorely

tested as he works out the new relationships of the five-campus university. Hopefully, he will be able to play a major role in rebuilding the strength of academic departments that have been decimated by the terrible losses sustained during the past few years. Although it is still too early to know for sure whether Fretwell will succeed in this endeavor, the prospects for the university look promising. The new institutional configuration should give it a stronger voice locally as well as a stronger national presence. As an interim president, Fretwell, too, will be a short-termers, and we ought not to expect more than he can possibly deliver in the allotted time frame.

The treatment David Bartley received should not be ignored or dismissed lightly. If he was the product of a virulent localism, he was also the victim of a political smear. Did the trustees hurt their own cause in rejecting him? Answers to this question have remained highly partisan and extremely sensitive politically. It is not possible to measure precisely the political damage that resulted from the dispute and the negative publicity that accompanied it. Suffice it to say that residual animosities still linger in some powerful quarters. To overlook that resentment is, in my judgment, a mistake. Fortunately, Bartley behaved decently, made no attempt to get back at anyone, and accepted his defeat graciously.

Why did all this happen? The easy explanation is to blame it on trustee collusion and politics as usual. The true answer is more complex. For one thing, Bartley's candidacy had been in the works for some time. Like his predecessor David Knapp, Fretwell was a late entry, brought in from the outside as the prescribed antidote for the local front-runner. Many of the key participants liked Fretwell, whose particular abilities matched their specific needs. The mobilization of the pro-Fretwell trustees would seem in part to reflect a campaign to discredit Bartley, who by all accounts is a decent man, but whose effectiveness locally might have been partially blunted by lack of recognition nationally and in Washington. For some of the trustees, or those who tried to persuade the trustees, the national issue was more important than what Howie Carr might write or say on his daunting talk show. Surprisingly, Governor William Weld comes off rather well in the outcome. Why did he care so much? His role would suggest more interest in public higher education than he had indicated earlier.

In hindsight, the Bartley supporters felt that their man could do more for the university than any outsider. His rejection disappointed both the Amherst alumni and the Irish legislative leaders, if for no other reason than that one of their own had been rejected. The class distinctions and the issues of ethnicity and elitism merely exacerbated their resentment. It is striking, of course, and David Bartley is the most recent illustration of what might be thought of as a certain antagonism toward Catholics. This is all the more surprising when one considers that Massachusetts has a very high proportion of Catholic citizens whose offspring attend public colleges in equally high numbers. In the university as in society, as our cultural cleavages have widened, they reflect divisions that run deep and have importance for the future.

In the aftermath of the battle, Alan Lupo, a *Boston Globe* columnist, referred to the whole affair as "UMass's self-inflicted wound." His attack on the candidacy of E. K. Fretwell for its elitism and snobbery is a powerful column by a man who is not an Irish Catholic. As Lupo argues:

The University of Massachusetts trustees seem to have gone out of their way to alienate state legislators whose cooperation is crucial to the university's future . . . Those trustees reflected the elitist concerns of some faculty who worried that they might look bad in the eyes of their peers in Cambridge or elsewhere if they

picked a community college president as their leader. It is a job for an educator, all right, but it is also a job for a good politician, somebody who knows the political culture of the state and its players.⁷⁵

Even making allowances for its parochialism, Lupo's argument, in my opinion, does have some merit. First of all, UMass is not Harvard, and vice versa. The two institutions are very different in nature and serve very different academic missions. Second, there is ample evidence to suggest that "good politicians" have gone on to become effective university presidents. Terry Sanford at Duke University, John Brademas at NYU, and Lamar Alexander at Tennessee come readily to mind. It is also interesting to observe that three of the five modern UMass presidents (Wood, Patterson, and Knapp) were all political scientists or professional students of politics. One who was not, Duffey, had been a theologian and a professional politician before becoming president. For that matter, Fretwell, who served a stint as the U.S. vice consul to Czechoslovakia, is an academic politician in the best sense of the term. The point is that the political element is an essential aspect of the job. Public figures who are proven leaders should not be automatically excluded from consideration simply because they have devoted part of their careers to public service. Surely, there is a life after politics. One must be able to look beyond mere partisanship and determine what is in the best interests of the whole institution.

Given what has happened to UMass in recent years in terms of fiscal deprivation, one can reasonably argue that the political pedigree of a president may be as important as his or her academic credentials. It was certainly true of both Wood and Duffey. In reality, Duffey's political connections with Dukakis were valued more highly by the trustees than his academic discipline in theology. Some would contend that modern presidents, in matters that really count, still need to act essentially as Robert Wood did but would never openly acknowledge it.

Today the complexities of university life increasingly demand a president who can operate and feel comfortable in both the political world and the academic world. This is especially true at a land-grant university, which depends so much on public funding. To cling to the idea that the office of president is primarily an executive one is to continue a criterion that neither tells us what a university president does nor what he should do. To be a president requires an understanding of history, of culture, and of human nature and a capacity to exert sufficient intellectual and moral energy to bind together people of diverse interests and commitments. He or she must be able to inspire, inform, encourage, and embolden all those who have a stake in public higher education.

Having pointed this out, I hasten to add that I do not assume that professional academics lack the necessary political skills. This study suggests otherwise. But the culture of the academy is vastly different from the culture of Beacon Hill. In order to be effective, a president must be able to operate in both spheres. Equally important, I think the involvement of the Massachusetts political leadership in these searches has gone beyond what is desirable. As we have seen, the intervention by governors tends to provoke a counterintervention by legislative leaders. It is precisely at this juncture that political interference destroys the integrity of the search process and robs the institution of its autonomy.

As mentioned earlier, the search mechanism formulated in the Wellman report is the only adequate method yet devised for permitting significant participation in the choosing of a new president. Because it provides representation for the major stakeholders and is a practical way of doing things, I value highly its function of resolving

basic conflicts of interest. Not even the strongest advocates would claim that it does all these things completely satisfactorily, but no one has yet provided any substitute for assuring faculty and students that they will have some say in the outcome. That maximum involvement is going to be difficult is no reason to turn back from it.

It is particularly encouraging to note that the trustees have already agreed to embrace the principles of the Wellman report in conducting the upcoming search for a permanent president. At its meeting on June 5, 1991, the board approved a resolution calling for a search committee that included "voting representatives from each of the campuses." This policy should go a long way toward ameliorating some of the problems that have plagued recent searches.

Reviewing this history, one is struck by two things. First, the title "president" is about all that has remained constant about the position. Second, one cannot help but observe that several UMass presidents have gone on to other presidencies, beginning with Kenyon Butterfield in 1924. A change in governors and regents or a shift in political winds can make life untenable for a president. Still and all, it is perhaps a compliment to the University of Massachusetts — or even to the searches that produced them — that these presidents are considered desirable "catches" by other institutions. By looking back, we look ahead, identifying what is worthwhile to preserve from the past by way of predictive value and carry it into the future. If our capacity to predict the probable effectiveness of presidents is not very imposing, we can at least be sure that the quality of our picks over the past two decades has been top grade. ♫

Notes

1. This figure is arrived at by including in the count Paul A. Chadbourne, who served two separate terms, the first in 1866–1867, the second in 1882–1883, and William P. Brooks, who served as acting president from 1905–1906.
2. A few Jewish candidates have been courted for the post in recent years, but none have been selected. This is illustrated by the finalist positions of Marilyn Gittell and James Vorenberg in 1978. The same is true of recent Catholic candidates like finalists David Bartley and William Hogan in 1991.
3. For a perceptive analysis of such searches, see Judith Block McLaughlin and David Riesman, *Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints* (Princeton: Carnegie Foundation, 1990), 21. On a personal note, I owe a special debt of gratitude to these authors. In many ways, I have profited from their work and from their correspondence.
4. See Joseph M. Cronin, "Higher Education Policy-Making in Massachusetts," a paper for the Alden Seminar, April 1987, 2.
5. For an excellent account of the history of these conflicts in higher education in Massachusetts, see Charles A. Radin, "Public Higher Ed: An Academic Orphan," *Boston Globe*, March 1, 1991.
6. *Ibid.*, 14.
7. *Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts*, Boston, December 1971, 111.
8. For more on this, see McLaughlin and Riesman, *Choosing a College President*, 65.
9. Anthony Flint, "Weld Hails New Education Era; Names Cabinet Secretary, Adds Two Campuses to UMass," *Boston Globe*, July 12, 1991.
10. For a detailed biographical sketch and career history of Wood, see Gary Griffith, "UMass President Robert Wood: Nothing Left to Do but Run for Governor," *Boston Phoenix*, October 9, 1976, 26–30.

11. Interview with Robert Wood, June 11, 1991.
12. Robert Wood, "Oral History Interview," January 27, 1989, 7–8. This document is housed at the Archives at UMass/Amherst.
13. Quoted by Robert Wood in interview, July 1, 1991.
14. Interview with Ernest Lynton, July 30, 1991. Lynton, who served as vice president for academic affairs under Robert Wood, provided me with much information about the personality and leadership style of Wood. I am, of course, solely responsible for the interpretation of Wood's presidency.
15. See *Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts*.
16. Robert C. Wood, *The Independent University in Time of Testing: Report of the President*, University of Massachusetts, 1976, 6.
17. Insights about the work of this group were obtained from retired professor Thomas N. Brown, who served on the Wellman committee. Interview, June 11, 1991.
18. See "Trustee Policy on University Governance," Document T73-098, adopted April 4, 1973.
19. For more on this, see Robert Wood, "The Public-Private Forum: Good Intentions Randomize Behavior," *New England Journal of Public Policy*, 3 (Summer/Fall 1987): 6–20.
20. For insights on how President Wood was perceived at the Amherst campus, I am indebted to Professor Lewis C. Mainzer. Interview, July 9, 1991.
21. Interview with Lynton.
22. Interview with Mainzer.
23. Benjamin Taylor, "Wood-Dukakis Conflict Ends Politely: A Basic Difference of Philosophy," *Boston Globe*, December 9, 1977.
24. Nina McCain, "Wood Quits as Head of UMass," *Boston Globe*, June 18, 1977.
25. Interview with Franklin Patterson, June 14, 1991.
26. While William P. Brooks served as the first acting president of the university from 1905–1906, Patterson was the first so-called interim president. In legal terms, the difference between the two titles is more than just a matter of semantics.
27. Memorandum of the Ad Hoc Committee on Search Process, July 1, 1977.
28. Minutes of special meeting of the board of trustees, May 15, 1978.
29. Interview with Professor Richard Lyons, June 18, 1991. He served on the search committee as the faculty representative from the Boston campus.
30. Interview with Mainzer.
31. Mario Fantini and Marilyn Gittel, *Decentralization: Achieving Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1973).
32. McLaughlin and Riesman, *Choosing a College President*, 79.
33. Minutes of special meeting of the board of trustees, May 15, 1978.
34. Interview with David Knapp, July 1, 1991.
35. Again, Ernest Lynton's rich experience in UMass academic administration and his association with both Knapp and Wood made him an invaluable source of insights and information.
36. Interview with Knapp.
37. David C. Knapp, "Preparing for Change: Education in the '80s," *Report of the President*, March 1980, 4.
38. Interview with Lynton.

39. See, in particular, Thomas O'Brien, "The Regulations That Stifle Higher Education," *Boston Sunday Globe*, September 1, 1991.
40. Interview with Sandra Elman, July 27, 1991. Professor Elman, who served as associate director of the Saxon Commission, interrupted her own work frequently to advise me.
41. Interview with Knapp. See also *News and Views*, UMass/Boston, March 23, 1990, 2.
42. Judith Kelliher, "Higher Standards Mark First Decade for UMass Chief," *Union News*, October 16, 1987.
43. See "Learning to Lead: Building a World-Class Public University in Massachusetts," *The Report of the Commission on the Future of the University*, March 1989.
44. David C. Knapp, "Statement on the Saxon Report" (mimeograph), April 5, 1989.
45. Anthony Flint, "UMass Head Quits; Duffey to Take Dual Role," *Boston Globe*, February 21, 1990.
46. "President Knapp Resigns, Duffey to Succeed," *Campus Chronicle*, March 2, 1990. See also Patricia Hayes, "President Knapp Retires, Duffey to Take Over," *Mass Media*, February 27, 1990, 1, 7.
47. For more on this, see Joseph S. Slavet et al., "After the Miracle: A History and Analysis of the Massachusetts Fiscal Crisis," monograph published by the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, May 1990.
48. Anthony Flint, "Weld Creates Panel to Study Closing Colleges," *Boston Globe*, February 26, 1991.
49. Anthony Flint, "Regents Chancellor Bromery Resigns," *Boston Sunday Globe*, February 11, 1991.
50. Anthony Flint, "Regents Question Weld Commitment to Public Education," *Boston Globe*, February 14, 1991.
51. Anthony Flint, "State College Flight Continues; Head of UMass Due to Leave," *Boston Globe*, March 1, 1991.
52. See the trustee resolution passed at the meeting of June 5, 1991. Minutes of this meeting, 10.
53. Minutes of the special meeting of the board of trustees, March 21, 1991.
54. Minutes of the UMass/Amherst faculty senate, May 2, 1991.
55. Letter of James F. O'Leary, chair of president's search committee, April 16, 1991.
56. Interview with Chancellor Sherry Penney, June 18, 1991.
57. See David Ellis, "David Michael Bartley: The Speaker or Rising to Power from Holyoke" (mimeograph), 1-10.
58. See David Bartley, "A Vision for the University" (Xerox, 1991), 1-15.
59. Anthony Flint, "Trustees Tap Former Senator Kraus to Head Cape Community College," *Boston Globe*, May 16, 1991.
60. Anthony Flint, "Politics Is Raising Its Head on UMass Top Job," *Boston Globe*, May 15, 1991.
61. Interview with Elbert K. Fretwell, July 10, 1991.
62. See Richard A. Hogarty, "The Search for a Massachusetts Chancellor," *New England Journal of Public Policy* 4 (Summer-Fall 1988): 7-38.
63. Martha Weinberg, who at the time was a trustee at the University of Lowell, sat in for Solomont when he couldn't make the meetings. She, too, was adamantly opposed to Bartley for much the same reasons.
64. For these endorsements see David Nyhan, "A UMass Savior," *Boston Globe*, May 14, 1991, and James Coppersmith, "Editorial," WCVB-TV, Channel 5, June 3, 1991.

65. "Short Circuits," *Boston Sunday Globe*, May 26, 1991.
66. Minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees, June 5, 1991.
67. Alan Lupo, "UMass's Self-inflicted Wound," *Boston Globe*, June 15, 1991.
68. Strangely enough, the minutes of the trustee meeting for June 5, 1991, do not give either a vote tally or a roll call on this motion. Hence there is no way of confirming the reported unanimity of the trustee vote.
69. Anthony Flint and Phyllis Coons, "UMass Trustees Reject Bartley," *Boston Globe*, June 6, 1991.
70. Frank Phillips, "Votes to Pick UMass President Ruled Illegal," *Boston Globe*, July 2, 1991.
71. Anthony Flint and Frank Phillips, "Pressure on Over Second Vote for UMass Interim Head," *Boston Globe*, July 9, 1991.
72. Minutes of the special meeting of the board of trustees, July 9, 1991. See also Anthony Flint, "UMass Panel Again Rejects Bartley as President," *Boston Globe*, July 10, 1991; Eric Fehrstrom, "Interim Chief OK'd by UMass Board," *Boston Herald*, July 10, 1991; and John Gately, "Fretwell Survives Re-vote Threat," *Mass Media*, July 23, 1991.
73. "The Right Choice for UMass," *Boston Globe*, July 10, 1991.
74. McLaughlin and Riesman, *Choosing a College President*, xxxvi.
75. Lupo, "UMass's Self-inflicted Wound."

ERRATA

With regard to Richard Hogarty's article, "Searching for a UMass President: Positions and Leaderships, 1970-1991," footnotes 66 and 67 were printed incorrectly. They should read as follows:

Chairman Gordon Oakes has taken exception to this statement. He claims that he never actually threatened to resign and that he was misquoted in the press. Oakes defended his position by saying: "I told the news media that I would have trouble working with Bartley if he became president." Interview with Gordon Oakes, September 23, 1991.

Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees, June 5, 1991.

Compelled to Speak

Women Confronting Institutional Racism, 1910–1950

Sharlene Voogd Cochrane

Women within and outside the YWCA have been able to move this organization to confront its own racism. Although the strategies and goals for this endeavor took several decades to work out, the organization moved more quickly than other similar institutions. One reason for this movement was the power of women speaking out in an institution that encouraged them to make connections between their faith and their daily lives. Their strategy was a profound commitment to connecting talk and action. They constantly set a context for and educated others to see connections between YWCA rhetoric, ideals, and practices.

The article considers this effort through the lens of Boston over a period of forty years and the life of Lucy Miller Mitchell, the first woman of color to be elected to the Boston YWCA board. It explores the work of women in the national, student, and city associations who felt compelled to speak for a more diverse and just YWCA.

The surprising thing about the YWCA is not its racism — American institutions reflect the racism of society at large, and the YWCA was no different in its early goals and practices. What is surprising and instructive is the way in which women within and outside the organization have been able to move the YW to confront that racism and bring about substantial change. Although the strategies and goals for this confrontation took several decades to work out, the organization moved more quickly and to more effect than similar service and membership institutions.¹ Today the YWCA operates from the “one imperative,” one of the most strongly worded mission statements of any nonprofit organization: “Our one imperative: The elimination of racism, wherever it exists and by any means necessary.” The YWCA began in this country in the 1860s. Much of the work that led to this imperative, and to the existence today of a solidly integrated organization serving the needs of women from many races and backgrounds, was accomplished between 1910 and 1950.

Two elements of this struggle stand out. The first is the radical implications of women speaking out in a structure that encouraged them to make connections between their faith and their daily lives. Women with viewpoints that questioned accepted practices overcame immense social pressure to “be quiet,” and instead

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debated and publicly negotiated these strongly felt issues. The YWCA institutionalized the power of speaking out as a way of making change. Through these women “the pressure never let up.”² Their strategy was a profound commitment to a connective process of constant talk and education. They kept issues alive and raised points at every opportunity. They set a context for and educated others to see the connections or disparity between YWCA rhetoric, ideals, and practices.

A secondary theme is the constant tension between separatism and integration in the efforts to make the YW more diverse. Was the goal a separate series of African-American YWs, a fully integrated single institution, or something in between? The YWCA created what at first appeared to be a racially specific structure, completely separating African-American and white women. In fact, this structure was more connected and complicated and, with steady pressure from some members, moved toward full integration. Every step of this movement took immense effort and continual prodding from women who had a vision that challenged traditional American racist assumptions.

Documenting the efforts of the YWCA to confront racism is valuable because of its national scope, the thousands of women involved in its programs, and the relative success of those efforts. The national YWCA story centers on the development of African-American branches in cities and colleges during the early twentieth century. The events and processes in specific cities and local organizations, however, that capture the details and problems of implementing the national policy are not well known. This article considers one local situation — Boston, Massachusetts — in order to better understand the process through which the organization confronted racism and came to have a fully integrated program — or didn’t. It views the story through the life of Lucy Miller Mitchell, the first woman of color to be elected to the Boston YWCA board, and explores the work of women with the national, student, and city associations, which led to a more diverse and just YWCA.

The Boston YWCA, the first in the nation, was founded in 1866 by upper-class women to guide and guard New England’s single, rural women coming to the city to work in the years immediately following the Civil War. They acted despite Boston’s male clergy, who attacked this female institution-building as dangerous and unnecessary. The YW provided a safe, inexpensive place to live, as well as assistance in finding work, for primarily Protestant, white, working young women. The founders expected residents to worship daily, exhibit upright moral character, and follow the rules of their new “home.” The first housemother clearly stated her expectations: “The Superintendent would be grateful to the ladies connected with the Association if they would discourage as much as possible the attempt made by Irish Roman Catholic girls to frequent the rooms in search of employment — the object of this organization being to benefit principally our New England girls over whom we can exert a lasting influence.”³

Women of color were served even less than the Irish within the early YW. Occasionally an African-American woman would be allowed to stay for a day or two at the residence, until “more appropriate” lodging could be found with an African-American family. A few women of color took part in clubs or training programs. Anna Wade Richardson, for example, was part of the Bible study group at the Berkeley residence in the 1880s. She left Boston to start a school in Marshallville, Georgia, which was partially funded for over a decade by her friends at the Boston YW. Such events and individuals, however, were rare.⁴

The National Picture

At the time the national YWCA was formed in 1906, certain patterns existed in the local associations across the country. In both the North and the South, city associations existed for white women. In the North there might be occasional participation by women of color, as in Boston. In the South this option did not exist. In a few southern cities with a large number of African-American women, a separate organization might exist for them.⁵

Within a year after the national YWCA was formed, the directors responded to two kinds of requests from women of color. Those who had established their own city YWCAs wanted to affiliate. Students at black colleges wished to join the new national organization. In response, the national YWCA hired Mrs. W. A. Hunton to visit fourteen interested student associations, including Spelman Seminary in Atlanta and Tuskegee Institute. She also did "city work" in the first four African-American city associations to affiliate, Washington, D.C., New York, Baltimore, and Brooklyn. Within two years, thirty-six student associations were affiliated, and a fifth African-American city branch was established at St. Paul, Minnesota.⁶

The national organization determined by 1910 that in cities with a central (white) association, work should be organized for women of color as a branch of that association. Any decision about creating such a branch had to have the approval of the white association, so that white women had the ultimate say as to whether women of color in a community had a YWCA. That branch would be located separately and have a separate board, overseen by the white board, which also controlled the finances. If no central association existed and the African-American population was large enough to support its own work, a "colored YWCA" could be organized. Within collegiate settings, student associations were also separated by race, and northern predominantly white colleges might have a small separate association for women of color.⁷

By 1912, there were sixteen African-American associations in cities and over fifty African-American college-based student YWCAs. The national organization expanded its commitment to this constituency by creating the position on its board of "Secretary of Colored Work in Cities." The following year, Eva Bowles was hired to fill this new position. She traveled throughout the country, coordinated conferences of women working through the YW with the African-American community, and extended the training of secretaries and leaders for black branches. Under Bowles's leadership, between 1913 and World War I, the branch system grew, increasing both the number of groups and the number of women of color served. As these women became leaders within their branches, they began to participate in national conferences and training sessions. The national and local boards faced increasing pressure from women of color to run their own boards and have control of their own finances and programs. Bowles carefully and patiently supported them; she commented that she "walked a tightrope" in urging women of color to remain involved while she educated and "developed" YWCA white women to understand the disparity between their words and actions.⁸

The student YWCAs moved more quickly toward fuller integration. The initial national response to requests for affiliation were to accept, separately, white student YWCAs and associations from black colleges. In 1915, at Louisville, Kentucky, the first integrated student YW convention took place with twenty-eight delegates meeting together. Bowles said of their work, "The conference marks one of the greatest

forward steps in the Association's history and has served as a clearing house for many preconceived notions and prejudices."⁹

The next year the association faced the question of integrating a college site in a different way. Fifteen women of color, students at the University of Iowa, wanted to establish their own branch of the university association and met friction from white students who wanted them to have full membership in the previously white association. "This is the first student association where there is such a large number of colored that it raises this issue."¹⁰ Seemingly, if a few women of color wanted to attend a northern "white" association, that was acceptable, but this large a group would present a greater, and to some, threatening, level of integration. The report goes on to say the same issue was likely to come up at the University of Minnesota and the University of Illinois. It does not say how the issue was settled.

The student YWCA was soon holding conventions for both black and white students. The first convention for students of color was held at Atlanta's Spelman College in 1917. The YWCA increased its efforts through the work of Eva Bowles to recruit additional students of color at white schools. By 1919 the student convention in Talladega, Alabama, boasted 107 delegates from 42 schools, both black and white. Many student organizations undertook joint meetings in the early 1920s, and between 1923 and 1926, a number of student groups became interracial, a step in race relations that at the time was considered extremely radical.

World War I provided immense opportunities for the YWCA, since its war work councils provided housing and activities for growing numbers of both white and African-American women who moved to cities in response to the need and opportunity for work. Following the war, the YWCA built on this momentum by establishing the Girl Reserve clubs, with separate clubs for young black and white women. If there were twelve girls and a woman able to lead them, the YW granted them a charter. Although the organizations were separate, again the leadership roles provided an opportunity for women of color to meet at conventions with white women, and leaders of the separate groups met together within the local organization boards and committees.

Another YWCA activity following World War I was organizing industrial clubs for working girls. These clubs were biracial, since the issues the girls had required joint organizing. "We hope the Association's approach to the colored girl who works will be a different one. Out of 12 years' experience we feel that the organization of colored girls in clubs without relating them to the whole industrial situation in the community does not develop racial understanding. The Industrial Department of an Association should seek to know the whole industrial situation of its city and realize that the colored girl is a definite part of it. The responsibility of the Industrial Department is to develop a consciousness in both white and colored groups to know that their interests are dependent on each other."¹¹ As in other segments of the organization, women of color who took on leadership roles were integrated into local and national participatory structure and ongoing training opportunities. White and African-American women gradually began to work together more and know and respect one another.

The Boston Story

In 1924, Lucy Miller Mitchell, a young woman of color, newly married and ready to make the city her home, moved to Boston. She had graduated from Mary McCleod Bethune's Dayton Beach, Florida, school and earned a college degree from Talladega

College in Alabama. Although she had participated in the student YWCA there, Mitchell did not become involved in the organization. In 1941, nearly twenty years later, she became the first woman of color elected to the Boston YWCA board.

By the time Mitchell settled in Boston, both the local YWCA and the African-American community were changing. The YWCA became a membership organization in 1912, the same year Boston affiliated with the national organization. Membership meant a significant shift in focus, from upper-class directors helping young working women to a broader spectrum of women designing and carrying out programs for themselves. A growing outreach effort accompanied this shift and expanded YW membership to younger girls, mothers, older women, and immigrants. New leadership began to come from the women using the YW, while national conventions and personnel brought a wider view to the local organization. Women who had not previously been involved in policymaking were encouraged to speak out. With greater power and voice, a stronger internal leadership developed.

In 1920, the African-American community made up only 2 percent of Boston's total population, as it had consistently for several decades. It was changing its physical location within the city and gradually becoming more diverse as a community. During the nineteenth century, people of color had clustered on the north slope of Beacon Hill near the African Meeting House built in 1806. Overcrowding and the change in that area to tenements for Italian and Jewish immigrants led African-Americans to move to the South End and Roxbury. The 1920s witnessed a steady stream of people of color from the South and the West Indies arriving in Boston. Many, like the Mitchells, were new residents from small southern towns. Others were poorer migrants and immigrants bringing a less skilled working class to the city. A number of new and established organizations served community needs, including at least ten churches representing a variety of denominations, and settlement houses such as the Robert Gould Shaw House in Roxbury and the Harriet Tubman House in the South End.¹²

Mitchell had first come to Boston with her family in 1916, when her brothers attended Northeastern University, and lived one block from the Harriet Tubman House. Many African-American families living in that area of brownstone townhouses rented out part of their home to students, since no students of color were allowed to live in any of Boston's college dormitories. Mitchell returned South to college, and the student YWCA was important in her college years. She was influenced in her choice of colleges by Juliet Derricotte, a national secretary whom she met when she attended her first national YWCA conference for women of color in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1917. Derricotte convinced Mitchell to attend her own alma mater, Talladega College, where Mitchell served as president of the student YWCA and attended additional YWCA student conferences.¹³

Mitchell raised two children, a son and a daughter. After volunteering at her own children's schools, she studied education at Abigail Eliot's school and received a master's degree in the new field of early childhood education from Boston University in 1935. She then developed the model nursery school at Robert Gould Shaw House and became a respected professional educator in the early childhood field. Mitchell later led efforts to improve and license day care providers and consulted to the national Head Start programs in Massachusetts.

In the 1920s, the city YWCA had the opportunity to support the development of an African-American branch in Boston. While many large cities developed branch

relationships between black and white women, Boston developed in a different direction. Local members did not support efforts to establish a branch for women of color.

In 1925, Victoria Saunders, a black social worker, sought support from the board for her plan to use a building in the South End for club rooms and overnight lodging, with the hope of becoming a branch of the YWCA. Saunders hoped to establish a day nursery, rooms for twenty-five young women, club rooms, and a food service. She tried to purchase furniture from the YW residence to help get started. The YW leadership discussed this request with Eva Bowles, then serving as administrator of colored work in cities. She did not support the project, because she hoped that the associations of the YWCA would become single, racially integrated organizations. A letter from Bowles to the Boston board said that groups wishing to duplicate YW programs and services seldom realized the effort and financial processes involved. She suggested to the Boston group that their YW become interracial, admitting any girl to any program on her merits, not developing programs according to race. Second, she believed the time was not right to give this project the attention and energy it would need to be of the highest quality, since the YW was in the midst of a major building campaign. Shortly after receiving this letter, the Boston board decided not to assist in establishing this residence.¹⁴

Saunders went ahead anyway, moving into 511 Columbus Avenue, a five-story building with a cafeteria in the basement, club space, and rooms for girls. The project was not mentioned again in the YW reports, and apparently it did not last long. Mitchell stated in a 1944 report that Victoria Saunders never had much of a following among the African-American community and the project “might not have prospered even if we had given her the aid she requested.” Mitchell saw this episode as important not because of the end of the request, but because it is characteristic of the association’s ambivalent attitudes during those years toward efforts of women of color to work with the YWCA.¹⁵

Boston’s African-American community faced the question of supporting separate or integrated institutions in another way during this same period. A black hospital wishing to expand was strongly opposed by radical African-American newspaper publisher William Monroe Trotter. Through his newspaper, the *Guardian*, he led a controversial fight that led to the closing of the hospital and the eventual integration of Boston City Hospital. Both Trotter and the student YWCA worked at the same time to move Boston hospitals to allow women of color to train as nurses.¹⁶

At a time when most major cities had a local white YWCA and a growing black branch, Boston did not. It was also not clear that the city organization shared Eva Bowles’s sentiment that they should be “fully interracial.” The most common practice for women of color needing lodging was still to find room with an African-American family, rather than at the YW. The board president explained as late as 1926 that “it is part of our job to fit the girl into the proper environment.” For women of color that meant boarding in private homes because “we believe they will be happiest among colored people.”

Certain women on the board worked for a more open, consistent policy. The person most associated with these efforts in the 1920s was Mrs. Everett O. Fisk, a white woman who lived in the wealthy suburb of Brookline and served as YW education chair and vice president throughout the decade. In 1921, she brought a member of the Urban League to the board to speak about “the colored girl problem.” The rep-

representative, Mrs. Barney, urged the board to make specific its position regarding women of color living in the YW residence. Fisk met with other members of the Urban League and pushed the local Council of Social Agencies to call a meeting of the various social institutions in the city. She chaired a conference of the association for all social agencies to consider the welfare of young women of color. Her committee continued to meet, again reporting that many people in the community wanted a more open housing policy.¹⁷

For the most part, that open policy was confirmed in 1929. In that year, the Boston YWCA opened its new facility, a large modern complex, still in use, on Clarendon Street at the edge of the South End, about one-half mile from the center of the African-American community of the 1920s. When the new building was about to open, the student YW, which planned to use meeting rooms there, met with city YW representatives to assist in “promoting right race relations” through the use of its facilities. Chairpersons and secretaries of the city departments and the president and executive secretary of the student board met to establish policies. The group confirmed a general policy conforming with the national policy — absolutely no discrimination in the use of dining room, cafeteria, Pioneer residence, and other facilities and programs. A racially mixed committee of members would consider any cases of discrimination arising outside of this general statement.¹⁸

The last facility to become fully integrated was the swimming pool. A symbol of the new building in 1929 and of new directions for meeting women’s physical and social needs, the pool also symbolized the difficulties facing African-American and white women who struggled to make the YW serve all Boston women. The pool was an exception to the “no discrimination” agreement, and the planning group decided that policy regarding its use would be made later. Apparently even this well-meaning group could not decide on a suitable policy. Pool use remained the most inconsistent element of the YW policy for several years.

In 1926, when people of color were denied access to the YWCA pool in New Bedford, the Boston leadership claimed that would never happen in Boston. “Colored girls are treated just as any girl is treated by the Boston YWCA.” However, once there was a pool in the new Clarendon Street facility, the policy was anything but inviting. Unlike other community organizations, groups from the Robert Gould Shaw House had to make special requests of the YWCA board in order to use the pool. Young women of color who were members of YWCA clubs could swim when the club did, but they were not welcome as individuals during free swim periods. Since fewer than sixty African-American women were members of the YWCA in the 1930s, this effectively limited the number of women of color to ever use the pool. Although the board claimed a no-discrimination policy, the daily reality for women of color was still often an “unwelcome sign.”¹⁹

Reflecting the national pattern, the local student YW moved more quickly than the city association toward integration. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as the city YWCA haltingly confronted its own racism and clarified its policies, the student YW was taking much stronger action to diversify itself. Women represented several colleges, including Simmons, the Practical Arts and Letters College and the College of Liberal Arts of Boston University, and Sargent College. Following the national student convention in 1923, several local women decided to find a way of better understanding racial issues in Boston. Their efforts included regular discussions, research about racial practices, and organized action.

The student group initially received help from Constance Ridley, a secretary at Robert Gould Shaw House, who assisted in organizing a first meeting between black and white women. "In the first discussions, there was considerable groping about in an endeavor to become familiar with the general aspects of the problem, but by autumn the group seemed eager to concentrate upon a definite line of study for the year and to give honest thought and preparation to the meetings."²⁰

By the fall of 1925, with growing talk and trust, the group expanded to twelve African-American and twelve white members, with a regular program of monthly meetings. Each meeting included discussion, often based on readings, and a program "revealing the cultural contributions of the modern Negro." The group received a boost the following year when two members of the National Conference of Settlements at Cleveland, Ohio, said that the Boston group's meetings "had made the greatest advance of any in the country in promoting right race relations."²¹

The student group grew in membership and developed more activist tactics. Research committees studied racial problems and issues throughout the city and attempted to influence their resolution. The Education Committee assembled African-American and white representatives from fourteen local schools and colleges. They collected information, made reports, and organized discussion groups of African-American and white students on their respective campuses. At the time no nursing schools or hospitals accepted women of color for nurses' training. The Interracial Committee set a goal to change this policy and met quietly and without publicity with doctors, hospital superintendents, and trustees. In 1929, after much effort, two young women were admitted to the Nurses Training Course at Boston City Hospital.

The group also researched conditions in industry and business. The industry initiative collaborated with efforts of the Boston Urban League to analyze and publicize the job situation for men and women of color. The Urban League placed about 1,000 of 5,000 applicants for jobs, mostly in domestic service. The committee collected information documenting the difficulties of African-Americans in obtaining work in clerical positions and the Boston Elevated (the subway system), as well as discrimination in wages for women of color once they received a position. Students teamed up to study businesses' racial practices. Women of color who attempted to eat at certain lunch counters or use facilities at a store reported their experiences to the study group, and white members interviewed business leaders. Records were kept of ways in which the practices did not match the declared policies: "The report of practices was seldom wholly praiseworthy."²²

The student YW Interracial Committee continued its work until 1944, although its greatest impact appears to have been between 1925 and 1930. According to the 1944 report, its biggest problem was the short life span of each college generation. Just when members of the group were educated and ready to make an impact, they would graduate, and the process would have to begin again. A further difficulty in evaluating their work was not knowing the committee's influence on students in their later years.

Despite these problems, members of the early Interracial Committee were seen as real pioneers, stepping into untried territory by talking and working together. Constance Ridley Heslip continued to support the group through the Robert Gould Shaw House and the National Conference of Settlement Workers. Helen Morton, longtime volunteer and secretary of the Interracial Committee, went on to become executive secretary of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, YWCA.

Through “eternal vigilance and . . . never letting any situation reach a crisis,” discriminatory actions (except for the pool policy) were discouraged and dealt with and gradually a small number of African-Americans became more involved in programs. Still, some women of color who were very active in their community did not support the YW because their experience found the organization to be “prejudiced and discriminatory.” A study carried out by the YWCA in 1930 made a telling recommendation: “That serious consideration be given to the fact that there is a very large colored group within our immediate neighborhood, with whom the Association is at present doing practically nothing.”²³

Women of color were more likely to engage in community activity through their community churches and settlement houses or through women’s groups such as the Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs. The national YWCA recognized the need for the support of black women’s organizations as early as 1920, when their minutes of the Board of Colored Work said, “The Federation is a very powerful organization and that as it is necessary to have the cooperation of such sister organizations, the YWCA should make a decided effort to secure the good will of the Federation.”²⁴

Several steps had been taken to confront racism throughout the YWCA by 1930. The national organization ended its Council on Colored Work, chaired by Eva Bowles, because the goals of the subcommittee had become an integral part of the whole organization. Committees of local organizations now had both African-American and white women. Three cities had women of color on their boards: Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia. A woman serving in a leadership role in a branch would become a member of the central association and could then be appointed to the national board, usually as chair of the Colored Work Committee. Policymaking levels of the organization were becoming integrated, even when the branches themselves were not.²⁵

YWCA-sponsored Industrial Clubs had a solid grounding in work for both African-American and white women, and the Girl Reserves were more closely united. Leadership activity of black branches led to the training and raising through the ranks of many women of color, who had positions of leadership either in their local branches or within the national organization.

The student organization had achieved a certain level of interracial knowledge and understanding. African-American and white students learned from one another and established ties through several generations of students on both northern and southern campuses. Still, for many women who advocated full integration of policy, finances, and power, the progress was extremely slow and difficult.²⁶

The national YWCA, through its annual convention, established in 1936 a number of resolutions urging local groups to study racial relations in their cities and work toward better understanding. Following this national push, the Boston board expressed increasing concern for the lack of service to the African-American community and requested the Program Committee to make a study of this issue. The study was the most thorough ever undertaken by the Boston association. It included investigation of every group connected with the YW, an inquiry into recreation facilities in the community, and a week-long visit by Isobel Lawson, a woman of color serving as secretary of the National Services Division. She interviewed key persons in the city and held meetings with various groups within the local YW.

The Program Committee made its report in 1939. It showed that sixty-four women of color participated in programs. Half were seventeen or younger, the other half between ages seventeen and thirty-five. Nearly all the women were in clubs. All were

single and lived in Boston or Roxbury. The recommendations were clear: the YW was still seen by women of color as discriminatory, and more active messages had to get out to the community. Specific measures were encouraged, such as having women of color serve on the board and inviting volunteers from the African-American community to come to club meetings to talk about subjects other than race. As part of the recommendations from this report, the pool was finally declared open to all women. While the report sounded far-reaching, the truth of the allegations is seen in the fact that its recommendations were not publicized, and no clear messages were immediately sent to the nearby African-American community.²⁷

More progress was made in increasing the number of women of color on the board. Boston had followed the national recommendation that its Industrial Clubs be interracial. In 1940, Sara Conyers, an African-American member of one of these Industrial Clubs, was appointed to the board, representing that group of working-women members. The following year, in line with one of the 1939 report's suggestions, the board invited community leader Lucy Miller Mitchell to run for board office. Mitchell was by then directing the nursery program at the Robert Gould Shaw House and was a respected professional in the developing field of nursery and day-care education. Following her election to the YWCA board, she served for seven years, chairing the Public Affairs Committee.

Mitchell recalls that even though policies in general had been agreed upon by the board to welcome people of color to all the programs, a huge job remained to encourage racial mixing of club groups, craft groups, and gym programs. The process of changing these practices and making the pool truly available to blacks involved constant work, it being "slow but steady, and the pressure never let up!" Mitchell constantly interpreted the YW to the community through the work of the Public Affairs Committee. She has understated her own achievements, saying her activities were "not spectacular, and received no publicity, but were meaningful and had impact on community attitudes and practices." The accomplishment she valued most was the complete integration of the pool by the time she left office.²⁸

The national organization played a significant role in the increasing integration of the Boston association. Its pushing local YWCAs to become more inclusive constantly provided a powerful model for women working together. It acted as a support and justification to those in the local association who wished to confront racism. By 1940, they had issued their call for extensive study and reform, and the local association could use the national policy and reports to give weight to their arguments. The Boston student and city YWCA responded to stimulation from the national leadership. Conventions and visits by national secretaries continually prodded the local organizations for response. In 1923, the student group organized the first interracial study group in Boston, following a national convention attended by several Boston student YW representatives. Visits from the national leadership urged the city group along throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The national convention of 1936, urging local groups to study their own interracial practices, led the Boston YW to finally clarify and expand its local policies and compile a report documenting its struggles. Movement on the local level was closely related to activities of the national association.

A second force in confronting racism was the strong belief of many YWCA women that their faith called them to serve all women. They accepted the moral power of the argument that the YWCA was a Christian organization and that Christian principles of equality, love for all, the oneness of all under Christ, were compelling reasons for

action — the power of social gospel Christianity. As the current president of the national YWCA likes to remind today's members, "They were Christian women and they were living out their Christianity. They talk about being compelled, that 'Our Christianity compels us to do certain kinds of things, and that if we are true Christians then we are compelled to take action.' They were compelled, not just to believe, but to take action." As Mitchell said, "As one of the most influential Christian bodies in the country, both at the student and community level, there wouldn't be any other stand that the organization could take other than to be in the forefront of eradicating racism in this country." While this might be true, the argument needed to be made constantly and coherently throughout the board and membership meetings, and women within the YWCA, through their constant talk, continued to build the context for understanding this moral argument. Their sense of being compelled to act gave women an intensity, a fervor, which overcame other powerful cultural messages of racism and silence and gave them a clarity of purpose and courage to act. Their voicing of the moral argument was unending, coherent, and powerful.²⁹

When asked how pressure was applied to change the YW, Mitchell smiled. "We just kept talking," she said. "At every meeting we would raise issues, we kept bringing them up, and presenting the rationale and reasonableness and moral power of our arguments. Eventually our position prevailed." This statement is a testimony to a different kind of power that women have when they find their "voice," when they speak out consistently, firmly, argumentatively, out of the place of connection in their lives between goals and practice.³⁰

In 1946, Dorothy Height was elected the first African-American chairperson of the national board, and the association made its strongest statement against racism, in the Interracial Charter. The charter stated: "Wherever there is injustice on the basis of race . . . our protest must be clear and our labor for its removal vigorous and steady." When Mitchell's term on the board ended two years later, the Boston YWCA was a fully integrated organization on paper and becoming more so through its actual policies. Where 64 women of color were members of the association in 1938, the 1944 report showed 151 members. The student department claimed the largest number of participants, with the younger girls having the next largest. The swimming pool was completely integrated.³¹

Speaking Out

This movement had proceeded slowly and needed constant prodding. Pressure came from both African-American and white women at every level of the YWCA — the national office, the student YW, and women within and outside the Boston organization. The student YWCA in Boston followed the pattern of the student groups in the South and Midwest. Its interracial group met throughout the twenties, acting as a catalyst and model for the work other student YWCAs did in developing connections between races. In the city organization there were efforts to diversify that met with modest success. The first effort of women of color to organize a branch of the YWCA in Boston came in 1925, but was not supported by either the city or the national association. The local group did not respond to the calls of the national board for studies of the community, and in 1929, when the new facility was built, it expressed concern that the YW reach out to women in the African-American community. Again in 1936, responding to the national call for further work, it began a

major study of the association and its relationship to women of color. Following this study, and as a direct result of its recommendations, the YWCA in Boston elected Lucy Miller Mitchell to the board and supported the Interracial Charter of 1946.³²

Constance Ridley Heslip, Helen Morton, Eva Bowles, Lucy Mitchell, and many others at every level of the YWCA faced a difficult challenge. Each of them felt compelled to keep talking, setting every action within a moral context and making connections between the policies and practices of the YW. They confronted the disparities, educated the organization's leaders and members, and kept the pressure on for a diverse, welcoming, and just YWCA. 🐼

Notes

1. The YWCA was considered to be more interracial than the YMCA; see Vincent P. Franklin, "In Pursuit of Freedom: The Educational Activities of Black Social Organization in Philadelphia, 1900–1930," in *Papers and Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Midwest History of Education Society* (12th), Chicago, October 29–30, 1976, 94. "This advance toward sisterhood at a snail's pace . . . must also be seen in the perspective of comparing it with the much less successful efforts of other women's and community organizations." Gerda Lerner, ed., *Black Women in White America: A Documentary History* (New York: Vintage, 1973), 479.
2. Lucy Miller Mitchell, *Black Women Oral History Project*, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, 1987, 49. Much recent work by Carol Gilligan and others has shed light on women's moral development and the ways in which women experience their own knowledge. For a discussion of "silence," "voice," and "connected knowing," see Mary Field Belenky et al., *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
3. *YWCA Annual Report*, 1867. Thousands of Irish immigrants came to Boston after 1845, and young Irish women needed the kind of residential and employment support offered by the YWCA. While many Bostonians agreed with the superintendent, many Irish leaders discouraged their young women from the organization as well, because of its requirement that the women follow daily Protestant worship.
4. *YWCA Annual Reports*, 1880–1890.
5. The national YWCA was formed following nearly twenty years of negotiations between the international YWCA, which represented primarily groups in New England cities, and the American committee, representing midwestern student associations. The Boston YWCA, founded in 1866, was the first city association. The first student YWCA was formed in 1873 at the Illinois State Normal School, and the first "colored association on friendly terms with the white association but not part of it" began in Dayton, Ohio, in 1893. Mary S. Sims, *The Natural History of a Social Institution: The YWCA* (New York: Woman's Press, 1936), 173.
6. Jane Olcott Walters, ed., "Young Women's Christian Association History of Colored Work: Chronological Excerpts from Reports of Secretaries and Workers and from Minutes Showing Development of the Work among Colored Women, 1907–1920," typescript, 1920, September 1907, 2, 3. There was also a small city group in Kansas City and presumably the one Sims mentions in Dayton.
7. *Ibid.*, national subcommittee report, 1910, 8.
8. *Ibid.*, 17, 19, 24, 1912; Lerner, *Black Women in White America*, 479–488; Jean Blackwell Hutson, "Eva delVakia Bowles," in *Notable American Women 1607–1950: A Biographical Dictionary*, Edward T. James, Janet Wilson James and Paul S. Boyer, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 214–215.
9. Walters, "YWCA History," Report by Bowles, October 20, 1915, 42.
10. *Ibid.*, Report, Conde, December 20, 1916, 59.

11. "Interracial Practices in Community YWCA's," in Gladys Gilkey Calkins, "The Negro in the Young Women's Christian Association: A Study of the Development of YWCA Interracial Policies and Practices," master's thesis, George Washington University, 1960, 55. For a larger discussion of the YWCA role in women's labor history, see Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, "Survival Strategies Among African-American Workers: A Continuing Process," in *Women, Work, and Protest: A Century of US Women's Labor History*, Ruth Milkman, ed. (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 148–150.
12. Robert C. Hayden, *Faith, Culture and Leadership: A History of the Black Church in Boston* (Boston: NAACP, 1983), 1–2.
13. Mitchell, *Black Women Oral History Project*.
14. Eva D. Bowles felt strongly that all members should work for total inclusiveness of the YWCA and not support racially-separate YW branches. "Chronological History of Interracial Practices, Boston Young Women's Christian Association, 1918–1944," 4–6.
15. *Ibid.*, 4.
16. "William Monroe Trotter, One-Man Protester," slide/tape, Institute for Boston Studies, Boston College, 1985.
17. *Boston Post*, May 25, 1926; "Chronological History of Interracial Practices," 2–4.
18. "The History of the Interracial Committee Which was Sponsored by the Student Y.W.C.A., Boston, Massachusetts, 1924–1944," 3.
19. *Boston American*, May 24, 1926; *Boston Post*, May 25, 1926; "Summary of Chronological History of Interracial Practices of the Boston YWCA, 1918–1944," 5–6.
20. "History of the Interracial Committee," 1; Ridley's name appears as Constance Ridley Heslip later in the report.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, 2–3. Unfortunately no further details are provided.
23. "Area Studies, 1930," Boston YWCA study of neighborhoods near the Clarendon Street building; Melnea Cass, *Black Women Oral History Project*, 87. Cass returned to the YW as an older woman, and the Clarendon Street building now bears her name. The 1944 history supported Cass's view: "The YWCA from 1920 made slow but steady progress in race relations . . . The Negroes have at times had just cause to doubt our sincerity . . . Experiences did not add to their confidence in us as a Christian organization." "Summary of Chronological History," 9.
24. Walters, "YWCA History," Minutes, Board of Colored Work, September 24, 1920, 78.
25. Calkins, "Negro in the YWCA," 63.
26. Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York: Bantam, 1984), 155–158.
27. "Summary of Chronological History," 5–6.
28. Mitchell, *Black Women Oral History Project*, 48–50, and personal interview, August 1988, Boston.
29. Mitchell interview; Glendora Putnam, personal interview, October 1990, Boston; Calkins, "Negro in the YWCA," 23, 24.
30. Mitchell interview, 1988.
31. Interracial Charter of the YWCA, 1946; "Summary of Chronological History," 9.
32. It was 1968 before the Boston YWCA established a branch in the African-American community and women of color were widely served by the organization and active participants in it. An oral history project documenting the establishment of Aswalos House in Roxbury is currently under way.

Beyond the Party-Group Continuum

Massachusetts Interest Groups in the 1980s

John C. Berg

Studies in the 1960s determined that Massachusetts had strong parties and weak interest groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Republican Party shrank, party competition declined, conflict with the Democratic Party grew, and interest groups gained more importance — and probably will remain important despite the Republican gains of 1990. However, group conflict and citizen mobilization, including increased use of the initiative and referendum, create a situation of interest-centered conflict rather than interest-group dominance as traditionally conceived. This article, based on a 1987 survey of state legislators and legislative aides, plus a summary of recent Massachusetts political history, assesses the relative importance of various types of groups and of particular organizations.

Studies of state interest-group politics by V. O. Key, Jr., Sarah McCally Morehouse, and others posit an inverse relationship between the strength of groups and the strength of political parties.¹ In one sense, such a relationship is logically necessary; if parties dominate politics, groups cannot, and vice versa. Morehouse rightly distinguishes between states in which groups can act only through the parties and those in which powerful groups can ignore the parties, offering the domination of Alabama by the Farm Bureau as a classic example of the latter.² Studies of Massachusetts interest groups in the 1950s and 1960s accepted this relationship and classified the state as having a strong two-party system with weak groups.³ However, the most recent of these studies was published in 1969; Morehouse's later book simply reports the conclusions of the earlier studies.

Great changes in the last two decades have moved Massachusetts closer to the interest-group end of the interest-group/political-party dominance scale. However, I believe that movement along this scale does not convey the whole picture. While the interest groups are now much stronger than the parties, they do not dominate Massachusetts politics. They are kept from doing so not by the parties, but by inter-group conflict.

The most dramatic change in Massachusetts politics has been the rise in Democratic Party dominance of the legislature. The Democrats won control of both houses for the first time ever in 1958 and have not lost it since. In the 1976 election,

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Republican numbers in the state Senate dropped below the level needed (8 members) to force a roll call vote and continued to hover just above or below this line until 1990.⁴ During the 1980s the Republicans failed to contest most seats. If every Republican candidate in the 1986 election had won (and only 58 percent of them did), the Democrats would still have retained control of both houses by virtue of the 114 uncontested seats. (See Table 1 for a summary of this election for the House.)

Table 1

**Party Competition in Massachusetts Legislative
Election, 1986 — House of Representatives**

Party Affiliation of Winning Candidate	Party Contest	Contest with Independent	Unopposed	Total Seats
Democrat	23	11	92	126
Republican	14	3	16	33
Independent	1	—	—	1

Source: Calculated from *Massachusetts Election Statistics, 1986*, sec. 133, 198–357.

Although Ronald Reagan carried the state in both 1980 and 1984, Republicans did not win any statewide or federal elected office between the election of Senator Edward Brooke in 1972 and that of Governor William Weld, Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci, and Treasurer Joseph Malone in 1990. During that time the question often was not whether the Republicans would win, but whether they would manage to field candidates. In 1986, the first two Republican candidates for governor withdrew from the ballot in the face of scandal and the Republicans failed to contest 7 of the 10 Democratic seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 of the 8 seats in the all-Democratic Executive Council, 22 of the 29 Democratic seats in the state Senate, and 103 of the 126 Democratic seats in the House of Representatives.⁵

As might be expected, one result of the two decades of Democratic prosperity was the loss of whatever internal coherence the party might have had. Massachusetts developed an electoral pattern similar to that of the one-party South. In both the state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives, the renomination of incumbents was rarely challenged; but when a vacancy occurred, there was a mad primary scramble among as many as six candidates. The primary winner — often with far less than a majority of the vote — then faced only token or no opposition from the Republicans and was generally able to retain the seat for as long as he or she chose. (A similar pattern prevailed among the Republicans in the few strongholds they retained through the 1980s.)⁶ The preprimary endorsement conventions for statewide offices do little to strengthen the parties, since any candidate who gets as much as 15 percent of the delegate vote can and does go on to the primary.

Things changed dramatically in 1990. Taking advantage of a state budget crisis, the Republicans won the elections for governor, lieutenant governor, and state treasurer. Led by its aggressive chairman, Ray Shamie, the Republican State Committee increased its paid staff to 28 and recruited legislative candidates energetically. Republicans contested 37 of the 40 state Senate seats and won 16, doubling their strength in that body. Having won 38 House seats, they seem determined to bring

two-party competition back to Massachusetts.⁷ However, the Democrats continue to dominate the state legislature, hold all 11 (soon to be reduced) seats in the U.S. House and both U.S. Senate seats, and tend to dismiss the 1990 Republican victories as a fluke. Republicans John Volpe and Francis Sargent held the governor's office from 1967 to 1974 without seriously threatening Democratic dominance of the state, and many Democratic legislators hope that Weld's term will meet the same fate. Events may prove them wrong; but so far the Republican gains have had little effect on the *modus operandi* of the Democratic Party policymakers.

Individual Democratic politicians may have strong organizations, but these are purely personal. Such organizations work hard for their leader but have little or no effect on nominations for other offices. This is especially true in the downward direction: a local official may call on his or her troops to work for a gubernatorial candidate, but any attempt by a governor to influence the outcome of a local primary contest is likely to be deeply resented and counterproductive. Thus Governor Michael Dukakis, who possessed one of the strongest personal organizations of any Massachusetts politician, chose to stay out of contests for lieutenant governor in 1982 and 1986, even though he subsequently had to run on a joint ticket with the victor.

Although the absence of a strong Democratic Party organization might lead to a chaotic legislature, it does not, because power in the General Court is highly centralized in the hands of the Senate president and the House speaker. The two presiding officers are chosen by majority vote of the members of their respective chambers, but once elected, each possesses a multitude of resources for consolidating his (or potentially, her) power. Unlike the U.S. Congress, the Massachusetts General Court has no seniority system. Committee memberships and chairmanships, office space, furniture, additional staff support beyond the one aide to which each member is entitled, patronage jobs in the State House, and even parking space in the state garages are all under the control of the presiding officers. Legislative leaders also control significant patronage in the state's executive branch, because another of the peculiarities of the state's constitution permits the legislature to define the terms of office — including terms for life — of all executive officials other than judges and elected constitutional officers. The legislature generally must both authorize positions and permit them to be filled.⁸ Until 1967, governors often were unable to choose their own major department heads.⁹

The privileges and positions of legislators can be conferred or withdrawn by the leadership at any time. Moreover, many top positions carry salary increments, so that members' pocketbooks as well as their power depend on the leaders' will. Those who wield this power too strongly risk being deposed by the membership, as in 1985, when Speaker Thomas McGee was ousted by George Keverian. But challenges to sitting leaders are rare, so they have a good deal of leeway in legislative matters.

Since the Democrats held both the governorship and the two legislative leadership positions from 1975 to 1991, strong party coordination of policy might have been possible. But in practice, the Democrats' numerical strength was so great that much of the pressure for unity was removed, and disputes among the three powerful Democrats were brought center stage. While the capture of the governor's office by Republican Weld has created more pressure for Democratic unity, Senate president

William Bulger and House speaker Charles Flaherty have not always succeeded in overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of the 1980s.

In a study published in 1981, Doyle and Milburn found that

because of the fluid party organizational structures within most of the New England states, the general influence on governmental policy in all six states comes from organized interests. Factions appear within the parties of the legislatures and from one gubernatorial officer (often of the same party) to another.¹⁰

One might question whether the divisions within the party today constitute “factions,” but the incoherence of the Democratic Party on policy questions remains. The way is clear for the influence of interest groups.

The Current Interest-Group Scene

To discover what legislators and legislative staff thought about various interest groups, I drew up a survey and sent forms to every member of the legislature in the fall of 1987. I asked the members to fill out one copy themselves and give another one to a staff aide. I received replies from 42 of the 200 legislators and from 36 staff members. This response rate is not high enough to show significant patterns through statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the responses were suggestive in some areas. While it is possible that some important groups were not mentioned by the respondents, we can fairly conclude that any group that *was* mentioned frequently has some importance. The survey form requested information about the activity and influence of six types of interest groups: business groups, professional groups, labor, grassroots community groups, religious groups, and women’s groups. Respondents were asked about the activity and influence of each category of group, then asked to identify the particular groups in each category they thought were most important.

Respondents were also asked to rate the seven types of groups separately by three different criteria: how often they heard from each type; how likely their own vote (or their boss’s, in the case of aides) was to be influenced by that type of group; and how much influence that type of group had on the outcome of legislation. The responses were averaged, and interest-group types ranked, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Composite Rankings of Interest-Group Influence

Type of Group	Frequency of Contact		Influence on Personal Vote		Influence on Outcome of Legislation	
	Legislator	Aide	Legislator	Aide	Legislator	Aide(tie)
Labor	4	5	3	6	1	1/2
Business	2	1	5	5	2	1/2
Environmentalist	1	3	1	2	3	5
Grassroots citizens	3	2	2	1	4	3
Professional	5	4	6	3	5	4
Women’s	6	6	4	4	6	6
Religious	7	7	7	7	7	7

Source: Calculated from my survey, November–December 1987.

These figures show a certain amount of cynicism on the part of the respondents; while their own votes are most influenced by environmentalist and grassroots citizens groups, they perceive business and labor as having the most influence on leg-

islative decisions. Similarly, respondents see themselves as more responsive than the legislature as a whole to women's groups. This may show that the sample is unrepresentative; proportionately more women than men responded. (Twelve female and 26 male legislators filled out questionnaires; in 1987, 37 of the 200 members were female.) But it may also represent a recognition of what one respondent wrote on the questionnaire: "Most high-powered lobby efforts are really geared toward the House speaker, Senate president, and a few key committee chairmen because the rank and file legislators rarely vote against what these people say."

Table 3 shows the specific groups most often mentioned by both legislators and staff members in response to a request to list by name "the most powerful [groups] in Massachusetts."

Table 3

Legislative and Staff Mentions of the Most Powerful Groups in Massachusetts

Group	Legislator	Staff
Associated Industries of Massachusetts	12	7
Citizens for Limited Taxation	12	7
Insurance industry	11	6
Massachusetts Teachers Association	12	7
AFL-CIO	8	5
Massachusetts Hospital Association	6	6
Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts	6	3
Massachusetts Bar Association	5	3
Massachusetts High Tech Council	4	2
Massachusetts Municipal Association	7	3
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group	4	5
Gun Owners Action League	4	2
League of Women Voters	1	3
Chamber of Commerce	0	3
Massachusetts Medical Society	1	4

Source: Calculated from my survey, November–December 1987.

Those mentioned most frequently include business (Associated Industries of Massachusetts), local government (Massachusetts Municipal Association), labor (AFL-CIO, Massachusetts Teachers Association, Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts), and citizens groups of the left (Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group) and the right (Citizens for Limited Taxation). On most major issues, powerful groups are likely to be opposed to one another, yet each of these groups has some issues over which it is the dominant influence. A clearer picture will emerge when we examine each type of group separately.

Business in Massachusetts Politics

Discussion of interest groups' resources usually covers votes, money, and information.¹¹ Business, taken collectively, has an additional resource: without its cooperation, the economy will cease to function. Labor, too, can bring the system to a halt by striking, but a union strike is an extraordinary event. A corporation's decision to move a Massachusetts plant to a new location is simply an everyday business decision, what Charles Lindblom calls "the privileged position of business."¹² Polit-

ical leaders must meet the needs of the business community regardless of their lobbying effort. Since business leaders are also effective lobbyists, their power is maximized.

The clearest example of this privileged position came in 1975–1976. With the state facing a recession and a budget crisis, a group of large financial institutions, led by the (then) First National Bank of Boston, declared that it would not buy any of several forthcoming state debt offerings unless several conditions were met, some of which were economic in the narrow sense. So-called moral obligation notes had to be replaced by those backed with the full faith and credit of the state, short-term notes with long-term bonds, and the new bonds were sold with above-market interest rates. But other conditions were more political. In November of 1975 the banks insisted that a “credible” state budget be passed before they would purchase \$131 million in notes. The ensuing budget cut 8,000 cases from the general relief category of welfare, reduced social service programs by \$300 million, eliminated planned cost-of-living increases for welfare clients and state workers, and raised taxes by \$350 million.¹³

Legislators and aides were asked to list the groups in each of the seven categories shown in Table 2 from which they heard most frequently. Table 4 gives the most frequently named business groups, with other information about them as reported to the Office of the Secretary of State for 1986. However, while some specific groups do stand out — Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM), the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and the Business Round Table in particular — other organizations tend to blend with the broader interest in respondents’ perceptions. Thus there were six mentions by name of the Massachusetts Hospital Association (MHA), but five other citations of hospitals or the health care industry. This doesn’t indicate that the MHA is weak, but that it has chosen an effective lobbying strategy.

One state senator, dissatisfied with the survey form, added a written comment: “Your survey fails to delineate the type of lobbying which is effective. If groups have members who are my constituents who contact me — especially on a personal level as opposed to petition or pre-printed letter — I listen. Otherwise ‘groups’ don’t influence me very much other than local groups.” Because this statement could be applied to many legislators, the MHA accordingly seeks to present its cause through representatives of local hospitals, not just in its own name.

The group mentioned most often, AIM, is the umbrella group for Massachusetts manufacturing. As such it concerns itself with the overall business climate; it seeks to lower taxes, limit regulation, and counterbalance the influence of labor unions on such issues as worker’s compensation and plant-closing legislation. With eight paid legislative agents, AIM is active and visible to legislators and their aides. However, much business lobbying focuses on the specific concerns of such regulated industries as health care, banking, insurance, and utilities. Groups representing each industry are active when that industry’s interests are at stake, so that the relative prominence of any particular group is more an indication of what the legislature is doing that year than of any group’s inherent influence.

Professional groups, listed separately on the survey form, might better be considered a subset of business groups. Respondents mentioned doctors (the Massachusetts Medical Society) and lawyers (the Massachusetts Bar Association) most prominently.¹⁴ These groups are strongest when they are defending their professional jurisdiction against incursions by nurses or paralegals. Recently, the two groups have also con-

fronted each other over the issue of medical malpractice, with doctors seeking to limit liability and lawyers upholding the sovereignty of juries. The result has been a lack of state action, with the costs adding to health care inflation.

Table 4

Business Groups Most Often Heard From

Group	Number of Legislator Mentions	Number of Staff Mentions	Number of Paid Agents	Reported Spending, 1986
Associated Industries of Massachusetts	26	16	8	\$130,001
Massachusetts High Technology Council	10	5	2	20,357
Business Round Table	11	4	1	3,028
Chambers of Commerce*	10	11	11	134,782
Massachusetts Hospital Association	5	6	3	68,613
Life Insurance Association of Massachusetts (LIAM)*	5	5	3	134,520
Small business†	10	8	—	—

*Chambers of Commerce include eight local Chamber of Commerce organizations; LIAM includes mentions of insurance or insurance lobby.

† Most mentions were to generic small business; no one organization stood out, although several received a mention.

Source: Calculated from my survey, November–December 1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Financial Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986*, and *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed Salaries — Cross Reference*.

Organized Labor

Legislators rated labor as the most powerful interest in the state, while aides placed it in first position with business. Like business, labor possesses economic power to back up its political efforts, but labor’s economic power is harder to use, as in the difference between everyday business decisions and the rare strike or other work action by labor. Collective bargaining is an effective means of pursuing economic goals, but with the important exception of public employees, for whom decisions about wages and working conditions are simultaneously political and economic, it is difficult to use collective bargaining for political ends. Hence unions in Massachusetts have developed sizable lobbying operations. Groups classified as unions by the Secretary of State reported spending \$284,548 on lobbying activities in 1986. If we add the Massachusetts Teachers Association which, though classified as an education affairs and services group, holds numerous union contracts with local school committees, the total rises to \$359,928. Police and firefighting unions lobby so intensively that the Secretary of State gives them their own category; these groups reported spending \$178,996.

Lockard and Morehouse¹⁵ both found that Massachusetts unions were closely tied to the Democratic Party. Despite the neoliberal tendencies of former Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis, which made him hesitant to identify too closely with unions, this remained true in the 1980s. Given the Democratic dominance of the legislature, unions have felt little need to seek Republican votes. However, the unions’ influence is limited by the equally significant power of business. Rather than wage

intensive conflict for broad social change, labor in Massachusetts has generally chosen to narrow its focus. In addition, some unions are more influential than others. As a result of both these factors, much of labor's lobbying effort is devoted either to winning approval for job-creating public works projects or to improvement of the pay and working conditions of public employees. On the first, labor is as likely as not to find itself allied with business. On the second, its power is limited by budgetary constraints and opposed by antitax groups, but such opposition is normally subdued.

Table 5 shows the labor groups from which respondents reported hearing most often. Except for the umbrella AFL-CIO, which leads the list, public employees' unions dominate, with the AFL-CIO Building Trades Council the only other group to receive significant mention. In recent years the AFL-CIO has pursued interests ranging from the reform of workers' compensation to the defeat of a bottle-deposit law. It has also worked to support the aims of the other unions listed in the table. But despite internal pressure from its left wing, the AFL-CIO has not pursued a broad working-class agenda. When it has done so, its efforts have met with only limited success.

For example, in 1984 unions endorsed a bill sponsored by then state representative Thomas Gallagher, a Boston Democrat, to protect workers from plant closings. Basic industry in Massachusetts has been declining, and several of the state's smaller cities have seen the closing of factories that were the mainstay of the local economy.

Table 5

Labor Groups Most Often Heard From

Group	Number of Legislator Mentions	Number of Staff Mentions	Number of Paid Agents	Reported Spending, 1986
AFL-CIO	30	15		
Massachusetts			2	\$67,581
Greater Boston			1	24,708
Teachers				
Massachusetts Teachers Association	10	8	8	75,380
Massachusetts Federation of Teachers	2	2	1	40,545
MTA and MFT	2	1		
Firefighters	10	4		
Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts			2	5,254
International Association of Firefighters, Boston				
Police and firefighters	1	1		2,400
5 police unions*			8	110,133
AFL-CIO Building Trades Council	7	3	1	3,666
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees	6	4	2	69,000
Service Employees International Union (includes locals 254, 285, and 509)	6	5	2	36,933

* Combined total for Boston Police Alliance, Boston Police Patrolman's Association, Massachusetts Police Association, International Brotherhood of Police Officers/National Association of Government Employees, and State Police Association of Massachusetts.

Source: Calculated from my survey, November–December 1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Financial Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986*, and *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed Salaries — Cross Reference*.

This industrial decline was counterbalanced during the 1980s by the growth of jobs in the service sector and in high-technology industry, so that the statewide unemployment rate was low until the end of the decade. But even at the height of what became known as the Massachusetts miracle, the new jobs either paid less than the old ones or went to different people; hence members of the unskilled industrial work force suffered, and locally depressed areas persisted even when the boom was at its height.

Gallagher's bill would have required advance notice of layoffs on a graduated scale, from one month for layoffs of 50 to 99 employees to one year for layoffs of 1,000 or more. Companies that failed to give notice would have had to offer severance pay to each employee in proportion to the notice not given. It would also have helped community-based nonprofit organizations take over the operation of closed plants. Although the bill was cosponsored by 81 of the 160 state representatives and 11 of the 40 senators, it was blocked by the insistence of the Massachusetts High Technology Council that its members would refuse to expand their operations in Massachusetts if the bill passed. Rather than choose sides, Governor Dukakis called all parties together to try to effect a compromise. After protracted negotiations, a much weakened version of the bill was enacted, which made advance notice voluntary and provided some funds for retraining workers. Despite intense dissatisfaction with the law as passed, Gallagher and the unions ultimately supported it as the best they could hope to get.

Since the 1980s the AFL-CIO has tried to increase its strength by involving its rank-and-file members. Local activists have been urged to run as delegates to state Democratic conventions. In 1983 the unions, which had not yet endorsed a presidential candidate for the 1984 election, demonstrated their strength by asking delegates to write in the word *jobs* for a presidential straw poll taken at the state convention. "Jobs" came in second to Walter Mondale, with 25.6 percent of the vote. While this reaffirmed labor's importance to the party, it is difficult to trace any specific policy results to it.¹⁶

Labor won a dramatic referendum victory in the 1988 general election. The Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an interest group of builders who employ nonunion workers, had placed repeal of the Massachusetts prevailing wage law on the ballot by initiative petition. The ABC portrayed the law as helping only highly paid construction workers while driving up the cost of local government. The unions might have been vulnerable to these arguments, but they defined the issue successfully as one of broad class solidarity. Most of their campaign shunned debate on the specifics for such broad slogans as "Question 2 — Bad for You" and, on a suitably illustrated billboard, "Listen to Mama — Vote No on 2." All members of the AFL-CIO Building Trades Council in Massachusetts were assessed \$50 for the campaign fund, and thousands worked the polls on Election Day. Despite one serious gaffe, when a worker who appeared in a television advertisement was found to have made \$70,000 in the previous year, the unions won by a landslide. The victory was defensive, but the new level of rank-and-file mobilization obtained carries the possibility of growing strength in the future.¹⁷

As stated above, most labor lobbying is done by public employees' unions. This is understandable; since their pay and working conditions are set by elected officials, public employees are the most directly affected by political decisions. Unions repre-

senting state employees seek to legislate pay raises and job security directly, while those representing employees of local government seek state standards for salaries and working conditions and state aid to help local government pay the bills. Unions of teachers, police officers, and firefighters have been particularly effective in influencing legislation. In return, they are able to deliver campaign contributions and the votes of their members in the district. Normally the result has been a classic case of what Theodore Lowi has called “interest group liberalism”;¹⁸ public employees’ unions, which press strongly for particularized benefits, are opposed only by diffuse taxpayer resistance, so they normally win. This has often been the case in Massachusetts, but not always, as we shall see.

Grassroots Lobbying

The civil rights and campus protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s spawned a host of community organizations all across Massachusetts. Some were launched by former campus activists seeking to broaden their base, others by local residents who saw and admired the successes of groups elsewhere. All shared some relation to the New Left tenet that all people have a right to participate in making those decisions which affect their lives. These local groups developed a wide repertory of political tactics, from civil disobedience to picketing officials’ homes to mass attendance at legislative hearings. While many such groups were unable to sustain grassroots involvement and burned themselves out after a few years, a few have developed funding mechanisms and membership structures that have enabled them to attain permanence. The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, more commonly known as MassPIRG, is a typical example.

MassPIRG is part of a national PIRG network, inspired by and still affiliated with Ralph Nader. Nader’s idea was that college students vote to have a per capita fee added to their tuition bills, either as a portion of the student activities fee or as an additional levy, and paid in a lump sum to a state PIRG, which would conduct research and lobby in the public interest — at least as PIRG conceived it. The idea caught on at several campuses, providing MassPIRG with a stable membership and source of funds.

This official campus funding arrangement is unique to the state PIRGs. In addition, MassPIRG uses a technique it shares with a number of similar organizations, the professional canvass. Full- and part-time canvassers, many of them students, are hired on commission to go door to door, talking about PIRG’s current campaigns and asking for contributions. No canvasser is likely to grow rich under this arrangement, but many young people find it rewarding to pick up some ready cash while contributing to a cause they believe in. The canvass produces new dues-paying members, occasional activists, and a steady source of funds to pay the expenses of organizing, research, and lobbying.

MassPIRG has sought to represent the diffuse interests of citizens and consumers, counteracting the tendency toward “interest-group liberalism” cited above. Typical MassPIRG legislative goals have included mail-in voter registration, the closing of nuclear power plants, more rigorous testing of drinking water, and requiring developers to include child-care facilities in large commercial or industrial properties.¹⁹

MassPIRG, together with a group of similar grassroots organizations, played a central role in the development of the initiative petition as a lobbying tool. Article 48 of the amendments to the Massachusetts constitution, which provides for the right of initiative, was ratified in 1918 but had fallen into relative disuse by the early 1960s. However, the initiative has seen a revival in the last two decades. Early efforts included unsuccessful attempts to regulate utility rates and enact a bottle-deposit law, and a successful one to allow cities and towns to tax business property at a higher rate than residential property. By the late 1970s, citizen-originated referenda often dominated the otherwise uninteresting ballot in statewide elections.

Such groups as MassPIRG and Massachusetts Fair Share liked the initiative because it not only gave them a chance to defeat better-financed interests, but also provided the kind of organizing tactic they needed to maintain their mass membership base. These advantages soon became apparent to another group that felt excluded from the state's power structure, the far right. Following the well-publicized victory of the Jarvis-Gann tax-cutting initiative, Proposition 13, in California, a group called Citizens for Limited Taxation (CLT) launched an initiative drive to enact Proposition 2½. This number did not refer to the measure's position on the referendum ballot (Question 2), but to its central provision: with certain qualifications and modifications, no city or town would be permitted to set its property tax rate at more than 2½ percent of fair market value.

CLT's action touched off a protracted battle. Proposition 2½ threatened the vital interests of public employees, who feared that it would deprive local government of the money to pay them. If that wasn't enough, it also contained provisions repealing all state mandates for spending by local school authorities and abolishing compulsory arbitration of labor disputes involving police and fire departments. These provisions had been important past victories of the teachers and of the police and firefighting unions, respectively. Advocates of improved welfare, health care, and housing also opposed Proposition 2½; while their programs were state funded, they realized that the state would have to make up some of the local governments' fiscal losses, leaving less for other state functions.

Local governments themselves opposed the referendum almost unanimously, as did most other elected officials. On the other side, CLT received major support from the Massachusetts High Technology Council, from real estate interests, and less visibly from other business groups. Since the state's voters were to decide, both sides had to go beyond the usual lobbying tactics. Media advertising, bumper stickers, leafleting, and grassroots meetings burgeoned. But ultimately the chance to vote for lower taxes proved irresistible to the electorate; Proposition 2½ was enacted, 1,438,768 to 998,839, in the 1980 general election.

The initiative and referendum process leads to the enactment of a state statute. Like any statute, Proposition 2½ could have been amended or repealed by the legislature. However, CLT and its charismatic leader, Barbara Anderson, were able to combine grassroots pressure with lobbying to rule this out almost immediately. State legislators and local elected officials, almost all of whom had opposed the referendum beforehand, scrambled to get back in step with their constituents by announcing that they had got the message and would try their best to make the new law work. State aid to local government was increased, but not enough to make up for the loss in local revenues; public employees were laid off and services cut back. The

sense of crisis wore off after two or three years, but the unions had learned that there were new limits on their influence, and both left and right had learned that the initiative process can be used by either side.

Both MassPIRG and CLT remain active. In 1986, CLT employed two paid agents and reported spending \$26,612 on lobbying, while MassPIRG employed eight agents and spent \$42,950. CLT is still influential but no longer succeeds in presenting itself as the voice of the tax revolt; it never managed to develop an organized mass base from those who voted for Proposition 2½. In the survey, it was mentioned twenty times as one of the groups most commonly heard from, but only fifteen of those who mentioned it considered CLT a grassroots citizens group; the other five listed it as a business group.

CLT attempted to regain its earlier status with a second referendum in 1990, this time calling for a cut in the state income tax rate. Although the proposal — Question 3 — was endorsed by William Weld, other Republican candidates, and some Democrats, enough voters were not convinced that it made sense to cut taxes in the face of a state budget deficit of half a billion dollars. The opposition used such slogans as “It goes too far” and “I’m mad, but I’m not crazy” to separate voters’ disgust with and anger at bureaucratic waste from endorsement of this specific proposal, which was defeated.

MassPIRG’s condition has been more stable; while it never reached the height of power once attained by CLT, it continues to enjoy mixed success as it tackles controversial issues. Current MassPIRG interests include control and cleanup of toxic wastes and incentives for the use of recyclable packaging.

Environmental protection organizations in Massachusetts comprise a hybrid category. On some issues they resort to grassroots mobilization; this has been particularly true of the long battle over nuclear power and the successful effort to pass a bottle-deposit law. But much of the environmentalists’ concern has been with preserving open space and protecting the state’s wetlands and coastline from destructive development. There has been grassroots involvement on these issues, too, but the tactics have centered on education and persuasion of policymakers rather than on mass mobilization and initiative petitions. These tactics have been fairly successful; Massachusetts now has strong coastal zone management and wetlands protection laws. In part, this success may have come more easily because the protected areas are in towns inhabited by the state’s social elite. Success in cleaning up Boston Harbor, where untreated sewage washes up on beaches used by the working class, has been harder to come by.

The Catholic Church

In 1958 Duane Lockard declared that “a good deal of foolishness has been written about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Democratic party in Massachusetts.”²⁰ Much of this foolishness is still believed, yet survey legislators and staff were nearly unanimous in rating religious groups as the least influential of the groups included. The Catholic church does try to influence politics and legislation, as do Protestant churches to a lesser extent. Twenty-two legislators mentioned the Catholic church, and thirteen named the Massachusetts Council of Churches (MCC) among the religious groups most commonly heard from. Eleven aides also mentioned the Catholic church, the only group cited more than three times.²¹ But only three

respondents considered “religious groups” to have “a great deal” of influence on legislation. Moreover, the Catholic church has not been very successful in battles over policy. Its highest priorities have been restricting abortions, gaining state financial support for parochial schools, reducing access to birth control information, and preventing use of the death penalty. It has been successful only on the last issue, on which it has been joined by the liberal groups that have opposed it on the first three.

However, the church has won more often in the legislature itself; its final defeats have come in the courts, in the executive branch, or from the voters. Abortion policy provides a good example. While the right of a pregnant woman to have an abortion is protected by the U.S. Constitution and the federal courts, states are not required to pay for abortions through the Medicaid program, and no federal matching funds are provided to states that choose to pay for them. The Massachusetts legislature voted in 1979 not to pay for abortions with state funds, either for Medicaid patients or for state employees. This law was revoked by the state’s Supreme Judicial Court, which found it to be unconstitutionally discriminatory against women, and the state resumed paying for abortions.

Antiabortion forces, including the Catholic church, then sought to amend the state constitution. Amendments must be approved by two successive biennial legislatures, which meet in joint session as Constitutional Conventions (ConCons) for this purpose, and then submitted to the voters at the next general election. Advocates of abortion rights were able to slow down but not halt passage of the amendment by the ConCon. In 1986, a question on the ballot proposed amending the constitution to “allow the legislature to prohibit or regulate abortions to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution,” except for “abortions required to prevent the death of the mother.” The ensuing referendum campaign was hard fought but not particularly close; the proposed amendment was defeated by a 42 percent to 58 percent margin.²² It was a bad election for the Catholic church as a second proposed amendment, to permit state aid to religious and other private elementary and secondary schools, was defeated even more badly, 30 percent to 70 percent.

These events show that the Catholic church does not control Massachusetts, but they do raise a question about the survey results. Is the low influence reported for religious groups inconsistent with the success of the Catholic church in the legislature on these two issues? While the available evidence does not allow a definitive answer, I do not believe that the legislators and aides were responding dishonestly. Rather, many legislators are personally opposed to the right to abortion. While many of them are Catholics and see their position as part of their Catholic beliefs, they also see it as coming from within, from their own conscience, rather than from without, from pressure by church leaders. While we cannot tell what would happen in the unlikely event that the church were to change its official position, members believe that they are not responding to influence when they vote on abortion.

This interpretation is reinforced by the knowledge that the Catholic church as an organization does not represent the views of its members. While the church has made opposition to abortion rights the centerpiece of its political program, opinion surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Catholic voters are on the other side. This has been reflected in the church’s inability to deliver votes. The antiabortion amendment lost in every county in the state, but came closest in Berkshire

County, one of the most Protestant. And when the archbishop of Boston called on the faithful to vote against U.S. Congressmen Barney Frank and James Shannon in 1982, both won the election.

Women in Politics

In 1987 women made up 52.4 percent of the population of Massachusetts, but only 19 percent of the House of Representatives and 15 percent of the state Senate. There are currently no women in the state's congressional delegation.²³ Evelyn Murphy, lieutenant governor from 1987 to 1990, was the first woman to hold statewide elected office. While seeking to increase the number of women in politics, feminists have also sought to compensate for their underrepresentation through lobbying efforts.

Survey respondents ranked women's groups one step from the bottom in frequency of contact and influence on legislation. They were ranked somewhat higher in influence on the respondent's own vote, but even here were only fourth. But while legislators of both genders concur in assigning women's groups less than average influence on the outcome of legislation, these groups are more often heard from and given a better reception by women legislators than by their male colleagues (Table 6).

No doubt the selective lobbying of the most receptive representatives is a necessity, given the resource constraints faced by women's groups. Of the four women's organizations mentioned most frequently by respondents, only the National Organization for Women (NOW) reported spending any money at all on lobbying — a total of \$6,093 — with one paid agent. The League of Women Voters, Mass. Choice, and the Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus each received at least ten mentions, but did not register as lobbying organizations; presumably they rely on their members' volunteer efforts.²⁴

Despite their shortage of money, women's groups have had some success. Massachusetts has ratified the Equal Rights Amendment and adopted a similar amendment to its own constitution. The women's lobby has also won passage of a bill to

Table 6

Mean Ratings of Women's Groups by
Women Legislators and All Legislators
Massachusetts Legislature, 1987

	Mean Rating by Women Legislators (n = 12)	Mean Rating by All Legislators (n = 38)
Groups most often heard from (on a scale of 1 = never to 5 = very frequently)	3.83	3.29
Influence on own vote	3.92	3.26
Influence on outcome of legislation (on a scale of 1 = none to 5 = a great deal)	2.92	2.89

Source: Calculated from my survey, November–December 1987.

change sentencing practices to make the laws against rape more enforceable and various measures to improve the enforcement of child support orders. The feminist movement has done much to increase awareness of the problems of battered women and forced the removal or censure of some judges who have been notably insensitive on this issue.

But women's groups have met with markedly less success on issues that require spending money. Every year a broad coalition of women's groups, social service agencies, and welfare advocates launches the latest round in the Up to Poverty campaign, seeking to bring the income of AFDC recipients up to the official poverty level; but every year the shortfall between benefits and the poverty line increases. The Up to Poverty coalition is unable to overcome the constraints imposed on the budget by those who support other spending programs or oppose higher taxes.

Massachusetts Lobbyists

As interest groups grow more important, so do lobbyists. Lobbying is a growth industry in Massachusetts. In 1984, registered lobbying groups reported spending just under \$5 million. By 1986, the total had reached \$8.9 million, and final figures for 1987 are expected to approach \$10 million.²⁵

Lobbyists are composed of many types. Some are retired politicians, like former Senate president Kevin Harrington, whose six-foot-six figure can often be seen around the State House. Harrington reported lobbying income of \$123,015 in 1986 and \$199,336 in 1987 from sources including insurance interests, the Shell Oil Company, and the Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute.²⁶ Some are professional lobbyists who have worked their way up through their skill and contacts. A good example is William R. Delaney, a retired police officer who launched a lobbying firm, Delaney Associates, in 1980. In 1987 the firm earned \$593,288 from twenty-one business clients. Delaney learned his skills as president of the Metropolitan Police Patrolmen's Union in the early 1970s, then decided to go into business for himself.²⁷ But Delaney's success has not been unmixed; early in 1988 he was indicted for having failed to file state income tax returns for the years 1982–1984.²⁸

Harrington and Delaney fit the traditional picture of the lobbyist who works for well-heeled special interests. Old-style lobbyists, aware of the high centralization of power in the Massachusetts General Court, cultivated personal relationships with the House speaker, the Senate president, and a few other key legislators. Much of their work was done over a drink at the Golden Dome pub across the street from the State House, over lunch at Anthony's Pier 4 Restaurant on the Boston waterfront, or during conversations in the private offices of the leaders. Campaign contributions, along with occasional bribes, were a major source of influence, but knowledgeable intermediaries were needed to direct the money to the right place while avoiding scandal. Therefore the ideal lobbyists were either former legislators or others who had built up networks of personal friendship with legislators over the years.

Lobbying of this sort was effective, but limited to those who could afford it. Since it was based on money, it was most useful for business interests. Labor unions employed similar tactics and were successful at gaining limited objectives. Unions of state employees seeking legislated pay increases and construction unions seeking public works projects were particularly prominent in their use of lobbyists.

During the 1970s and 1980s a new, more populist style of lobbying developed. Judy Meredith is a good example. She began as a community activist, found that she enjoyed lobbying, and decided to go professional. In 1986 she reported earnings of \$59,200 from such groups as the Council of Human Service Providers, the Coalition to License Acupuncturists, and Greater Boston Legal Services; in 1987 she earned \$63,000, including \$16,000 from the city of Boston.²⁹ Meredith and other lobbyists of this type found that they could replace the power of money with the power of votes. They put more of their energy into educating their own client groups' membership about issues and legislative procedures and finding ways to let legislators know that their constituents are watching how they vote. One such tactic is the lobby day, when supporters of a cause from around the state gather at the State House to meet with their representatives and senators.³⁰

These new tactics have helped change the style of Massachusetts interest-group politics. Today, even business-oriented lobbyists find that it helps to demonstrate grassroots support for their cause, as with the Massachusetts Hospital Association campaign described at the beginning of this article. Nevertheless, money is still vastly important in lobbying, and more and more of it is funneled through political action committees (PACs). Although 1987 was not an election year, the ten largest PACs contributed \$271,763 to members of the state legislature, a 64 percent increase over their contributions in the previous nonelection year.³¹ Each of the top ten PACs represented an industry or a labor union, most with important legislative goals that year, as shown in Table 7.³²

Table 7

**Contributions and Legislative Goals of
Ten Largest Political Action Committees
Massachusetts Legislature, 1987**

PAC	Legislative Interest	Result	Amount Contributed
Massachusetts Realtors	Defeat land bank bill	Success	\$56,361
Painters District Council #35	Retain prevailing wage law	Success	42,865
Massachusetts Bankers State Fund	Cut tax on banks	Pending	32,750
Bay State Physicians	Defeat universal health care	Success	29,097
Beer Distributors	General influence	—	24,700
Massachusetts DEAC (new car dealers)	Extend consumer protection to used car buyers	Success	24,250
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Administrators	Defeat universal health care	Success	17,940
Sheet Metal Workers #17	Retain prevailing wage law	Success	17,250
Committee to Elect Responsible Public Officials	Further utility interests	Mixed	14,050
Service Employees International Union 254	Further interests of public employees	Mixed	12,500

Source: Adapted from Peter B. Sleeper, "PACs Spend Lavishly, Effectively," *Boston Globe*, January 31, 1988, 27.

Interest groups are a big and growing business in Massachusetts. The number of registered lobbyists continues to rise, as do interest-group spending and campaign contributions. Until the 1990 election, Massachusetts seemed to be growing increasingly similar to a traditional one-party state, with the Democrats holding a dominant electoral position but little or no coherence on policy issues. As in the old one-party South, this allowed interest groups to grow in importance as the organizing force in policymaking.

But Massachusetts differs from those one-party states in having strong labor unions, environmental organizations, women's groups, and such grassroots groups as MassPIRG. These interests are not strong enough, singly or collectively, to overcome the economic weight and political power of the state's businesses, but they are strong enough to prevent the development of the kind of single-interest business dominance common in the Old South and West. Moreover, there are important divisions within the business community; for example, the huge health care industry depends on third-party payments, which are financed through taxes and premiums assessed in part on other industries. Such divisions further act to prevent single-interest dominance. The situation in Massachusetts might thus be better characterized as one of interest-centered conflict rather than interest-group dominance.

Recent events suggest that party competition may return. The Republican Party made a significant comeback in the 1990 election, winning the governorship and the treasurer's office and doubling the size of its state Senate bloc. Governor William Weld is a Republican very much in the mold of John Volpe and Francis Sargent whose victory would have done no more than theirs did to change the balance of party strength; but the Republican legislative gains may have more lasting importance. The Republican State Committee, which in the last few elections had run talented neophytes for Congress (and seen them obliterated) while virtually ignoring the state legislature, reversed its strategy; it made a strong effort to find legislative candidates, and the party gained seats as a result. It also made a serious effort to shed its previous antiabortion label; Weld, Cellucci, and several successful Republican legislative candidates in 1990 took strong positions in favor of the right to reproductive choice.

If the Republicans can sustain their efforts for the next few elections, Massachusetts may come to have a real two-party system.³³ If this happens, it may lead the Democratic Party to gain more policy coherence as well; some interest groups may then find themselves forced into partisan coalitions. Labor unions, citizens' groups of the left and right, and the Massachusetts High Technology Council already show signs of partisan sympathy. However, environmentalist groups, women's groups, and other business groups — particularly the life insurance and health care interests, but also AIM — seem determined to work with members of both parties. Unless the parties unify themselves much more strongly than they have to date, these groups will probably succeed in remaining neutral. The next few years will hold great interest for students of Massachusetts politics. ♣

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Notes

1. V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), 154–161; Sarah McCally Morehouse, *State Politics, Parties and Policy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 116–118; William Doyle and Josephine F. Milburn, "Citizen Participation in New England Politics: Town Meetings, Political Parties, and Interest Groups," in Josephine F. Milburn and Victoria Schuck, eds., *New England Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, 1981), 49; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 162.
2. Morehouse, *State Politics*, 106.
3. Lockard, *New England State Politics*; L. Harmon Zeigler and Michael A. Baer, *Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislatures* (Belmont, Mass.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1969); Morehouse, *State Politics*.
4. Cornelius Dalton, John Wirkkala, and Anne Thomas, *Leading the Way: A History of the Massachusetts General Court 1629–1980* (Boston: Office of the Massachusetts Secretary of State, 1984), 277–278; Alec Barbrook, *God Save the Commonwealth: An Electoral History of Massachusetts* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 104–105.
5. Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Massachusetts Election Statistics, 1986*.
6. In 1986 there were four Republican primary contests for seats in the Massachusetts House, with three candidates per contested nomination. There were forty-one Democratic contests, with 2.73 candidates per contest. *Massachusetts Election Statistics, 1986*.
7. See Agnes S. Bain and John C. Berg, "Redistricting and Endangered Incumbents: The 1990 Massachusetts State Elections." Paper presented at the New England Political Science Association, Worcester, Mass., 1991, for a fuller description and analysis of the 1990 election in Massachusetts.
8. Donald Levitan with Elwyn E. Mariner, *Your Massachusetts Government*, 10th ed. (Newton, Mass., 1984), 64–72.
9. *Massachusetts Constitution*, chap. 1, sec. 1, art. 4; Dalton et al., *Leading the Way*, 146, 329.
10. William Doyle and Josephine F. Milburn, "Citizen Participation in New England Politics: Town Meetings, Political Parties, and Interest Groups," in Milburn and Schuck, *New England Politics*, 49.
11. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 132–138.
12. Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
13. Michael Stone and Emily Achtenberg, *Hostage! Housing and the Massachusetts Fiscal Crisis* (Boston: Boston Community School, 1977), 28–30; see also John Kifner, "Massachusetts Raises Taxes Sharply Under Pressure of Banks," *New York Times*, November 10, 1975.
14. Teachers were also mentioned, but their organizations were more likely to be considered labor unions.
15. Lockard, *New England State Politics*, 163; Morehouse, *State Politics*, 115.

16. Chris Black, "Mondale Wins Massachusetts Straw Poll," *Boston Globe*, April 10, 1983, 1, 46; Robert Healy, "The Mondale Vote and Labor's Clout," *Boston Globe*, April 10, 1983, 44.
17. Clyde W. Barrow, "Organized Labor and Community Mobilization: The 1988 Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Initiative." Paper presented at the New England Political Science Association, Cambridge, Mass., April 1989.
18. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 50–61.
19. *MassPIRG Report* 21, no. 1 (1988).
20. Lockard, *New England State Politics*, 164.
21. It may be relevant that fourteen of the legislators surveyed, but only five of the aides, identified themselves as Protestants.
22. *Massachusetts Election Statistics, 1986*, 450.
23. There have been two women representatives from Massachusetts, Louise Day Hicks, a conservative Democrat, and Margaret Heckler, a moderate Republican. Both were defeated for reelection, Hicks after one term, Heckler after eight.
24. Mass. Choice is classified as a political action committee rather than a lobbying organization; its emphasis is on electing more pro-choice legislators rather than influencing the votes of incumbents.
25. Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Financial Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986*, and *Financial Statistics for Lobbyists, 1987*.
26. Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed Salaries — Cross Reference*; and *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1987; Disclosed Salaries — Cross Reference*.
27. Frank Phillips, "Beacon Hill Lobbyists Bring Home More Bacon," *Boston Globe*, February 1, 1988, 17–18; Renée Loth, "Lobbyist's Rise to Top," *Boston Globe*, February 23, 1988.
28. Renée Loth, "Top Lobbyist Charged with Tax Violations," *Boston Globe*, February 27, 1988. Earnings are from Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1987*, which includes income reported through May 1, 1988.
29. Massachusetts Secretary of State, *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986*, and *Legislative Agents and Employers; 1987*; see also Judith C. Meredith and Linda Myer, *Lobbying on a Shoestring: How to Win in Massachusetts . . . and Other Places, Too* (Boston: Massachusetts Poverty Law Center, 1982).
30. Meredith and Myer, *Lobbying on a Shoestring*, 12–14.
31. PACs are limited to contributing \$1,000 per candidate per year. Making off-year contributions allows them to double the amount contributed.
32. Peter B. Sleeper, "PACs Spend Lavishly, Effectively," *Boston Globe*, January 31, 1988, 21, 27.
33. On the other hand, Weld may find — as Volpe and Sargent did in their time — that he can govern best by cooperating with the legislature's Democratic leaders. If he does, he may undercut his party's ability to make a strong partisan appeal to the voters.

Professing American Literature

A Report from Brazil

Arnold Gordenstein

This American professor discovered that although his Brazilian students appeared to be entirely receptive to American literature, they were often culturally blocked from the concepts the books contained. He also found that some key American ideas don't translate well into Brazilian culture and that it is nearly impossible for a professor abroad to present literature in a politically and culturally neutral way.

It wasn't fair. I had arrived in Brazil fresh from a good American university, eager to teach the glories of American literature to the Third World. But the beaches were busy and the samba schools were preparing for Carnival. In the Rio clubs, the drink of choice was Chivas Regal, the filmmaker one discussed was Woody Allen, and the pianists and patrons knew all the Cole Porter and Jerome Kern lyrics. The smugglers sold as many Lee jeans as they could row in from the ships anchored offshore Copacabana beach, and Rocky Smith, an American basketball player, was showing the Brazilian pros how they played the game in Harlem. English-language courses were held on every street in downtown Rio, and even our small southern city boasted more than a dozen private English schools. All the students wore Adidas shoes and collected Bruce Springsteen records.

At the university, our graduate course in American literature was thriving, drawing students from a dozen Brazilian states and adjacent countries as well. Our university's American literature conferences attracted professors and graduate students from five thousand kilometers' distance, even though Brazilian students are notorious for studying near home. The relationship with the giant to the north seemed warm and positive. But there were time bombs in my luggage of which I was unaware — and I didn't discover them for some time.

The unpacking proceeded gradually: I found myself watching a much-heralded cultural event on Brazilian television, a dubbed *Rocky*. I watched Rocky gulp raw eggs, jog in the grim Philadelphia dawn, and sprint up the steps of the Museum of Art, just as he did in the American movie. But when the voice-over announced the judges' decision on TV Globo, Rocky defeated Apollo Creed and won the title. That, at the very least, should have taught me that the movie produced for North

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American sensibilities would not satisfy Brazilian viewers, but I was new in Brazil and not yet equipped to absorb the lesson. Only after several experiences of cultural disalignment did I learn to assimilate what *Rocky* had to teach me and how I could apply these insights to teaching American literature in Brazil.

For when I ventured beyond the warm glow of the bars and the beaches, other experiences increasingly suggested that I was not on entirely friendly ground. For instance, I was routinely told that the U.S.-owned foreign debt held the Brazilian economy in thrall and was responsible for most of the country's ills. When I discovered and reported that U.S. banks held only about one fourth of that debt, my Brazilian friends had no rejoinder and, more ominously, never repeated my findings in my hearing. When the U.S. fleet bombed an Iranian oil-digging platform in the Persian Gulf, I heard on regular, major-channel Brazilian TV news that the United States had totally destroyed Karg Island and in one blow wiped out the entire Iranian oil industry. The news story was very specific, estimating the damage at half a billion dollars. On the following days I watched in vain for more on the story, but elaboration never appeared, and neither did a retraction. Nor did the story ever appear in the newsmagazines, either Brazilian or American, which I read regularly.

The story of the first downing of an Iranian fighter plane that threatened a U.S. carrier in the Gulf was, by now predictably, described as an unprovoked attack by the Americans, a slant wholly absent from the same story in *Time* and *Newsweek*. In other words, I was told that the United States was omnipotent and exploitative, the Oedipal father in boots and jeans. U.S. failures were celebrated and successes ignored. The list of journalistic discrepancies could go on and on, but the point about political bias is easily made.

However, beyond that lies another point, one more subtle and more disturbing. Even if one is not an admirer of *Time* and *Newsweek*, as I am not, nor even a reflexive defender of all American policies, as I trust I am not, one finds oneself at the very least jostled out of one's smugness about the world one looks upon. If the parameters of our perception are determined by a stock of verifiable facts that are interpreted by a painfully acquired value scheme, to lose both of these components at once is to find oneself in a world with neither certitude nor shape, with neither recognizable boundaries nor familiar values. And this is precisely the world in which an American teacher who professes American literature in a foreign country finds himself or herself.

But no matter, I thought. I was a literature professor, and a liberal one at that. Ambivalence toward U.S. culture was never a Brazilian monopoly. I, too, had always been ambivalent; I had had my 1960s; I had my reservations about American culture and tried to incorporate them in my teaching. When I read Barry O'Connell and Myra Jehlen and Sacvan Bercovitch, I found that I had agreed with their analyses of Anglocentric U.S. history all along. But my own academic politics, a blend of old liberalism and sixties radicalism, constituted a cultural imperialism of its own and was the time bomb in my baggage, which would increasingly emerge. In the meantime I made certain choices in my teaching that were meaningful to me but, I learned later, less meaningful to my students.

I developed courses that privileged texts by underdogs and minorities, and I presented them as free from assumptions about manifest destiny and the virginity of the land as I could. In Walter Benjamin's wonderful phrase, I tried to brush history against the grain. I taught a revolutionary Thoreau concerned with the reification of

nineteenth-century economic life to establish my credentials. When I taught Poe and Melville, Hemingway and Fitzgerald and Bellow, I pointed out their peculiar characterizations of women. I taught David Levinsky to show how a socialist criticized U.S. capitalism and how our immigrants struggled. I taught *The Sound and the Fury* to illustrate the desirable decline of the Old South. I tried to suggest an approach to the Brazilians' own racial and sexual problems by indirection and by modeling, by displaying the United States, warts and all, and then the country's response, warts and all. I taught Malcolm X and *Black Boy* to show the pain and ambivalence of black youth. I taught Frederick Douglass, African history, *Native Son*, and LeRoi Jones's *Dutchman*. And when I taught a non-American like James Joyce, he became at least partly the product of an oppressed culture in a colonized nation. But as I continued self-assuredly on my project of bringing light to the dark Third World by alerting Brazilians to the evils of racism, sexism, and unchecked capitalism, I became aware that I was an increasingly alarming presence to my more paranoid students. And I was flattered when a student confided in me one day that his classmates had concluded amiably that I was, on one level or other, a spy.

But I was in good company. Junketing Yanks had long played variations on the same tune. When Gore Vidal visited São Paulo in 1987 to plug a new book, he pleased an audience of Brazilian historians by revealing that the writers of the U.S. Constitution had acted in their own economic self-interest, a view that Charles and Mary Beard would have appreciated had they not been forty years dead when Vidal delivered his opinion.

Visiting novelists often made our university a stopping place, and they took extraordinary pains, like good guests, to show their regard for Latin-American magic realism and point out its influence on their own fiction. The late Raymond Carver did so, as did Douglas Day, a one-time novelist. Douglas Unger actually leafed through the pages of his novel, *Leaving the Land*, to point this out, however unconvincingly. Stanley Elkins, who might be genuinely regarded as an occasional practitioner of an American magic realism, did so as well, but Elkins's connection is through his colleague and friend William Gass, who wrote knowingly about magic realism some years earlier. But none of these writers, secure in their own fictional gifts but less secure in their literary history, seemed aware that magic realism is a particular province of the Spanish-speaking countries of South America rather than of Portuguese-speaking Brazil, so they unknowingly patronized the students they meant to compliment.

A word about my students, especially those at the graduate level. They had their own problems with American culture. One bright such student, tormented by a patriotic desire to study Brazilian literature alongside American literature, gave up her master's thesis and withdrew from the course when she failed to find a Brazilian influence on an American writer that she could trace. The more pragmatic and career-oriented students forfeited their scruples and simply pursued purely North American subjects and went off to the United States or England to complete Ph.D.'s there.

But I had early learned to respect these students. They had invariably read less than their American counterparts, were not accustomed to the total kamikaze dedication we often find among American graduate students, were sometimes unfamiliar with the definition of plagiarism, were innocent of research strategies since they had few research libraries, and were addicted to a priori reasoning. Yet they read difficult texts with enthusiasm and intelligence, often bringing to them angles of entry

unavailable to the North American reader — all in a second language in a country which, as the popular and definitive newsmagazine *Veja* pointed out, is simultaneously the eighth economy of the world and a complete social disaster. One is reminded of Melville Herskovitz's observation that since blacks were able to score acceptable levels on white middle-class-oriented IQ tests, they might be racially superior after all.

For instance, my male Brazilian students, who had usually been educated in seminaries, could bring to *Ulysses* a far greater familiarity with church ritual than my American students could. Because of their European orientation they could provide mythological parallels that this former graduate student had had to sweat to learn fresh. Their bilinguality, especially their facility with Latin and Latinisms, invariably ferreted out many Joycean puns. But their relationships with the texts of Joyce, Faulkner, Abraham Cahan, Bellow, LeRoi Jones, Richard Wright, and Malcolm X were a new country of the mind for me, and certain books like *Walden* became a touchstone for the comparison.

My American students had invariably been beguiled by their version of Thoreau's natural economic system. One of them, after reading *Walden* and *Huckleberry Finn* back to back, renounced a summer job and actually built and floated a raft down the Mississippi River. But my Brazilian graduate students were mainly dismayed by *Walden*. Go live in the woods? they cried. Never mind the solitude and the poverty, what about the snakes and the insects? I had anticipated that the Brazilian students would be somewhat different, but I'd forgotten that Brazilian nature was different as well. But there was more to come.

We were reading the Jason section of *The Sound and the Fury*. Jason is talking to a drummer about farmers:

"Let him make a big crop and it wont be worth picking; let him make a small crop and he wont have enough to gin. And what for? so a bunch of damn eastern jews, I'm not talking about men of the jewish religion," I says. "I've known some jews that were fine citizens. You might be one yourself," I says.

"No," he says, "I'm an American."

"No offense," I says. "I give every man his due, regardless of religion or anything else. I have nothing against jews as an individual," I says. "It's just the race. You'll admit that they produce nothing. They follow the pioneers into a new country and sell them clothes."¹

After a peculiar and prolonged silence one of my best graduate students patiently explained to me that there was nothing to discuss, that it was true, that Jews were always unproductive and rich and did manipulate the wealth of the United States. How was a teacher, especially a poor one named Gordenstein, to respond? Only that I had no way to prove it was not true but wished that it was.

Another time, Malcolm X described his behavior in early manhood to illustrate that even he had once played Sambo, conking his hair, bedding white women, dealing drugs, Lindy Hopping in the Boston dance palaces. My American students, familiar with the context of Malcolm's life and his fate, recognized that we were reading a confessional book, a conversion book, but my Brazilians insisted that blacks always behaved that way and especially that they were born dancing well and that their skills had nothing to do with upbringing and cultural values. One student argued that black joints were actually more "oily" — he was perfectly fluent in

English, a well-read painter who had exhibited at the local museum, but he used the word *oily* — and therefore were capable of motions that whites were not.

But many times these same students had awakened me from a superior lethargy of my own. My American students had always assumed, as I did, that Beneto Cereno was the slave and Babo the master, that Malcolm X was damning his own Sambo behavior, and that *Dutchman* was an understandable statement of black rage. But the Brazilians pointed out that everyone, black and white, was starving aboard Beneto Cereno's ship, that there is a special and distinctive beauty to black dancing, whether from Africa or Roxbury, and that if only that man and woman in *Dutchman* could propagate they would leave a smaller problem for the next generation.

Early in my stay in Brazil I began to accept rides home through the evening Rio traffic with an older returning student, a familiar enough figure in a U.S. university, but an anomaly in Brazil. He was, he said, attending my class only to improve his English. My students, politically wiser and tougher than I — after all, they risked arrest and torture for transgressions for which we Americans were forgiven — had alerted me that he was also probably a spy. Keep in mind that the year was 1970, not only the year of the World Cup but also the climactic year of Emilio Garrastazu Medici's brutally repressive presidency.

After a month of such rides, during which I expressed my misgivings about the reception of the course I was teaching, it dawned on me that he was not spying on me at all, he was spying on the students. He had already assumed that I was a spy, and by his definition I was. That is, I was trying to influence my students' value system by presenting the current American academic left-of-center point of view with literature as a medium. So he didn't want to know where I stood. He knew where I stood. He only wanted to know how the students would receive my message and which ones might cross over and join their beliefs to mine so that the government might anticipate subversive activity. This was a shocking realization. For if the country's government and many of my students were secretly hostile — though for opposite reasons — if the news was falsified, if even the ending of *Rocky* was changed, how was the literature being received and where did I stand?

Neither my position nor that of my students was simple anymore. I had a variety of auditors and a multitude of texts that could be read in countless ways, and I was no longer sure what position I should endorse. I would later read an essay of Barry O'Connell's in which he wrote that he looked forward "not to some original synthesis defining American history or a newly composed canon of American literature but to a near Babel of tongues in an anarchy wonderful enough to riddle the very idea and power of nationalism."² But I didn't have the luxury of celebrating Babels and chaos. I was teaching in one.

I realized that the aspirations of Willy Loman and Jay Gatsby were mainly a puzzlement to native Cariocas. I found that Joe Keller's cry, to me heartrending, that perhaps these were all my sons in the play of that name hardly resonates in the Brazilian playgoer. For, unwilling to aspire to the American dream and unable to perceive the social dimension of the failure portrayed in these works, my Brazilian students usually did not see the fates of these fictional characters as socially resonant catastrophes but mainly as personal disappointments. I discovered that though the books had always been half known to Brazilians as "the canon," the values they once represented in the United States were never assumed in Brazil. Therefore, though it might have been easy for me to undermine the American myth, say, of

manifest destiny or of the “discovery” of America, of American individualism or of social justice for all, it was harder to gauge the moral universe in which these ideas were being received.

In a culture that begins with a relaxed and tolerant attitude to individual foibles based on a deep skepticism about the possibilities of social improvement through a chronically, almost acceptably corrupt central government, the largest discernible values have to do with family and blood loyalties. So a Brazilian Hester would be forgiven at once — if she were even charged — and find satisfaction in her private life. The Brazilian dissident, instead of going to jail for refusing to pay his taxes, would ignore the government and go home to live with Mother and tend his beans. Although American culture is “social to the core,” as Carolyn Porter has written, even when it challenges the dominant society, Brazilian life and literature reflects a flight from social issues to a concern for smaller nuclei like the family. My Brazilian students, therefore, began their relationship with American literature by examining the terms of the discussion, did not accept them, and therefore were not impressed with the resolution the gringos found.

But although I had long ago winked away the apolitical attitude to teaching literature in Brazil and had, in this reading, accepted my political responsibilities, I came to realize that I had been encouraging catastrophe. For if my students absorbed and acted on Thoreau in the way I was suggesting, they might land not in Concord jail but in an unmarked grave. I even had fleeting thoughts of seeking my professional virginity and teaching the truth, the goodness, and the beauty of my beloved texts once again.

I cast around among my Brazilian colleagues, but they had an even more tortured relationship to the American literature they studied and taught. Since they were regarded as turncoats — *entreguistas* — by some of their Brazilian colleagues, teaching American literature was a treasonous activity that sometimes left them deeply disturbed. Once, teaching during a noisy student protest, a colleague shouted at his class, “It is impossible to go on teaching unless we become numb, unless we pretend not to hear the voices of protest.”³ How much more painful when we consider that he was teaching American literature at the time. Another colleague, citing scholarly sources, proposed an approach called cannibalism, in which scenario the smaller culture would devour the larger one in order to avoid being overwhelmed by it. To quote the author, Sergio Bellei: “The method consists simply of the ritualistic imitation of the celebrated event in Brazilian history in which a European bishop was devoured by indians when he decided to christianize them. In this case the christian message, far from being imposed upon the indians, was literally absorbed by them and transformed into a source of energy for the creation of the kind of original work in which cultural identity is not cancelled, but preserved. Cultural cannibalism is then a form of reading foreign texts in which what is foreign is digested and transformed into a source of energy for the production of originality. It implies understanding foreign texts not in terms of passive comprehension but in terms of active appropriation.”⁴

Well and good, but how the hummingbird was going to digest the eagle was never made clear. Another colleague, in a ringing phrase that Arthur Miller would have admired, wrote that we professors should never defend a cause smaller than all mankind,⁵ but how this brave position actually worked out in an arena where neither side represented all mankind but only another conflicting national perspective was

equally unclear. In any case, this sentiment, which resonated in American ears, was probably inspired by my colleague's American training and meant little besides the eloquence to our Brazilian students.

If the most creative debate in current American studies scholarship is about the dismantling of the Anglo point of view, then from the vantage point of another only half-sympathetic culture the task is both unnecessary and essentially complete at the very beginning. The marginalization of the central books of the American canon is accomplished automatically when one simply shifts to another culture that operates on another paradigm. But for the American professor abroad it is both impossible and necessary to define early on both his or her relationship to the literature being taught and to the culture it sprang from or will find himself (or herself) being regarded as an agent of the U.S. government or of international capitalism or worse. Indeed, in some ways the role is unavoidable — no matter how much you may try to avoid it, you may actually be an agent of the U.S. government and of international capitalism. And to move toward rejection of the home culture leaves you in a most vulnerable position of isolation from one's past, enfeebled and dangling.

Although the barriers to intercultural understanding can hardly be overstated, there is fertile, if tortured, ground for speculation about these relations in the interplay between these books, students, and professors, both Brazilian and gringo. For the American, the other culture provides a remarkable cockpit for viewing the implicit beliefs of one's home culture. But this also places him or her in a highly exposed position. For we carry our professions — in both senses — in our gestures. If you have invested the time and commitment to study American literature, it is nearly reflexive to defend the point of view and values being showcased by your favorite books — both canonical and marginal — and, by extension, American culture as you read it. However, one's assumptions about an acceptable canon as well as one's purely aesthetic judgments are soon undermined. In the very effort to gain ideological and political neutrality by choosing books with negligible explicit political content, by cozying up to the host country, or by damning one's own, one discovers another ideology and another political position.

My cannibalizing colleague suggested that the time was ripe to prepare a Brazilian curriculum of American literature in which texts that were culturally translatable, like Poe and Dickinson, by his reckoning, would be taught first, regardless of chronology, and then writers like Twain and Whitman, who did not translate as well culturally. But my Brazilian colleagues knew better than I that the canon and even the peripheral texts carried unavoidable political freight and were never the innocent instruments of self-knowledge we had all learned about when we were students and not yet professors.

We only read the books we are prepared to read and whether these are the books the authors prepared for us we cannot know. Two readers from different cultures sharing a common book might be similar after all to two ants talking it over after visiting an elephant, unable to decide who had seen the tusk and who had seen the tail. When I returned to the United States, I found that the same problem of the shifting relationship between text and reader was under critical scrutiny here also. To reverse the formula at the end of *Invisible Man*, who knows but that on the higher frequencies I speak for you? 🐜

Notes

1. William Faulkner, *The Sound and the Fury* (New York: Random House, 1946), 209.
2. Barry O'Connell, "Putting Down the Puritans and Starting All Over Again: Towards the Abolition of American Literature." Paper presented at American Studies Association National Convention, Miami Beach, November 1988, 29.
3. Dilvo I. Ristoff, "Educating Rituals — The Uneasiness of Teaching American Literature in Brazil." Paper presented at American Studies Association National Convention, Miami, Beach, November 1988, 1.
4. Sergio Bellei, "Teaching American Literature in Brazil: Reading as Cannibalism." Paper presented at American Studies Association National Convention, Miami Beach, November 1988, 1.
5. Ristoff, "Educating Rituals," 12.

The Vietnam War Memorial and the Gulf War

Paul L. Atwood

This article discusses the debate over the “meaning” of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., relating it to the revision of the “Vietnam syndrome” as it has been played out in recent U.S. armed interventions overseas. Considerable political struggle occurred during the design phase of the memorial over which values the monument should enshrine. Since its construction the memorial has continued to be a focus for controversy about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy and has functioned as a magnet for continuing historical and political attempts to sort out the “lessons” of the second Indochina war. This debate has helped shape the manner in which both the Reagan and Bush administrations have responded to foreign “crises.” The issue in the Persian Gulf was substantially the same as in Indochina, and at least for the moment, reactionary interpretations of the lessons of Vietnam are in the ascendant. Historical and cultural revisionism contributed to public willingness to employ devastating force against Grenada, Panama, and Iraq.

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., the outcome of the Gulf War may serve to underscore the debate over the “meaning” of this highly controversial symbol. It is clear that the Wall, as Vietnam veterans call it, has occupied a very special, if not central, symbolic space in the ongoing politicocultural attempt to make sense of the war in Indochina and define it for history. The Vietnam memorial has become a pivotal cultural icon during the last decade, one which has been the subject of intense scrutiny and struggle to delineate its importance in the ongoing debate over interpretation of the war.¹ Most important, America’s “Wailing Wall” has been emblematic of the argument over the future direction of American foreign policy. President George Bush’s promise that the Gulf War would not be “another Vietnam” was a conscious attempt to exploit the Gulf crisis to purge the national sense of shame and impotence that has been seen as the negative legacy of Vietnam by proponents of armed diplomacy.

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On one side of the debate are those who call into question the proclaimed role of the United States as defender of the "free world" in the aftermath of World War II. How was it possible, many ask, that the United States should virtually have destroyed Vietnam in the name of saving it? And what does the unconscionable destruction, chiefly on the territory of our ostensible ally, South Vietnam, say about the real aims of American policy? Many American citizens see the Vietnam memorial as a necessary reminder of the tragic end of imperial adventurism and a warning to future generations not to become trapped in a net of presidential lies and deceptions. The nearly 59,000 names on the Wall bear mute testimony to the costs of armed policy.²

Others see the memorial as a "black gash of shame" that seems to celebrate defeat and dishonor. During his presidency, Ronald Reagan sought to cast the Vietnam memorial as a testament to and symbol of a failed "noble cause" that became tragic primarily because a "vocal minority" sabotaged the nation's will to win.³ In this view, the death of Americans without clear-cut victory has rendered their sacrifice all but void, leaving bile in the mouths of survivors. The "lesson" of Vietnam then, which the memorial ought to teach, is that "good intentions" are a nullity in the absence of victory.

Such logic gathered power in the face of the Reagan administration's use of force in Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Later, President Bush built upon the foundations laid by his predecessor to slam into tiny Panama, under the cover of darkness and with high tech ablazing. The fact that the United Nations condemned this violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Panama, as did the Organization of American States, was lost in the popular exultation following the lightning success of Operation Just Cause. The "Vietnam syndrome" was being laid to rest. The America of the 1950s was coming back. "By God! We've licked the Vietnam syndrome," gushed President Bush after the hundred-hour war in the Iraqi desert.

The Wall was controversial from the start, and the initial antagonisms to its design were really deep cover for objections concerning the outcome of the war. Bothered by the collective amnesia about Vietnam that overtook the United States after the fall of Saigon in 1975, a group of Vietnam veterans headed by Jan Scruggs, Tom Carhart, and James Webb initiated a campaign to build a memorial to the war dead on the nearly sacral ground of the Washington Mall. Despite the best intentions of the memorial committee they assembled, the old bitter controversies immediately reemerged with passionate intensity. Pentagon officials sneered at the efforts of the committee, composed initially entirely of Vietnam veterans, calling them crybabies and vowing that no memorial would ever be built to "losers." The committee then attempted to enlist bipartisan support on Capitol Hill in the persons of Senators Barry Goldwater and George McGovern, but their efforts were impeded by an avalanche of letters hostile to the latter who, in the minds of many writers, was the man most responsible for the American "defeat." When the committee approached the heads of large multinational corporations, many of which had profited handsomely during the war, they were accused of attempting to extort blood money. In short, all the controversies that had promoted the collective amnesia threatened the construction of the memorial.⁴

The memorial committee insisted on an open, democratic design contest and approved the selection of Maya Ying Lin, a Yale architecture undergraduate and a Chinese-American. Ms. Lin, barely twenty years old, had few direct memories of the war and described herself as apolitical. Yet her vision of stark black walls emerging

from earth, which itself appears to be wounded, struck a chord in the design committee composed of distinguished architects. The emphasis of the design was on healing and invited sober reflection about the costs of the war. It functioned in the manner of an ancient Roman *memento mori*, a serious reminder that we all must die and return to the earth. The inclined angles of the walls suggested human hands opening to reach mourners in a healing embrace. Another grace of the design lay in the mirror-smooth texture of the black granite. As anyone who has ever visited the memorial knows, the effect of standing before the Wall and pondering the names, at the same time seeing the reflection of one's own face and the sky overhead and nearby trees, is a profoundly moving experience that aptly symbolizes the solemnity of death while capturing a continuing commitment to the living.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, however, ideas about art and heroism were not what they had been. The imperial renderings typical of other Washington war memorials could not address the collective emotion of the nation about Vietnam — if such a thing could be said to exist. Unlike the other monuments, which glorify heroism and hence war, Maya Ying Lin's design was a superbly contemplative abstraction that begged an utterly sane question: "Is war, any war, worth this price?"

H. Ross Perot, the millionaire Texas financier who had underwritten the cost of the design contest, ran roughshod over the democratic procedures that had resulted in approval of the Lin design and railed against the design committee, leading a conservative attack on the perceived symbolism of the design. James Webb, a secretary of the navy during the Reagan administration — and a highly acclaimed author of a successful popular novel on Vietnam — asked publicly, "Why is it black?" and "Why is it underground?" Thomas Carhart, a former West Pointer and platoon leader in Vietnam, whose own design had been rejected, said, "I just can't live with this. There have been a lot of us who have been looking for a memorial to celebrate and glorify the Vietnam veteran."

Before long, many veterans nationwide were referring to the design as a mark of shame.⁵

In September 1981, William F. Buckley's *National Review* lobbed a bombshell, calling the design "Orwellian glop," and urged the Reagan administration "to throw the switch on this project."

Okay, we lost the Vietnam War . . . Okay, the thing was mismanaged from start to finish. But the American soldiers who died in Vietnam fought for their country and deserve better than the outrage that has been approved as their memorial.⁶

In a *Washington Post* article, Tom Wolfe called the memorial a "tribute to Jane Fonda." Labeling the jurors in the design the "Mullahs of Modernism," in a blatant attempt to tarnish the patriotism of the design jury in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis, Wolfe added:

By the late 1940's the universities were turning out students who acted as if modernism were encoded in their genes. You could put a gun at the temple of one of the new breed and you couldn't make him sculpt a realistic figure of a soldier to put up on a pedestal.⁷

Many opponents of the design objected to its color. The issue of the memorial's blackness as symbolic of shame could not fail to offend many of the nation's black veterans, who justly felt that they had borne a disproportionate share of the burden

and grief of Vietnam. One of the nation's highest ranking black officers, General George Price, was moved to say:

I remind all of you of Martin Luther King, who fought for justice for all Americans. Black is not a color of shame. I am tired of hearing it called such by you. Color meant nothing on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam. We are all equal in combat. Color should mean nothing now.⁸

Yet clearly, the color of Asians had meant something on the battlefields. Without doubt, the race of Maya Ling Yin was a source of deep dissatisfaction to many who felt that the design of the memorial was compromised by its Asian-American authorship. Unfortunately, the official history of the memorial, *To Heal a Nation*, downplays this ugly aspect of the choice of the winning design. Though many veterans felt that such a choice was a fitting, though unintended, touch, which might help to effect reconciliation, many others conveyed contempt. Numerous veterans working to raise funds for the memorial encountered expressions of outrage that a "dink" or a "slope" had been allowed to design "our" memorial. Admiral Thomas Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam War, went so far as to say "I don't like the idea that it was not designed by an American."⁹ Such attitudes demonstrated that the anti-Asian variant of racism, which helped to foster the war, is still endemic to American society.

Responding to the reactionary backlash, Secretary of the Interior James Watt refused his necessary signature unless the site could be redesigned to include a flag, unusual for a war memorial, as well as a heroic statue dedicated to the valor of Vietnam veterans. Since Watt's intransigence otherwise spelled doom, a compromise had to be effected by the committee. Over the strenuous objections of Maya Ying Lin, a bronze of heroic stature, depicting three American fighting men — Caucasian, Afro-American, and Latino — was added. This marked a turning point in the ideological struggle to control the meaning of the Vietnam memorial.¹⁰

For a brief hiatus during and shortly after the Vietnam conflict, warriors went out of fashion. But with the advent of the so-called Reagan revolution, revisionist interpretations of the Vietnam experience were catapulted to the forefront of cultural productions, not least in those oriented to mass consumption. No longer the alienated, disaffected symbol of failed policies, the Vietnam veteran in films like the *Rambo* series, *Missing in Action*, *Uncommon Valor*, replayed and won the war in popular fantasy. The Clint Eastwood epic *Heartbreak Ridge*, in addition to functioning as a two-hour Marine Corps recruiting vehicle, depicted the U.S. invasion of Grenada as standard military heroics by young U.S. citizens against evil incarnate, also serving ominous notice that there would be no more Vietnams — no defeats, that is. At about the same time, a largely adolescent audience flocked to see *Hamburger Hill*, a film about a notorious battle in which the United States suffered horrible casualties, only to give up the territory a few days later. The film was a shameless attempt to elevate infantry "grunt" to Valhalla epic: any sacrifice is worth the price as long as the boys comport themselves heroically. The sales of war toys, virtually banished from toy stores throughout the 1970s, since 1982 have risen by 700 percent. During the same period the number of hours of "war cartoons" increased from 1.5 to 43 hours per week in 1989. In the latter year, the average four- to eight-year-old would see 250 half-hour episodes of these cartoons and over a thousand thirty-second commercials selling the paraphernalia accompanying this propaganda.¹¹ As one antiwar veterans organization notes, this amounts to a videonic basic training for kids.¹² The tears shed

at the Vietnam War Memorial are ceasing to be in sorrow over the tragic waste of lives, both American and Indochinese. As the revisionists have their way, the Wall will represent a symbol of determination never to “fail” again.

Many of the soldiers who served in the Gulf, particularly those in the front-line outfits, were children when the sea change in mass media depictions of Vietnam, and of militarism, was undertaken. The popular understanding of the Vietnam conflict had led to revulsion toward war in general and a virtual boycott of G.I. Joe toys (best-sellers in the early years of the Vietnam War) and similar products. At the most basic level, the public believed that the United States had been led into combat as a result of presidential duplicity and congressional ineptitude and that a tragedy had ensued for America’s stature in the world. By 1984 this view, all but banished from media outlets, was replaced by a manufactured consensus that an armed American foreign policy was the requisite nostrum to address the decline of the United States — as defined by the Reagan-Bush administration.

The essential shallowness of public understanding of the issues involved in Vietnam also ill prepared the American people to understand many important facets of the Gulf crisis. The gnawing sense of self-doubt, exacerbated by almost ceaseless media and presidential jeremiads about the need to expunge American impotence, also contributed to the psychological imperative to see the United States “standing tall” once again.

The parallels between the Vietnam conflict and the Gulf require some elaboration.

The success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and the defeat of the anointed client, the Kuomintang, upset American development plans for post-World War II Asia. Ironically, the very defeat of the Japanese by the United States paved the way for the Chinese communists, especially since the forces of Chiang Kai-shek were notoriously incompetent and corrupt.¹³ A full-scale assault against the Vietnamese Revolution became a necessary gambit for American policy after the Geneva Accords of 1954 all but endorsed the victory of the Vietminh. The agreements at Geneva, stipulating that Vietnam be partitioned temporarily until reunifying elections could be held under United Nations auspices in 1956, augured ill for U.S. plans. For one thing, the election of Ho Chi Minh was a foregone conclusion, which alone would have punctured the crucial element of American anticommunist ideology that communists achieved power (in the pre-Gorbachev era) only by means of the gun or by trickery. A reunited Vietnam, under a communist government mandated in an open, internationally monitored election, seemed to spell disaster for American plans. The elections were therefore aborted, and a new nation, South Vietnam, was “invented.”¹⁴

North Vietnam was never the creation of either Moscow or Beijing, but the United States set up a quisling government south of the 17th parallel since, in the absence of the Kuomintang, a new client was needed to spearhead attempts by U.S. policymakers to salvage what was left of Southeast Asia for themselves. Ngo Dinh Diem’s refusal to participate in nationwide elections, and his efforts to undo the genuine reforms of the Vietminh in the South Vietnamese countryside, led to the creation of the National Liberation Front in 1960. Diem’s attempts to conscript peasants to fight against their own compatriots had little success, so an American invasion of South Vietnam became necessary to secure the continued existence of this client regime against the ostensible beneficiaries of the “democracy” the United States had brought to southern Vietnam.

President Lyndon Johnson appealed to Congress for endorsement of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution so that he might facilitate American military intervention, having seen the United States' political and economic policies fail in Southeast Asia. As congressional hearings and *The Pentagon Papers* showed, Johnson lied to the Congress and the American people about the sequence of events in the Gulf of Tonkin in order to induce them to believe that the North Vietnamese had intentionally committed an act of unprovoked aggression against the peaceful forces of the United States. In fact, the United States had fostered a secret plan to initiate bombing of North Vietnam well prior to early August 1964; all that was needed to set it in motion was a pretext.¹⁵

There are significant parallels in the Gulf crisis. The most important is the continued dominance of the United States in the Middle East and the containment of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, just as the primary impetus for the United States in 1954 had been to salvage preponderance in Southeast Asia and contain China. While not exactly a client of the United States, Saddam Hussein nevertheless benefited by playing a role against Iran that suited the overriding premise of American policy. When he invaded Kuwait he stepped out of his assigned role and threatened the fragile balance of forces in the Gulf region so carefully crafted in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.

An Iraq in control of both domestic and Kuwaiti oil, with expanded outlets to the sea, would have become the de facto regional power, one which owed much of its military machine to the Soviets (though also to West Germany, France, Britain, and the United States), and one which clearly had tendencies toward an independent policy of its own. That may have included renewed war with Iran. It may also have meant brokered agreements with both Germany and Japan to deliver oil at prices substantially lower than those which the U.S.-led consortiums in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had been charging these two rapidly emerging economic superpowers. In the wake of U.S. economic decline, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had been depositing their immense sums of petrodollars in Japanese banks, thereby strengthening the Japanese system.¹⁶

In Southeast Asia the United States had lost its favored client, the Kuomintang, which it had hoped would contain the communists both in China itself and in neighboring Vietnam. Kuomintang troops had been employed north of the 16th parallel in 1946 in order to partition Vietnam in the aftermath of the September Revolution of 1945 and to allow British (and rearmed Japanese) troops to prepare the way for the return of the French in the south. After the abject ejection of Chiang's forces from mainland China by the communists in 1949, the long-cherished dream of the "Great China Market" seemed at an end. In response, the United States sought to reindustrialize Japan as the "workshop of Asia," and to anchor what remained of the region to the Western economic system. To function as a linchpin in the new global order envisioned at Bretton Woods, Japan would require sources of raw materials in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, therefore, became symbolically critical as the United States pinned its hopes on the French to retain Indochina in the Western orbit. After the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, the United States sought to subvert the 1954 Geneva Accords and create a new client out of whole cloth.

The role played by the United Nations is important. As an arm of the UN, the Geneva Conference stipulated that the world body accepted the territorial integrity

of Vietnam. Partition between 1954 and 1956 was intended only as a temporary measure to allow the return of peoples north and south. The elections of 1956 were to be carefully monitored by India, Canada, and Poland, and the elected government duly recognized. That would have left the United States bereft of clients in South-east Asia at the time, a fact that explains the tenacity with which succeeding U.S. administrations toughed it out until 1973. At least by then Thailand had been groomed to replace South Vietnam. Communism in Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya had been extirpated. By then, too, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos had been so devastated that any claim to victory against the United States could only be called Pyrrhic. The near apocalyptic condition of Indochina virtually ensured that eventually these nations would come begging for normalization of relations with the United States, even allowing draconian International Monetary Fund and World Bank methods to direct their future development (as is the case in Laos).

The UN never ruled on the matter of the disputed Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, a failure that eventuated in the crisis. Long before the UN came into existence, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Britain had carved out putative client states of its own to guard its hegemony in the Gulf region, having assented to a French sphere of influence farther to the west, in Syria and Lebanon. The boundaries assigned to Iraq seemed arbitrary but were intended to keep the emirate of Kuwait as a trading entrepôt in Britain's control, guarding as it did the Persian Gulf. Oil was not yet the prize. In fact, Britain had been encroaching upon Ottoman territories even prior to World War I in order to thwart German intentions in the region. However, in the aftermath of the Great War, Britain decided that keeping all its mandates and clients in a weakened state was simply good policy, so the former Turkish province of Basra was not incorporated into Iraq. Some of it was, and the rest was partitioned off as the British colony of Kuwait.

There had long been an emirate of Kuwait, dating back to the late eighteenth century, but there had never been any assigned boundary to this tiny fiefdom, the size of which expanded or shrank according to the size of the herds of livestock and the territory they grazed. Numerous sheikdoms and emirates also existed on the territory of what would become various Gulf states, yet few of these — and none in Iraq — survived the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Kuwait served the important purposes of providing Britain with undisputed naval authority in the Gulf while weakening Iraq and Iran. When the immense reservoirs of oil in Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Persia were discovered and put into production, this state of affairs appeared as geopolitical prescience on the part of Britain. There was then no chance that Iraq's claim to Kuwait would ever be taken seriously.

Just as World War I caused the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, so did World War II signal the dismemberment of the British Empire. The United States played Rome to Britain's Athens, and the hegemonic position formerly occupied by the latter fell to the former. Increasingly, U.S. policy evolved to thwart the imperial hangover of France and Britain and continue the geopolitical chess game of balancing power in the Mideast. The arrangement crafted by the former European great powers seemed adequate, pitting as it did Arab against Arab, Arab against Persian, Turk, and Kurd — and after 1947, Arab against Israeli. The boundaries established by the British in the Gulf ensured virtually perpetual instability, since national frontiers encompassed amalgams of widely differing peoples and faiths. Thus, the single

overriding threat to U.S. influence, political unity among Arabs, was already effectively subverted. The attempt by Saddam Hussein to achieve union between Iraq and Kuwait, thereby giving Iraq control over the lion's share of Gulf oil, would have severely disrupted American plans for the region, given Iraq much too much leverage over the international price of oil, and potentially given Iraq too much *real* military prowess as a regional power. Potentially, too, success at this unification, under the noses of the West, would have spurred renewed Pan-Arab nationalism, the very outcome U.S. policy had always been at pains to obviate.

Put succinctly, Saddam's success at achieving integration between his nation and Kuwait would have posed a deadly threat to American development plans, just as the victory of the Chinese communists and political unification of Southern and Northern Vietnam appeared to have done to plans for Southeast Asia between 1949 and 1954.

The Persian Gulf Resolution, passed overwhelmingly by Congress in votes almost as lopsided as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, was sold to the American public as the moral equivalent of a Red Cross mission to liberate Kuwaitis from oppressive rule. An identical pitch, with respect to the "salvation" of South Vietnam, was made in 1964 to support, first, the bombing of North Vietnam and later the injection of American combat troops into South Vietnam. Missing in 1964, at least for public consumption, was information that would have negated the charge that the North Vietnamese had perpetrated the ethical equal of Pearl Harbor, since the destroyers *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* had been assisting South Vietnamese naval forces to harass North Vietnamese ports. Missing, too, was information on the secret plan to bomb North Vietnam, which had been on the shelf for some time. Most important, the American public was fed the myth that the "independent nation" of South Vietnam was the victim of the illegal aggression of its neighbor. All but forgotten at the time was that in 1955 the United States had subverted the mechanisms of the nascent United Nations to bring peace to Indochina.

The United States also had a secret plan to inject a rapid deployment force into the Middle East.¹⁷ When investigators uncovered the plan, top Pentagon officials initially said that the operations were geared to forestall a potential Soviet move into the Gulf region. However, the Soviets had acknowledged an American sphere of influence there dating back to the "crisis" over Iran in 1946, when the Soviets were induced to withdraw from northern Iranian territories in exchange for a pledge of a share of Iranian oil. Having begun the process of dispossessing the British, the Americans were not inclined to grant Soviet concessions, so the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, repudiated the deal with the Soviets. The United States pleaded ignorance and the Soviet withdrawal stood. The USSR has never contemplated a military challenge to U.S. hegemony in the region for the same reason that it has never moved westward beyond the pale of the Iron Curtain — the virtual certainty of thermonuclear war.

The real threat came from the direction of Pan-Arabian nationalism, potentially leading to unification of Arab states, or from Islamic fundamentalists extremely hostile to satraps like the shah of Iran, or the royal houses of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the pollution of their ancient traditions by Western influences. It was for this reason that rapid deployment became a fixture of American foreign policy, not because of any presumed Soviet threat. Yet that rationale had served as cover for the development of such military capabilities as were demonstrated in Operation

Desert Storm. That American citizens had ever believed the Soviets were willing to risk nuclear war over the Mideast, that Soviet troops, for example, were actually bent on moving from Afghanistan, after their invasion of the country in 1979, to the Gulf, is testament to the ability of the media to “invent reality” for the body politic.¹⁸

The transubstantiation of the ethos of revulsion toward war, which characterized the immediate post-Vietnam era, has been abetted by the mass media. This was characteristic. Even during the later years of the Vietnam War, when public opinion had clearly shifted against it, the press and electronic media had largely followed the Nixon administration’s line, even after the Pentagon Papers had been broken by the *New York Times*.¹⁹ The unwillingness of media outlets to challenge the Reagan-Bush interpretation of foreign affairs resulted in the Iran-contra debacle,²⁰ accompanied by a profound unwillingness on the part of any elite institutions, including Congress and the press, to plumb the depths of, and expose, what amounted to a coup over the Constitution. Despite enough information about a possible deal arranged by the Reagan campaign in 1980 with the Ayatollah Khomeini not to release Iranian-held American hostages until after the November elections, a possibility made more palpable by revelations in Congress that Reagan did, indeed, provide arms to Iran as early as 1981, the Dukakis campaign of 1988 broached not a word about the matter. Numerous American citizens exclaimed that Reagan was justified in whatever he did simply because they believed that he had restored the economy to health and made America “walk tall” again. Contragate has thus emerged as the most extensive whitewash in American history.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, with very few exceptions in establishment media, no serious scrutiny was given to the virtually unspoken reasons why the United States went to war with Iraq.

In 1958, when the Baathist Party of Iraq overthrew the British-installed satrap, King Faisal, the United States declared that any attempt by Iraq to annex Kuwait would result in immediate American military intervention, despite the fact that Kuwait was still a British possession. Earlier, in 1956, the United States had intervened politically to call off a combined Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt to forestall an eruption of Pan-Arab nationalism. Efforts by the former European imperialists to recapture control — or perhaps their delusions of grandeur — threatened future American plans. As early as 1945, the United States had given warning that any threat to American access to the “greatest of all material prizes,” that is, the immense Gulf oil reservoirs, would constitute a *casus belli*.²¹

So rationales such as concern for the fate of the Kuwaiti people, or the stance for the principle of nonaggression, were disingenuous at best. No such scruples came into play when Turkey invaded Cyprus, when Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese Timor, when South Africa refused to withdraw from Namibia, when China raped Tibet. Or more salient, when Iraq invaded Iran. In the latter case there was no chance that either side could effect total victory. Rather, the attraction on the part of the United States to supply both belligerents concerned the outcome that both would be severely weakened, as well as the matter of cash generated by arms sales to Iran for use in supplying the contras. The simultaneous engagement of Saddam Hussein as a cryptoclient appeared to make it unlikely that he would step outside his assigned role to challenge the United States. It would seem, too, that Saddam miscalculated in his assessment of the situation. He knew that the UN knew of the long-standing dis-

pute between Iraq and Kuwait over borders. He knew that the world knew and, more emphatically, the Arab world knew, that Kuwaiti intransigence on the matter of raising oil prices redounded to the extreme detriment of Iraq and its effort to clear its debt after the war with Iran. Finally, all players knew of Iraqi grievances over Kuwaiti slant drilling in the disputed Rumailah oilfield. When the State Department refused categorically to condemn Iraqi aggressive moves toward Kuwait in late July 1990, Saddam reasoned that he could get away with the annexation.

Whether or not the United States led Iraq into a trap can be debated. Clearly, the Iraqi invasion presented an opportunity to mobilize the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in a grand way, which could be seen to stand against the forces of illegal aggression in the outlaw world and be taken as a generous move by a strong power to liberate a captive people from a savage bully. At the same time the “principle of nonaggression” enshrined in the charter of the UN could be upheld.

The proclaimed purpose of the UN — to make war unnecessary and virtually impossible — was subverted in Southeast Asia in 1955–1956, and the same was done in the Southwest in 1990–1991. The members of the Security Council were brow-beaten, cajoled, bribed, and threatened until all but two voted for the resolution that would enable the United States to undertake the most intensive bombing campaign in history — worse over the duration even than in Vietnam — in the name of waging peace. Sanctions that would have left the civilians of Iraq with enough food, medicine, and other basics to sustain the essentials of life, while progressively eroding Iraq’s warmaking capacity (and not, incidentally, its ability to conduct the sort of terror operations launched against its own civilians), were bypassed in favor of use of the greatest army ever assembled by the only global institute ostensibly devoted to peace. War, with its attendant miseries — refugees, untreatable wounded, infant deaths due to exposure and dehydration, the almost total destruction of civilian infrastructure, and so forth — was the object of choice by a UN in thrall to an America with a chip on its shoulder and a grudge to bear.

All predictable, just as the outcome in Indochina was prophesied. Much ink has been expended about the “defeat” of the United States in Southeast Asia. But things do not look so today. Once the “rice bowl of Asia,” Vietnam cannot now feed itself. The effects of Agent Orange have resulted in a population afflicted with the highest rates of birth defects in the world. Though promised assistance to rebuild by President Nixon, Vietnam has received instead war by other means in the form of an extensive embargo that, coupled with fiscal amateurism on the part of erstwhile revolutionaries, has resulted in the near collapse of the Vietnamese economy. In neighboring Cambodia, the American bombing campaign of the late 1960s and early 1970s plowed the killing fields from which the Khmer Rouge reaped their grisly harvest.

Though Saddam Hussein has been weakened vis-à-vis his immediate neighbors, he remains a source of terror to the Shiite population of southern Iraq and the Kurds of the north. Kuwait is a monumental ecological catastrophe. Having waged war in the name of liberating Kuwait, the United States has nevertheless come down on the side of the continued rule of Saddam in Iraq — or at least of the Baathist Party by which he rules. Having repeatedly said that Saddam had victimized his own population, George Bush victimized them twice when he unleashed Desert Storm to expunge their infrastructure and reduce Iraq, in the words of the UN, to a “near apocalyptic” state. Now Saddam victimizes Iraqis thrice. All this in the name of freedom.

Freedom for whom? Not for the Saudis who want an end to feudal rule. Not for Kuwaitis who daily witness the priorities of their emir to restore his own splendor while those who bore the full burden of Iraq's occupation languish without adequate shelter and water. Not for the Shiites and Kurds of Iraq who were led to believe that their deliverance was at hand.

Saddam and his minions have been delivered freedom *carte blanche* to renew their tyranny. Hafez al Assad of Syria, a bloodstained despot and the moral equal of Saddam, has been free virtually to annex Lebanon (the part not already under the control of Israel) at the very moment U.S. citizens thought that their troops were liberating Kuwait. The bribe of \$3 billion paid to Assad as *quid pro quo* for his services to the "alliance" against Iraq is already being spent for Chinese Silkworm missiles possessing much greater accuracy than Scuds.²² Both Saudi Arabia and Israel will receive new top-of-the-line high-tech weapons. The military operation that was supposed to bring peace and stability to the Gulf and the Mideast has prepared the way for an even bloodier future round.

But the United States has secured freedom too — freedom for the major American oil companies in partnership with Aramco to further control petroleum producers in the Gulf and competitive consumers like Germany and Japan, and freedom for the Bechtel Corporation to rebuild ruined Kuwait. It has long been an article of faith that OPEC was dominated by the Gulf states, which conspired to raise prices at the expense of American and other consumers. In fact, the United States has always been a hidden member of OPEC, and the major oil companies were never sorry to see the price of oil go up. As world prices stabilized over the last five years, overseas operations became more important since Third World wages can be paid there. The major block to renewed domestic production in the United States is not that the price of oil is not high enough but that the cost of American labor is highly injurious to the rate of profit. (This is also one reason why American construction companies engaged in rebuilding Kuwait will not hire American workers for the job.) Now the United States has co-opted the Saudi royal family even more closely. The emir of Kuwait, too, owes a great debt to his benefactor. Both provincial governors will abet U.S. pricing policies and both will begin to withdraw petrodollars from Japanese banks for deposit in troubled U.S. banks and for the benefit of their investment strategies.

Once again in the driver's seat, the United States will control the price of oil available to Germany and the European Community (EC) in general. The policy of the last forty years toward Japan to control its sources of energy is buttressed, and Nippon's banking system has been simultaneously diminished. Faced with severe challenges to its post-World War II policies of global domination, the United States has moved to create a "new world order" by again seeking to reduce its rivals to mere subsidiaries. From the view at the top the prospects look good.

But matters are never that simple. Neither the EC nor Japan will simply roll over. Perhaps more important, the Soviet Union seems unlikely to become a mere client. Though clearly a profound change has occurred over the last few years in relations between the superpowers, the bombing of Baghdad, a capital virtually on Soviet borders, could not have taken place without Soviet complicity, and the future remains highly problematic.

Optimists believe that the recent coup failure against Mikhail Gorbachev represents the eventual triumph of democracy in the USSR. However, despite lack of

careful planning by the plotters, the coup represents a deeply rooted and profound animus against both Gorbachev's and Boris Yeltsin's reform program by hard-line conservatives and others who view a return to authoritarian rule as the only solution to worsening economic and political conditions. Let us remember that a majority of the Russian population remained indifferent throughout the coup attempt.

The Soviet economy is on the verge of collapse. Soviet policy of the last fifty years to keep Germany weak has come to failure, and Americans are seen as more than partially to blame by right-wing organizations like Pamyat. While NATO troop strength has abated somewhat, Western missiles are still poised at the heart of the USSR. In addition, a new massively armed American naval presence remains on the Soviet southern flank, and while President Bush insists that most of it will be withdrawn, that remains to be seen.

The collapse of the Soviet center could lead to a recapitulation of strikingly similar conditions to those which occasioned the rise of totalitarianism and paranoia in the first place. The United States will probably have little to say about a return to authoritarian rule as long as the Soviet leaders are playing footsie with Washington. However, many great Russian nationalists, especially, see Gorbachev and Yeltsin as sellouts to the West. The events of August 19, 1991, may yet prove to have been a dress rehearsal. We can be sure that future putschists will be much more aggressive and ruthless.

A sharpening of militaristic competition between the superpowers would portend worse than catastrophe, yet many Americans seem to bask in the supposed glories of desert victory.

And that returns us to our initial theme.

Returning Vietnam veterans brought more than tales of hardship in jungle warfare. Many carried messages about large-scale atrocities committed in the name of saving Vietnam. Many avowed that the high command had lost control of the troops, many of whom refused any longer to endanger themselves or to participate in the slaughter. Public confessionals such as the Citizens Committee of Inquiry in 1970 and the testimony of returning Vietnam soldiers during the Winter Soldier Investigations of 1971 served to awaken U.S. citizens to the magnitude of the war waged against civilians. The defection of groups like Vietnam Veterans Against the War signaled that the war could no longer be prosecuted, and widespread revulsion to it forced troop withdrawals from Southeast Asia. Many veterans were shattered by what they had seen and done. Still the popular image of the Vietnam veteran quickly came to focus not on the causes of his (and her) estrangement, but on the symptoms of drug abuse and violent and antisocial behavior. By refusing to deal with the etiology of posttraumatic stress disorders — that is, the war itself and the genesis of American intervention — the mass media effectively silenced the Vietnam veterans and transmogrified them into objects of fear or ridicule. Thus was the process initiated by which the lessons of Vietnam were buried.

As the living survivors of Vietnam were co-opted, so were the dead. The initiators of the Vietnam memorial project hoped for an altar of "healing and reconciliation." Most understood this to mean a domestic process whereby the political wounds in the polity would be bound up. However, as experience has since shown, healing for many veterans has come with a return to Vietnam. Reconciliation also means the capacity to see the former enemy as fully human and in need of com-

passion and renewal. These are not the values of a militaristic and imperial society. Such “feminine” virtues undermine the capacity to define armed power as the signature of the nation.

The ideological struggle at the Wall intensified as the Reagan and Bush administrations fostered the renewed use of force. Those who remonstrated that the original design cast aspersions on the honor of the nation, and on veterans, were enabled to alter the memorial. The standard-cast heroic statues added to the site injured its starkness. The Vietnam memorial was thereby invested with the message of neighboring imperial allegorical figures in alabaster and bronze: “War is the lifeblood of nations!” The somber memento mori, intended to encourage sober reflection on the war and its outcomes, was vitiated.

Though the memorial had been officially dedicated on Veterans Day 1982, another public display, Salute 2, was organized in 1984. At this second liturgy, President Reagan “officially accepted” the memorial on behalf of the nation only *after* Frederick Hart’s representational sculptures were added and blessed. Media coverage of the event stressed the theme “America’s veterans — one and all” in a deliberate attempt to integrate younger Vietnam veterans with older veterans of the “successful” wars. This transgenerational tactic would subsequently be seen in film and television representations of the Vietnam “experience” as substantially identical with World War II and Korea.²³ The Vietnam War was “decontextualized” by removing it — and the reality of the Vietnam veterans’ experiences — from specific historical circumstances.

In his “dedication” speech, President Reagan said of Vietnam veterans that there had been “a rethinking . . . Now we can say to you, and say as a nation, thank you for your courage . . . It’s time we moved on, in unity and with resolve, with the resolve to always stand for freedom, as those who fought did, and always to try to protect and preserve the peace.”²⁴

The Vietnam War had been “normalized” — made consistent with American ideology. The deaths had been made rational, the veterans made whole and finally unburdened of responsibility for “losing” the war. A consensus was manufactured which elided those lessons of Vietnam not in sync with the new look in U.S. foreign policy.

Reagan was to get one more crack at revising the meaning of Vietnam. Shortly after the 1988 elections, another media event was staged at the Wall. John Wheeler, chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund and a speaker at the event, declared, “Perhaps at this late date we can all agree that we’ve learned one lesson: that young Americans must never again be sent to fight and die unless we are prepared to let them win.”²⁵

Then senator-elect Charles Robb, son-in-law of Lyndon Johnson and a former marine infantry commander in Vietnam, linked the reintegration of veterans to foreign policy.

Perhaps in no other area is the need so acute as in the area of foreign policy. We have to proceed on a bipartisan basis for a course of energetic engagement, a policy that vigorously asserts America’s ideals and defends her interests abroad, a policy that establishes our role as an inspiration to oppressed peoples everywhere . . . And it must be a policy that neither renounces nor relies exclusively on the use of force, a policy tempered but not paralyzed by the lessons of Vietnam.²⁶

Finally, in a photo opportunity used on the front pages of virtually every major daily, President and Mrs. Reagan visited the Wall as mourners. Said Reagan, "Who can doubt that the cause for which our men fought was just?"²⁷

Slightly more than one year later, Operation Just Cause was launched against Panama, resulting in heavy civilian casualties (the extent of which the Bush administration lied about), and roundly condemned by the UN as violating the territorial sovereignty of the tiny nation. From the jingoist glee surrounding that turkey shoot, it was but a small step to Baghdad and the killing fields of Iraq. ☸

Notes

1. Trenchant analyses of this ideological struggle include Charles Griswold, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Washington Mall: Philosophical Thoughts on Political Iconography," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (1986); S. Foss, "Ambiguity as Persuasion: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial," *Communication Quarterly* 34 (1986); Harry W. Haines, "Disputing the Wreckage: Ideological Struggle at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial," *The Vietnam Generation* 1 (1989); and "What Kind of War? An Analysis of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, March 1986.
2. Obviously, the memorial does not attempt to speak to the human costs in Vietnam itself, where millions died and many more millions were permanently maimed. It should be stressed that the number of names carved on the granite is not an accurate assessment of the true costs of the Vietnam War to the United States. For example, the names of military personnel who were assigned to Southeast Asia but may have died in air crashes outside the official war zone are not included. Nor are those killed in shipboard accidents or on bases Stateside. Many of those killed in Laos or Cambodia, where it was supposed to be illegal for U.S. forces to be, are omitted. Numerous soldiers who were evacuated to hospitals in Okinawa or Hawaii, or Stateside, and subsequently expired from wounds received earlier, are not included. Of course, the nearly 100,000 suicides, as estimated by the Disabled American Veterans, are not counted among the casualties of Vietnam. Many veterans believe the Wall should be twice as large and that the reason it is not represents a cynical attempt by various administrations to keep the true American "body count" from the American people.
3. See J. Kimball, "The Stab-in-the-back Legend and the Vietnam War," *Armed Forces and Society* 14 (1988).
4. Information in this section from Jan Scruggs and Joel L. Swerdlow, *To Heal a Nation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 24–31.
5. Ibid.
6. Editorial, "Stop That Monument," *National Review*, September 18, 1981, 1064.
7. Tom Wolfe, "Art Disputes War: The Battle Over the Vietnam Memorial," *Washington Post*, October 13, 1982.
8. Scruggs and Swerdlow, *To Heal*, 110.
9. Quoted in Peter Nien-chu Kiang, "About Face: Recognizing Asian/Pacific American Vietnam Veterans in Asian American Studies," in *AmerAsia Journal*, Fall 1991.
10. It should be noted that the efforts by another committee, representing the nearly eight thousand women who served in Vietnam, was told by the Fine Arts Commission (which has oversight over all monuments in the Capitol district) that their proposed statue of a combat nurse as an addition to the site will "compromise the artistic integrity" of the memorial. One observer even argued that the call for inclusion of women's contributions would produce an outcry on behalf of the Army's Canine Corps! Such logic about artistic integrity was exactly the argument against the initial sculptural additions. Many male veterans make no secret of their idea that women, even those who cared for the wounded and dying, are not "real" veter-

ans of the war. This despite the fact that the majority of Vietnam combat nurses were inundated daily with far more trauma than the majority of men who served there. The question of an additional statue at the memorial is a difficult one for many former nurses. The inclusion of their statue at the site, if approved, will soften the Ramboesque features of the bronze of combat soldiers and serve to legitimate a meaning that stresses militarism and not the tragedy of war.

11. Diane E. Levin and Nancy Carlson-Paige, *The War Play Dilemma: Balancing Needs and Values in the Early Childhood Classroom* (Hagerstown, Md.: Teachers' College Press, 1983), 28.
12. The Major General Smedley D. Butler Brigade/Veterans for Peace, Boston, Massachusetts.
13. See Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945* (New York: Bantam, 1980), 187–188, 513–514.
14. Loren Baritz, *Backfire* (New York, Ballantine Books, 1986), chap. 3.
15. Ibid., 124–131. See also "Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, JCSM-46-64," January 22, 1964, *The Pentagon Papers* (New York Times) (New York: Bantam, 1971), 496–499; Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy, "Draft Memorandum for the President," March 1, 1964, in Gareth Porter, *Vietnam: A History in Documents* (New York: New American Library, 1981), 263–266.
16. Thomas Ferguson, "The Economic Incentives for War," *The Nation*, January 28, 1991.
17. For numerous citations documenting this long-standing plan, see Ralph Schoenman, *Iraq and Kuwait: A History Suppressed* (Santa Barbara: Veritas Press, 1990), 35–39.
18. Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).
19. Dan Halin, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 210.
20. For discussion on how the public sees the media as too conformist, see Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1988), 84–85. Some critics see the press as mere "Adjuncts of Government." See Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 75–103.
21. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 242.
22. Columbia Broadcasting System, "Another Saddam?" *60 Minutes*, March 10, 1991.
23. Haines, "Disputing," 148–149.
24. Ben Franklin, "President Accepts Vietnam Memorial: Crowd of Veterans and Others Hear His Call for Healing," *New York Times*, November 12, 1984, 10.
25. Haines, "Disputing," 152.
26. Ibid., 151.
27. Ibid.

Defense Cuts

What Might Connecticut Expect on the Manufacturing Employment Front?

Bruce D. Wundt

Connecticut has enjoyed considerable economic prosperity as a result of its reliance on the defense industry. However, as a consequence of reductions in federal spending on defense, this favorable trend of many years is reversing, unfortunately, while the region is also experiencing a general economic slowdown. Many Connecticut industries must prepare for a new era of reducing their dependence on defense contracts and diversify into new markets and products. State policymakers can help during these uncertain times by encouraging private and public retraining of labor resources and the expansion of industries that will promote economic stability.

Connecticut has enjoyed economic prosperity as a result of increased federal spending on defense that began in the late 1970s and continued through the 1980s. Residents of the state were regularly apprised of the contracts awarded to such major players as Pratt & Whitney and Sikorsky, both divisions of United Technologies, and the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. We were also regularly reminded of our favorable unemployment and income levels relative to other states. Most would agree that this prosperity was closely linked with the high level of defense spending per capita the state experienced at the time. This recognition has been underscored of late because the trend is reversing. While the full extent of defense reductions is not yet known, we can be certain that they will have an impact on both the composition and the level of defense spending in the state. We have already been informed of recent employment cutbacks at many of the companies whose primary production is geared to defense. The employment situation is further exacerbated by a general slowdown in economic activity.¹

The Defense Industry in Connecticut

Two state industries closely related to the defense industry are aircraft and aircraft parts (which includes Pratt & Whitney and Sikorsky) and ship and boat building (which includes Electric Boat).² Direct employment in these defense-related industries has

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averaged greater than 21 percent of the total manufacturing base of employment in Connecticut during the twenty-three years between 1964 and 1987. These employees represent roughly 86,000 workers of a manufacturing base that averaged 400,000 during this period. The majority of such employment (76 percent, or 65,360 employees) belongs to the aircraft and parts category, by far the largest single manufacturing industry in the state. In contrast, national employment in these two industries represents only about 4.2 percent of total U.S. manufacturing employment. In addition, while Connecticut's manufacturing base relative to national manufacturing is only about 2.25 percent, the share of the state's employment in aircraft and ship production compared to employment in these industries at the national level is greater than 11 percent. From 1964 to 1987, manufacturing employment in Connecticut declined at a rate of one half of one percent per year, but the share of employment in aircraft and ship production actually grew, especially from 1977 forward. This corresponds directly with increases in federal military spending that began prior to the Reagan years.

Given the size of Connecticut's manufacturing base, an average of 86,000 employees directly engaged in aircraft and ship production is impressive in itself. However, when we consider that many manufacturing sectors supply various parts and services in support of these industries, we gain an even greater sense of their significance to the state. Keep this in mind as we address several related questions. First, how can we identify those industries with specific production linkages to aircraft and ship production, and how has this dependence affected their employment behavior? Second, how do changes in employment in these two major industries affect overall manufacturing employment and defense-dependent employment? And third, given the reality of defense cutbacks, what can be done to mitigate the employment reductions the state has already begun to experience?

Production Linkages with Defense Industries

There are varied estimates of the impact that defense spending reductions will have on the state's manufacturing employment.³ One reason is the difficulty in measuring the complex linkages of industries related to defense production. An accurate estimation should take into account not only the direct impact on the aircraft and ship-building industries, but also the indirect impact on the many other manufacturing industries in the state.

One way to identify the industries with production linkages is to trace the portion of one industry's output (the indirect industry) that is used by another (the direct industry) as a production input.⁴ This approach enables us to identify the production interrelationship between each manufacturing industry and the aircraft (or ship-building) industry and provides an estimate of the degree of this association. For this purpose, the manufacturing sector was disaggregated into eighty-one relatively detailed industries. Significant linkages are found to exist between at least twenty-five industries and aircraft and ship production. (A description of all industries is provided in Appendix A.) For example, industries engaged in the electric and electronic equipment, engineering and scientific instruments, primary metal, and metal machinery sectors have strong ties to aircraft and ship production. In dollar terms, for every one-dollar increase in the demand for output from the aircraft and parts industry, a multiplier effect leads to an increase in output from all industries (both aircraft and parts and production-related) of roughly \$1.52; for every dollar increase

in the demand for output from ship and boat building, there is an increase in output from all industries of roughly \$1.75. (The impact that these industries have on twenty-five of the state's manufacturing industries is shown in Appendix B.)

Several interesting points emerge once the interindustry relationships are identified. Those industries with the greatest degree of production dependence on aircraft and ship production also tend to be large employers, corroborating that the state's manufacturing base has specialized to serve these major industries. But what is also revealed is an inverse relationship between relative employment stability and the aircraft and shipbuilding industries.⁵ This is a significant finding because it suggests that many industries have experienced greater employment stability as a consequence of their dependence on aircraft and ship production resulting from the defense buildup. The stabilizing effect is also reflected in the behavior of overall manufacturing employment. While manufacturing employment exhibited a downward trend over the entire 1964–1987 interval, in times of increased federal defense expenditures — particularly from 1977 on — manufacturing employment fluctuations were relatively mild. This is in contrast to the ten years prior to 1977, when defense expenditures began to decline and we experienced greater instability in manufacturing employment.

Next, what impact do the aircraft and shipbuilding industries have on overall manufacturing? Historical evidence suggests that for every one percent change in employment in these two industries, there is roughly a four tenths to one half of one percent change in overall manufacturing employment in the same direction. The relationship is remarkably stable during periods of both expansion and contraction. For example, if we estimate combined employment in the two defense-related industries to drop by 5 percent (based on 1987 employment of 85,550, this would represent a reduction of approximately 4,280 workers), the impact on total manufacturing employment (based on 1987 employment of 359,203) would be on the order of 7,500 to 9,500 workers. The impact on manufacturing employment net of aircraft and shipbuilding is between 3,200 and 5,200 workers. The range is an estimate of how employment in the production-related industries would be affected. Based on such figures, a reasonable estimate of the number of manufacturing employees directly and indirectly related to these two sectors of the defense industry is slightly greater than one in four workers. The ratio also suggests that the state's overall unemployment rate could increase by slightly more than one half of one percent as a result of the initial 5 percent reduction. It should be emphasized that, given the relative magnitudes of these two industries in the state, the aircraft and parts industry is responsible for the majority of the employment impacts described.

What can be concluded from these figures and, with future cutbacks in defense spending, what do they suggest for the future of Connecticut's manufacturing economy? Because the state's current economic structure relies on the production of aircraft and aircraft parts, there is no doubt that reductions in employment in this industry will translate into reductions in employment in many other industries. Such a trend has already begun. Should the ship- and boat-building industry shrink, however, the consequences for the state won't be as severe.

As the major employer in the aircraft and parts industry, Pratt & Whitney has already been successful in increasing its commercial sales relative to its military business. This favorable reallocation should continue as global markets continue to

expand. While the new era in East-West relations may mean a reduction in military demand, it should also present the opportunity for increased commercial business. So too will changes under way in the European Economic Community. Similarly, while there will also be a reduction in the military's demand for helicopters, it does not follow that opportunities for expanding into other markets do not exist.⁶

Connecticut should not direct its efforts toward replacing the defense industry with another dominant industry. Regional economists are well aware that all industries eventually experience changes in market trends, a natural occurrence in industrial economies. The state has been fortunate for the last thirteen years, but the economy must now diversify. As markets guide it, the state must encourage the expansion of industries that would not only increase the manufacturing base, but also provide stability in employment. To attain this objective, state policymakers should focus their efforts on promoting the expansion of industries compatible with the state's economic structure. Preliminary research suggests that certain medical instruments, printing, chemical, and textile and apparel industries may fit this objective.⁷ This topic should be studied in greater depth.

While public and private retraining of displaced workers is important, we must be mindful that retraining does not guarantee employment, especially since the timing of defense cutbacks will coincide with a general economic slowdown. However, the high skill level of the affected labor force should augur a considerable degree of transference of labor resources to other industries. Engineers, computer specialists, mechanics and others in specialized trades can be employed in the manufacture of nondefense goods. To that end, greater emphasis should be placed on the occupation than on the industry.⁸

The gradual reduction of defense expenditures can provide a buffer as Connecticut firms respond to the conversion process. Companies will have to diversify across products and markets. This change may be more difficult for those engaged in supplying such defense-dependent products as submarines and tank engines and, to a lesser degree, helicopters. In addition to expanding current markets, planners must find new uses for existing technologies to facilitate the production of nondefense goods. While this conversion process may be painful for a time, Connecticut firms have few options; they must therefore respond to changing market conditions. ■

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Appendix A

Eighty-one Manufacturing Industries

A: Twenty-five Industries with Greatest Production Linkages to the Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Industry

SIC Code	Description
1. 366	Communications equipment
2. 367	Electronic components and accessories
3. 346	Metal forgings and stampings
4. 335	Nonferrous rolling and drawing
5. 354	Metalworking machinery
6. 30	Rubber and plastics
7. 331	Blast furnace and basic steel products
8. 3599	Other machinery: engines and turbines (351), farm and garden machinery (352), construction and related machinery (353), special industry machinery (355), refrigeration and service machinery (358), miscellaneous machinery, except electrical (359)
9. 356	General industrial machinery
10. 345	Screw machine products, bolts, etc.
11. 3399	Other primary metal industries: iron and steel foundries (332), secondary nonferrous metals (334), miscellaneous primary metal products (339)
12. 336	Nonferrous foundries
13. 382	Measuring and controlling devices
14. 3899	Other instruments and related products: optical instruments and lenses (383), ophthalmic goods (385), photographic equipment and supplies (386)
15. 342	Cutlery, hand tools, and hardware
16. 347	Metal services
17. 3499	Other fabricated metal products: metal cans and shipping containers (341), plumbing and heating, except electric (343), miscellaneous fabricated metal (349)
18. 2899	Other chemical products: industrial inorganic chemicals (281), drugs (283), industrial organic chemicals (286), agricultural chemicals (287)
19. 329	Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products
20. 369	Miscellaneous electrical equipment and supplies
21. 381	Engineering and scientific instruments
22. 362	Electrical industrial apparatus
23. 282	Plastics materials and synthetics
24. 344	Fabricated structural metal products
25. 289	Miscellaneous chemical products

B: Remaining Manufacturing Industries

26. 202	Dairy products
27. 203	Preserved fruits and vegetables
28. 205	Bakery products
29. 208	Beverages
30. 2099	Other food and kindred: meat products (201), grain mill products (204), sugar and confectionery (206), fats and oils (207), miscellaneous foods and kindred products (209)
31. 21	Tobacco: cigarettes (211), cigars (212), tobacco stemming and redrying (214)
32. 222	Weaving mills, synthetics
33. 225	Knitting mills
34. 228	Yarn and thread mills
35. 229	Miscellaneous textile goods
36. 2299	Other textile products: weaving mills, cotton (221), weaving and finishing mills, wool (223), narrow fabric mills (224), textile finishing, except wool (226), floor covering mills (227)
37. 232	Men's and boys' furnishings
38. 233	Women's and misses' outerwear

	SIC Code	Description
39.	234	Women's and children's undergarments
40.	238	Miscellaneous apparel and accessories
41.	239	Miscellaneous fabricated textile products
42.	2399	Other apparel products: men's and boys' suits and coats (231), hats, caps, and millinery (235), children's outerwear (236), fur goods (237)
43.	243	Millwork, plywood, and structural members
44.	244	Wood containers
45.	249	Miscellaneous wood products
46.	2499	Other wood: logging camps and contractors (241), sawmills and planing mills (242), wood buildings and mobile homes (245)
47.	251	Household furniture
48.	259	Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures
49.	2599	Other furniture: office furniture (252), public building and related furniture (253), partitions and fixtures (254)
50.	264	Converted paper products
51.	265	Paperboard containers and boxes
52.	2699	Other paper products: paper mills, except building paper (262), paperboard mills (263), building paper and board mills (266), pulp mills (261)
53.	271	Newspapers
54.	272	Periodicals
55.	273	Books
56.	275	Commercial printing
57.	276	Manifold business forms
58.	278	Blankbooks and bookbinding
59.	279	Printing trade services
60.	2799	Other printing and publishing: miscellaneous publishing (274), greeting card publishing (277)
61.	284	Soap, cleaners, toilet goods
62.	285	Paints and allied products
63.	31	Leather and leather products
64.	323	Products of purchased glass
65.	327	Concrete, gypsum, plaster products
66.	3299	Other stone, clay, and glass: glass and glassware, pressed or blown (322), structural clay products (325), pottery (326)
67.	348	Ordnance and accessories, not elsewhere classified
68.	357	Office and computing machines
69.	361	Electric distributing equipment
70.	363	Household appliances
71.	364	Electric lighting and wiring equipment
72.	367	Electronic components and accessories
73.	372	Aircraft and parts
74.	373	Miscellaneous transportation equipment: motor vehicle and equipment (371), ship- and boat building and repairing (373), motorcycles, bicycles, and parts (375), miscellaneous transportation equipment (379)
75.	384	Medical instruments and supplies
76.	387	Watches, clocks, and watchcases
77.	391	Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware
78.	393	Musical instruments
79.	394	Toys and sporting goods
80.	396	Costume jewelry and notions
81.	3999	Miscellaneous manufacturers: miscellaneous manufacturers (399), pens, pencils (395), office and art supplies

Sources: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statistical Policy Division, *SIC Manual*, 1972, and *Survey of Current Business*, 1972.

Appendix B

Twenty-five Industries with Greatest Production Linkages to the Aircraft and Ship-building Industries*

(1)	(2)	Aircraft and Parts		Ship and Boat Building	
		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	SIC	Total Requirements Coefficient	Total Requirements Coefficient (Employment)	Total Requirements Coefficient	Total Requirements Coefficient (Employment)
1.	366	0.0422	0.0738	0.0738	0.0061
2.	367	0.0371	0.0588	0.0588	0.0066
3.	346	0.0339	0.4555	0.0455	0.0700
4.	335	0.0323	0.0221	0.0221	0.0103
5.	354	0.0164	0.0231	0.0231	0.0067
6.	30	0.0124	0.0171	0.0171	0.0483
7.	331	0.0115	0.0067	0.0067	0.0142
8.	3599	0.0109	0.0135	0.0135	0.0212
9.	356	0.0106	0.0133	0.0133	0.0113
10.	345	0.0105	0.0148	0.0148	0.0123
11.	3399	0.0092	0.0079	0.0079	0.0086
12.	336	0.0087	0.0105	0.0105	0.0054
13.	382	0.0079	0.0109	0.0109	0.0016
14.	3899	0.0069	0.0031	0.0031	0.0002
15.	342	0.0057	0.0026	0.0026	0.0039
16.	347	0.0043	0.0082	0.0082	0.0066
17.	3499	0.0041	0.0061	0.0061	0.0135
18.	2899	0.0040	0.0019	0.0019	0.0024
19.	329	0.0032	0.0084	0.0084	0.0104
20.	369	0.0032	0.0023	0.0023	0.0076
21.	381	0.0031	0.0035	0.0035	0.0002
22.	362	0.0023	0.0021	0.0021	0.0022
23.	282	0.0017	0.0005	0.0005	0.0010
24.	344	0.0015	0.0021	0.0021	0.0025
25.	289	0.0013	0.0008	0.0008	0.0012
Total of 81 Industries		1.5181	1.5956	1.7462	1.6207

* Note: Columns (3) and (5) are total requirement coefficients for industries listed in column (2) corresponding to a \$1.00 increase in demand for output from the aircraft and parts and ship- and boat-building industries, respectively. For example, the coefficient of 0.0422 suggests that for a \$1.00 increase in output from the aircraft and parts industry, the direct and indirect increase in output from the communications equipment industry (SIC 366) is slightly more than 4 cents. Columns (4) and (6) describe the same impacts, but the entries represent the estimated number of employees.

Notes

1. The problems facing specific firms in the state that produce for the defense industry have been well publicized. For example, see "Peace Yields No Dividend for Defense-reliant Economy," *Hartford Courant*, September 30, 1990, and "Defense Cuts to Affect State Firms," *Hartford Courant*, February 1, 1991. For region-specific articles, see "Recession Approaches, but Not Everywhere," *Wall Street Journal*, October 31, 1990, and Edward Moscovitch, "The Downturn in the New England Economy: What Lies Behind It?" *New England Economic Review*, July/August 1990, 53-65. In addition, see Richard A. Barff and Prentice L. Knight III, "The Role of Federal Military Spending in the Timing of the New England Employment Turnaround," *Papers of Regional Science Association* 65, 1988, for a historical overview of the impact of the military buildup on New England's economy.

2. The state also supplies for the defense industry such products as electronics and communication equipment, radar systems, and turbine engines for tanks. While federal government plans to reduce production of M1 tanks has cast doubts on the economic situation for Textron Lycoming (which employs about 4,000 in the state), there has been optimistic news for the firm; the government has approved a major sale of M1s to Saudi Arabia. However, the aircraft and parts and ship- and boat-building industries are of primary concern here because of the significant employment in these industries.
3. For example, see Kevin Bean, "Reconversion in Connecticut," *Social Policy*, Winter 1988, 46-49; Yolanda K. Henderson, "Defense Cutbacks and the New England Economy," *New England Economic Review*, July/August 1990, 3-24.
4. I am referring to input-output (I-O) analysis. I developed an eighty-one industry I-O table for the manufacturing sector in Connecticut, which serves as a source of reference for this article. (See Bruce D. Wundt, "Industrial Diversification and Manufacturing Employment Stability: A Study of the State of Connecticut," Ph.D. diss., Clark University, 1988.)
5. As measured by the coefficient of variation, a ratio of an industry's employment variations relative to its average size from 1964 to 1987.
6. In addition to Pratt & Whitney's efforts to reduce its reliance on government contracts and Sikorsky's seeking markets outside the United States for helicopter sales, their parent company, United Technologies, is preparing for future involvement in the space-launch industry.
7. Bruce D. Wundt, "Minimizing Employment Instability: A Model of Industrial Expansion with Input-Output Considerations," unpublished manuscript.
8. Promoting the expansion of the manufacturing base and retraining displaced workers are two issues of concern for state policymakers regarding economic conversion. Others include financial assistance to communities and individuals dependent on defense contracts. See *Hartford Courant* for the following: "Legislators Fight for Defense Firms," May 20, 1990; "House Weighs Aid to Displaced Defense Workers," July 20, 1990; and "State Defense Industry Prepares for Pentagon Cutbacks," January 28, 1990.

Representative Men

Shaun O'Connell

The works discussed in this article include:

- Iron John: A Book About Men*, by Robert Bly. 268 pages. Addison-Wesley, 1991. \$18.95.
American Psycho, by Bret Easton Ellis. 399 pages. Vintage Books, 1991. \$11.00
Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man, by David Lehman. 318 pages. Poseidon Press, 1991. \$21.95.
Amongst Women, by John McGahern. 184 pages. Faber and Faber, 1990. \$25.00
Lies of Silence, by Brian Moore. 194 pages. Bloomsbury, 1990. \$25.00
Chicago Loop, by Paul Theroux. 196 pages. Random House, 1990. \$20.00
Rabbit at Rest, by John Updike. Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. 512 pages. \$21.95.
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Midway through 1991, with intentional hyperbole, in a tone combining wonder with irony, *Newsweek* declared that “the men’s movement is dawning, the first postmodern social movement, meaning one that stems from a deep national malaise that hardly anyone knew existed until they saw it on a PBS special.”¹ That is, until the Public Broadcasting System presented Bill Moyers’s *A Gathering of Men*, a 1990 television documentary on Robert Bly, a poet and an apostle of male self-awareness. Bly’s book on this matter, *Iron John*, stayed on the best-seller list for more than fifty weeks in 1991; at the same time, Sam Keen’s provocatively titled *Fire in the Belly* was also a best-seller.² Both Bly and Keen were inspired by Joseph Campbell’s pop mythic mysticism, and both Bly and Keen, like Campbell before them, were celebrated on PBS by Bill Moyers. As Richard Stengel wittily noted in *Time*, “What Oprah is to books like *Men Who Hate Women and the Women Who Love Them*, Moyers is to intellectual fare like Campbell’s *Hero with a Thousand Faces*.” Yet clearly a nerve was struck, by Bly’s iron and Keen’s fire, in the national psyche in the year of Desert Storm, though both Bly and Keen saw the war against Iraq as evidence of George Bush’s problems with manliness.³ (When *The Nation* solicited responses from luminaries to the question “What is patriotism?” Bly wrote, in response to celebrations over the Gulf War victory, “The yellow ribbon is the last refuge of a scoundrel.”)⁴

Both Bly and Keen argue that modern men are assigned roles that train them to succeed and grant them power, but these roles also cut them off from their fathers,

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their feelings, and their own families. The “father-hunger” of modern men results in their arrested development and their inability to deal with the world as mature men. Bly urges men to put away childish things — a range of surly behaviors which for Bly even includes the “deconstructing” of English department elders — and regain their mislaid manhood. Like Campbell, Bly searches myths to find salvific models of maturation. “Ancient stories are a good help, because they have endured the scrutiny of generations of women and men, and because they give both the light and dark sides of manhood, the admirable and the dangerous. Their model is not a perfect man, nor an overly spiritual man.”⁵ However, valuable as Bly’s approach might be, ancient stories cannot answer the question: What models of man are offered by contemporary stories? What do they tell us, as Tolstoy once put the question, about what a man should do?

Early in the 1990s, six men — one actual, five fictional — emerged from the pages of telling texts: one work of literary criticism, five works of fiction. They were offered up as representative men of the 1980s, an era when the worst were full of passionate intensities, particularly among men. Each antiheroic man in these works was selfish, domineering, dangerous to women, and deceitful, yet each was also committed to a system of values and ideas that made him an interesting case history — values which, in some instances, redeemed his failings. Though these figures are presented with varying degrees of sympathy — depending on the extent to which each author sees his representative man as trapped or the extent to which each of these literary figures rebels against his confining roles — each of these six male authors takes a sharply critical view of traditional male traits: their lust for power, their assumption of authority, their drive for self-fulfillment, and their romantic idealism.

In *Some American Men*, Gloria Emerson says it is still largely assumed to be “a man’s world,” though she also documents the “penalties” men pay for such assumptions. “In a country whose insistence on delusion seems without clear limits, the old definition of masculinity still persists. And it persists because of hidden and unspoken expectations.”⁶ The works here under discussion, written by and about American and European men, reexamine “the old definition of masculinity” in striking, occasionally brilliant ways.

Paul de Man was a leading advocate of the school of “deconstruction,” an approach to language and literature that has had significant, if indirect, influence on the American mind. After de Man’s death in 1983, it was revealed that he had written pro-Nazi tracts as a young man in Belgium, early in World War II. This story, man and idea, is brilliantly told in *Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man* by David Lehman. Paul de Man, who died before his wartime journalism became public, perpetuated a fraudulent image of himself as a former anti-Nazi resistance fighter; at the same time he self-servingly promoted a theory that separated language from action, history from judgment. Harry (“Rabbit”) Angstrom, antihero of four novels spanning the Eisenhower-Reagan eras, came to the end of the road in *Rabbit at Rest* by John Updike. Rabbit was consumed by all of that which nourished him — the consumer culture of middle America, where he lived out his failed dream of success. Patrick Bateman, villain of *American Psycho*, a controversial and lurid novel by Bret Easton Ellis, represents a horrific vision of the young urban professional; he personifies solipsism, consumerism, self-seeking, moral inertia, and violence against women. Parker Jacoda, dubbed by the press

“The Wolfman,” is a similarly savage and pathetic victimizer of women in Paul Theroux’s far better novel, *Chicago Loop*. Michael Dillon is at once a betrayer and rescuer of women in distress in Brian Moore’s political parable of Northern Ireland, *Lies of Silence*. Finally, Michael Moran, an obscure farmer in the west of Ireland, portrayed in John McGahern’s supreme work of fiction, *Amongst Women*, is a petty tyrant over a family whose women return his bitterness with love and grow all the stronger for their efforts. These six unattractive but compelling (in several senses) men represent, then, aspects of the age, signs of the times. They hint at what certain representative modern men want and do.

Deconstruction is the trendy literary theory of language and literature whose advocates have taken over many literary journals, whose enthusiasts have come to dominate important or ambitious English departments in American universities, whose academic strike force has even seized control of the Modern Language Association (MLA). These heady revisionists hold that there is no clear link between language and the world or, in their jargon, between sign and meaning. (Paul de Man in *Blindness and Insight*: “Sign and meaning can never coincide.” And: “Instead of containing or reflecting experience, language constitutes it.”)⁷ They discuss, or have “discourse” about, “texts” — not discussions of literary works as we had known them: works written in distinct genres, works composed by various writers, under different circumstances, works reflecting a range of intentions and bearing different degrees of success. Such texts, argue deconstructionists, are *autotelic*, or self-referential, self-contradicting artifacts, removed from the real world. (Of course there *is* no *real* world for deconstructionists; what we might think of as the real world they treat as yet another text, a place where we send each other “messages” — cryptic signals whose minimalist meanings are quite different from what they appear to be, meanings for which deconstructionists have, they claim, the code. Deconstructionists, naturally, arrive at no single meaning; rather, they “problematize” all texts, literal and figurative.)

Deconstructionists (or “decons” of the new anticanon) place linguistic and rhetorical considerations first, seeking contradictions rather than coherence within literary works, thus “liberating” readers from what deconstructionists take to be the common readers’ naive expectations of literary representation, morality, and coherence. “It is not difficult to see the attractions” of deconstructive readings, notes Jonathan Culler, a leading proponent, in *Structuralist Poetics*. “Given that there is no ultimate or absolute justification for any system or for the interpretations from it,” the critic is free to value “the activity of interpretation itself . . . rather than any results which might be obtained.”⁸ In other words, literary criticism, in their fast hands, has become an autoerotic act. Such moral relativism and critical license, however, do not add up to compelling intellectual attractions for all critics. “Readers interested in the moral dimension of a novel or poem, or in elevating the degree of artistic success, or in treating the ideas and values it promotes, can forget it. What you get with deconstruction isn’t knowledge but a reflexive suspicion of all sources of knowledge — a suspicion extended to art and culture more generally,” writes David Lehman in his withering attack on deconstruction, *Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man*.⁹

Deconstruction — like est, its trendy therapeutic counterpart, which also argues that thinking makes things so — is indeed a sign of the times. It represents a revolution —

all rhetorical, of course — against long-held assumptions and beliefs. J. Hillis Miller, who became president of the MLA in 1986, argued, with characteristic pride and deconstructionist bravura, that “a deconstructionist is not a parasite but a patricide. He is a bad son demolishing beyond hope of repair the machine of Western metaphysics.”¹⁰ And so it has come to pass. The center has not held, said Yeats; deconstructionists applaud the black hole.

Such a theory may at first seem patent nonsense, not worth the effort of refutation. (When told “Your house is on fire!” should you consider such a “speech act” a nonreferential, paradoxical, and problematizing “text,” a verbal artifice, or should you assume that this utterance may be a lucid description of an actual state that requires your action? I would call the Fire Department and worry about metaphysics another time. A popular bumper sticker of the early 1990s takes a clear stand on this issue of philosophical realism when it compellingly states: “Shit Happens!”) However, it must be granted, deconstructionists have performed a service by calling new attention to textual tensions, rhetorical rationalizations, and slipshod, self-serving, moralistic readings of literary works. They have as well, for better or worse, empowered a new generation of literary critics, aided by allies in related schools of partisan social critics — feminists, blacks, ethnics, gays and lesbians, Marxists, and so on — who seek to deconstruct the “hegemony” of the patriarchal literary canon and replace it with a new five-foot shelf of politically correct texts. Marginality is deconstruction’s central faith!

Lehman, if you will, deconstructs deconstruction by examining the case of Paul de Man, America’s leading deconstructionist and the center of a school of literary and linguistic theorists at Yale University, which dominated critical discourse in and beyond the academy during the 1980s. Deconstructionists argue, as de Man makes clear, that the author is irrelevant to his text: “Considerations of the actual and historical existence of writers are a waste of time from a critical point of view.”¹¹ Lehman convincingly shows this to be not only a false assumption, but also an expression of wishful thinking.

In the late 1980s, it was revealed that de Man had written ninety-two articles, spanning most of 1941–1942, for the journal *Le Soir*, which had become a Nazi publication in occupied Belgium. In “The Jews in Contemporary Literature,” March 4, 1941, de Man, then twenty-one, argued that Europe would not miss what he claimed were Jews’ minimal contributions to culture if they were deported. Europeans should not crossbreed with “them”; rather, “we” should “liberate ourselves spiritually from their demoralizing influence in the realm of thought, literature, and the arts.”¹² Furthermore, we learned that de Man had abandoned his common-law wife and children just after World War II when he came to America, where he soon began a new life with a new wife. (In eerie parallel, as Lehman’s book appeared in 1991, so too did the accusations that Werner Erhardt, founder of est, had brutalized his wife, beaten his son, and committed incest with his daughter! Those who urged separations between words and deeds had much to answer for in their own lives, it seemed.)

Reasonably enough, Lehman asks, “Did de Man’s insistence on language’s ‘unreliability’ conceal the wish to lay the blame for his youthful journalism on language?”¹³ Lehman’s inescapable conclusion is that de Man’s personal motives were suspect and self-serving, from the time he supported Nazism to the time he advocated deconstruction. In *Allegories of Reading*, de Man wrote, “It is always possible to face up to any

experience (to excuse any guilt), because the experience always exists simultaneously as fictional discourse and as empirical event and it is never possible to decide which one of the two possibilities is the right one. The indecision makes it possible to excuse the bleakest of crimes because, as a fiction, it escapes from the straits of guilt and innocence.”¹⁴ Here de Man, aware his own life is a fictional construct, implicitly claims for himself a freedom from judgment we usually grant to characters in fiction. David Lehman reveals de Man’s claims to irresponsibility to be a problematizing cover-up for his own moral-political-personal culpability. The “bad son” and the “patricide” had been revealed to be just that — not an allegorical figure, as Miller implied, but an actual person who had behaved immorally and was belatedly being held to account for his actions, which, in his case, were words that made a difference in people’s lives — in Nazi Germany and in contemporary America. *Signs of the Times* reaffirms the intimate relations between art and life, a connection that deconstructionists try to deny.

Bret Easton Ellis’s *American Psycho* opens with epigraphs from (presumptuously enough) (1) Dostoyevski — on the fictional nature but the social representativeness of the perverse narrator of *Notes from Underground*; (2) Miss Manners (who is a far better writer than Ellis) on society’s need for manners, for “if we followed every impulse, we’d be killing one another”; and (fittingly) (3) Talking Heads, a trashy rock group: “And as things fell apart / Nobody paid much attention.” All of which suggests that the novel’s narrator, Patrick Bateman — a twenty-six-year-old Wall Street hustler (he works at Pierce & Pierce, an allegorically aptly named brokerage firm), a young man on the make for thrills and chills, cutting and thrusting his way through his public life and his pubic obsession — is a representative man who shows how far America has come from a common assumption of civil manners. Bateman’s sickening displays of violence (upon women, the homeless, children, and animals), his inability to feel responsibility or regret, and his numbing materialism are offered as evidence that things indeed have fallen apart. At its best, Ellis’s shocking novel is his way of making Americans pay attention to a derangement at the heart of our culture. At its worst, Ellis’s tedious and lurid novel is yet another example of that derangement.

Narrator Patrick Bateman’s account of his night journeys through sex and violence in New York City are offered by Ellis as evidence of the “End of the 1980s,” as one climactic chapter is titled. However, by the time of its publication, the era of Reagan-Trump acquisitiveness and conspicuous consumption seemed long gone. Our only president, George Bush, was set on reversing the lessons of the Vietnam War by winning one for the Gipper’s former VP in the Gulf and Oliver Stone’s film of wretched excess during the 1960s, *The Doors*, was opening. Indeed, Stone had already done a film version of Reagan-era greed, *Wall Street*, years before, as had two writers in fiction: Jay McInerney in *Bright Lights, Big City* and Tom Wolfe in *The Bonfire of the Vanities*. So Ellis was a redundant latecomer in the genre of cautionary tales about the immoral selfishness and violence of our times — a tale set, of course, in New York City, our Gotham as Gomorrah.

“If I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere,” sing the Vegas showstoppers about New York, “a city that doesn’t sleep.” Patrick Bateman makes it there with a new level of callous violence, stalking his victims through the dark and naked city. As a result, many in the literary community and the other guardians of public taste were figuratively assaulted by the book. For example: “Misogynist garbage,” said Tammy

Bruce, president of the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Organization for Women, a group that pressed a boycott of the novel.¹⁵

Even Norman Mailer was shocked, which came as a surprise, for the author of *An American Dream* may have provided the literary model of *American Psycho*. In Mailer's novel the self-justifying narrator, Stephen Rojack, takes pleasure in the murder of a woman (his wife), enjoys sex with a maid, then wanders the streets of the city — a pattern followed many times by Bateman. However, after a time Rojack "wanted to be free of magic, the tongue of the Devil, the Dread of the Lord," while Bateman just keeps on slicing-and-dicing his way around Manhattan.¹⁶

Patrick Bateman is never stricken by conscience and he is never caught, two features of the novel that offended most reviewers. In the novel's final scene, Bateman is having drinks at Harry's Bar, trying to figure out where to try to get reservations for dinner. He notices a sign, THIS IS NOT AN EXIT, and narrator Bateman lets this stand as his final word to the reader, words that close Ellis's novel. Bateman and Ellis at that point seem to merge into one voice. The novel provides no moral center outside the immoral Bateman. That is, there is no exit from his life and character for Bateman and no assurance of safety for the reader.

Perhaps that is why Mailer was shocked. "I cannot recall a piece of fiction by an American writer which depicts so odious a ruling class — worse, a young ruling class of Wall Street princelings ready, presumably, by the next century to manage the mighty if surrealistic levers of our economy. Nowhere in American literature can one point to an inhumanity of the moneyed upon the afflicted equal to" some of the scenes in Ellis's novel.¹⁷ However, Mailer finally came down against *American Psycho*, for all of its author's talent and all of the novel's hyperbolic brilliance, because Ellis has made a banality of his murderer's evil.

Long before its publication, the novel infuriated so many that Simon and Schuster, which had paid the twenty-six-year-old author an advance of \$300,000 for his third novel, canceled the book's publication. The novel was resold, for an undisclosed amount, to Vintage, which issued it in a trade paperback in March 1991. Ellis, who had received death threats, defended his work as a social satire, a novel of "surface" that used "comedy" (undetected by most readers) "to get at the absolute banality of the violence of a perverse decade."¹⁸ So Ellis was proud of the very quality, banality, for which Mailer faulted the novel.

Ellis presents a New York of extremes between rich and poor, sane and insane. The word FEAR is "sprayed in red graffiti on the side of a McDonald's on Fourth and Seventh," where two handsome and affluent young men, leaving their workday on Wall Street, hail a cab on the opening page of the novel. In the cab one of these depressing men-on-the-make scans the newspaper and reports on the daily record of urban horrors:

Strangled models, babies thrown from tenement rooftops, kids killed in the subway, a Communist rally, Mafia boss wiped out, Nazis . . . baseball players with AIDS, more Mafia shit, gridlock, the homeless, various maniacs, faggots dropping like flies in the streets, surrogate mothers, the cancellation of a soap opera, kids who broke into a zoo and tortured and burned various animals alive, more Nazis . . . and the joke is, the punch line is, it's all in this city — nowhere else, just here, it sucks, whoa wait, more Nazis, gridlock, gridlock, baby-sellers, black-market babies, AIDS babies, baby junkies, building collapses on baby, maniac baby, gridlock, bridge collapses.¹⁹

This catalogue of urban diseases and afflictions, which makes no distinctions between the serious and the silly, recounted by a young man who is *not* the sociopathic antihero of the novel, serves as Ellis's reference point for the reader. It is as though he is saying to the reader, "You ain't seen nothin' yet!" before he launches into the loathsome days and ways of Patrick Bateman, before Ellis explores the permutations and combinations of horror he inflicts upon the innocent and vulnerable citizens of the city.

For all its repulsion, *American Psycho* contains telling catalogues of the consumer culture, for the inhabitants of his New York have no souls, only greedy hearts. Bateman's ability to recognize brand names is at first astonishing, then appalling, finally numbing. According to the *Boston Phoenix*, Ellis mentions some four hundred products in as many pages: Giorgio Armani leads the list (54 citations), followed by Ralph Lauren (49), J & B Scotch (34), and Rolex (26).²⁰ *American Psycho* seems to seek the combined audience of *GQ* readers and *Silence of the Lambs* viewers, presenting trendy duds with a maniacal genius. At work, for example, Bateman, brooding upon blood, sits at his Palazzetti glass-top desk, wearing Ray-Bans, chewing Nupurin, hung over from a coke binge begun at the night spot Shout! while he listens to rock music on his Walkman. He pops Valium, washes it down with Perrier, then applies Visine to his eyes. "All it comes down to is this: I feel like shit but look great."²¹ Ellis composes a fictional world of brittle, pricey "surface."

However, unlike his peers, Bateman lives on the edge as well as on the surface. It first seems his deepest passion is dedicated to obtaining restaurant reservations and attending the *in* clubs: Tunnel, Chernoble, Canal, Nell's, the Yale Club, the Quilted Giraffe, the Newport, Harry's, Fluties, Indochine, the New York Yacht Club, World's End. Bateman is faithful only to one thing — catching *The Patty Winter Show*, live or on tape, each day. During the course of the novel he watches programs on the following: descendants of members of the Donner Party, "UFOs That Kill," the inevitability of nuclear war, "Shark Attack Victims," "Aspirin: Can It Save Your Life?," Nazis, women who have had mastectomies, "Girls Who Trade Sex for Crack," an exclusive interview with Donald Trump followed by a report on women who had been tortured, "Concentration Camp Survivors," "Has Patrick Swayze Become Cynical or Not?," the best restaurants in the Middle East, Spuds McKenzie, "Home Abortion Kits," "Beautiful Teenage Lesbians," the punk rock band Guns N' Roses, girls in the fourth grade who trade sex for crack, and much more. From such lists we begin to discern not, as Trollope once put it, *the way we live now*, but the ways a few affluent, self-destructive Americans lived in the Reagan years. Morning in America, indeed!

Yet Ellis's novel is destroyed less by its indulgence in the horrific — Bateman's pathology, violence, and sexism, after all, should not be ascribed to the author — than by its implausibilities, most notably: (1) Bateman seems not to have to attend to his work to be able to afford a life of extraordinary luxury — restaurants, clothes, jewels, helicopters, and limos — so the economic base of this world is even more fanciful than it is in Wolfe's *Bonfire* or the stylish film *Someone to Watch Over Me*, in which the threatened heroine, rich and beautiful, lives in a Manhattan apartment the size of Grand Central Station. (2) Bateman hacks, dismembers, cooks, and drags bodies around town, to store human remains at a flat in Hell's Kitchen, his clothes soaked in blood, but he is never caught, never even noticed. (3) Ellis's configuration of the yuppie as serial murderer is self-defeating, for by exaggerating the moral corrosions of

the Reagan era, by equating greed with violence, he limits the application of his satire and destroys his case, misses the far more subtle derangements of the era. Wall Street hustlers were bad enough in what they did at the greedy work Bateman implausibly ignores, without trying to make them over into pathological sociopaths! The story of how Bret Easton Ellis ripped off two reputable New York publishing houses — which comically tried simultaneously to make a buck off his book and to protect their reputations — is a more telling social parable. *American Psycho*, as a novel and as a publishing event, embodies and exemplifies American men at their worst.

In Paul Theroux's *Chicago Loop*, Parker Jacoda, an architect, does attend to his work, as a builder-developer, until he quits to become an underground man in Chicago. He leaves murdered girls in their apartments and tries to get caught to stop himself from what he cannot help doing. So, unlike Bateman, Jacoda does have a latent conscience. Jacoda is not forced to stand as a representative of Reagan-era greed, but as an example of a man trapped in the destructive elements of his warped gender expectations. He reduces everything to sexual warfare; misogyny is the dark-side soul. "The presidential campaign was happening, and that was the best reason of all not to buy a paper. What a choice, and you knew they were awful when you saw their wives — four bossy bitches propping up their greedy eager-to-please husbands."²² When Parker looks at the men in Robert Mapplethorpe's exhibition of often shocking photographs — some of men who are committing sex and violence upon each other — he sees victims of a voyeuristic artist.

Theroux's Chicago serves as the apt setting for Jacoda's descent into the maelstrom. There Parker has no exit.

Parker had managed to cut across, to converge: he did not travel in a straight line. Was it a sign he saw, or the fact that the train was drawing into LaSalle, that made him think of the word *Loop*? Whatever, it was the right word. His whole life was a curve and in the course of his life he would inscribe a loop. He had escaped the tyranny of parallel lines.²³

However, it is not clear that Paul Theroux has entirely escaped the tyranny of parallel lines in this novel. It is, as Anita Brookner notes on the dust jacket, "remarkable . . . a tour-de-force," a sympathetic treatment of a horrific man who is the victim of his own murderous drives. It is also written with minimalist precision and scenic control, unlike the sloppy *American Psycho*, but *Chicago Loop* attempts no analysis of this evil man. As Coleridge said of Iago, Parker is an example of motiveless malignancy. No insight emerges from his killings, as it does, say, from Pinky's murderous deeds in Graham Greene's *Brighton Rock*, for Parker, like Bateman, cannot articulate a moral vision. Parker is first seen assaulting a vulnerable, reckless woman; he is last seen seeking his own punishment. Perhaps Theroux, too, is something of a voyeur, an exploitative artist, showing us lurid deeds for clever literary titillation.

At his boldest moment in *Rabbit at Rest*, John Updike, daring to be obvious, portrays his representative American, Harry ("Rabbit") Angstrom, in the role of Uncle Sam, marching in the 1989 Fourth of July parade in Brewer, Pennsylvania, his home town. Though Harry is fifty-six, overweight, and recuperating from a heart attack, he feels happy to be home again amid the cheers of townsfolk, reminded of those cheers he

heard thirty years before, when he had been a high school basketball hero. “He is a legend, a walking cloud. Inside him a droplet of explosive has opened his veins like flower petals uncurling in the sun.”²⁴ Young once more, seized by patriotic fervor, reveling in glory, Rabbit once more, he marches to recorded music.

Kate Smith belts out, dead as she is, dragged into the grave by sheer gregarious weight, “God Bless America” — “. . . to the oceans, white with foam.” Harry’s eyes burn and the impression giddily — as if he had been lifted up to survey all human history — grows upon him, making his heart thump worse and worse, that all in all this is the happiest fucking country the world has ever seen.²⁵

Harry Angstrom is Updike’s alter ego and hero-of-sorts in four novels — *Rabbit, Run* (1960), *Rabbit Redux* (1971), *Rabbit Is Rich* (1981), and *Rabbit at Rest* (1990) — which, taken together, constitute an epic of American life: from midcentury glory to fin de siècle decline and fall. In portraying his Pennsylvania double — Rabbit remained in the circumscribed world Updike fled, for “Brewer” is Reading, Pennsylvania, and “Mt. Judge” is Shillington, a nearby town, where Updike came of age before he left for Harvard — in triumphal march, Updike affirms his own patriotism and turns the knife to his critics, literary and political. Clearly Updike likes, though he does not wholly approve of, Rabbit. For all his faults, we shall not look on his likes again, this personification of some American men of the 1950s — callow, conventional, both home-centered and promiscuous, patriotic, and assured that the world owed them a living.

However, not everyone was won over by Rabbit. *Rabbit at Rest* so piqued Garry Wills that he denounced the whole tetralogy as implausible and overwrought in the *New York Review of Books*. “There is a compulsive tidiness about this scheme which tries to make up in comprehensiveness what it has increasingly lost in plausibility.”²⁶ Wills — the author of many works on politics and religion, including *Nixon Agonistes* — was particularly offended by Harry’s pro-war, pro-Nixon politics during the Vietnam War, the era portrayed in *Rabbit Redux*. “Under the fiction of Rabbit reaching up from the working class is the reality of Updike reaching down to a solidarity with Nixon’s values.”²⁷ For Wills, Rabbit and his author are of one political mind, so when Rabbit preens patriotically in a parade, so too does Updike. Thus, Wills might say, *Rabbit at Rest* is an act of narcissism, a self-consuming artifact, Updike’s advertisement for himself, his valediction forbidding mourning. “There is an air of forgiveness to the novel, since Harry has lost any sense of what might need forgiving . . . Harry’s creator has lost track of what he originally meant him to mean.”²⁸

Garry Wills is an astute political analyst, but he is much too argument directed to serve as an adequate literary critic. He has made a serious case against Updike, but to do so Wills has taken Updike’s own political statements far too literally. That is, Wills has overidentified the author with his novels’ hero — “Never trust the artist. Trust the tale. The proper function of a critic is to save the tale from the artist,” correctly affirmed D. H. Lawrence.²⁹ And Wills has, I believe, missed the irony and well-wrought ambiguity of *Rabbit at Rest*, for Updike’s art of fiction makes this a well-realized novel and an exemplary American tale. The novel is Updike’s good-bye-to-all-that for Harry Angstrom, who moves toward death with characteristic recklessness. *Rabbit at Rest* is, as well, Updike’s separate peace with his alter ego and

the America they both had long celebrated. Updike's "air of forgiveness" for his self-destructive character is balanced by a devastating satire of Rabbit's values, values that make him, like his country, bloated, heartweary and near terminal.

Garry Wills's attack on the Rabbit saga is based on the amazing revelations of political values in *Self-Consciousness*, Updike's 1989 autobiographical memoir. There, in a chapter titled "On Not Being a Dove," Updike recounted his fervid support of the Vietnam War. He recalls how he told British editors, early in the war, "I am for our intervention if it does some good." Blood sacrifices are apparently acceptable, for Updike, in a struggle between good and evil. While most notable American writers denounced the war in Southeast Asia and many demonstrated against it — as celebrated in Norman Mailer's *The Armies of the Night* — Updike fumed against the demonstrators! In a letter to the *New York Times*, he declared he believed that those who promoted the war did so to prevent other wars.

Americans should, as he did, *trust* Lyndon Johnson. "If he and his advisers (transferred intact, most of them, from Kennedy's Camelot) had somehow got us into this mess, they would somehow get us out, and it was a citizen's plain duty to hold his breath and hope for the best, not parade around spouting pious unction and crocodile tears." (Updike's heavy sarcasm and reliance upon clichés here show his determination to needle antiwar protesters; blind patriotism results in hyperbole, which overwhelms his usual stylistic delicacy. We are not surprised to learn, from Updike, that his family made him a present of an American flag during the Vietnam War! Curiously, here Updike-as-flag-waver anticipates the scene in which Harry Angstrom parades around, spouting pious and patriotic unction and weeping patriotic "crocodile tears.") John Updike was moved, he reports, when he saw those war proponents, Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk, hug at a White House dinner.³⁰ While Harry Angstrom supported the war from middle America, John Updike toasted it among the power elite.

Updike, shaped by memories of the Depression, his childhood faith in the wisdom of FDR, and the righteousness of the American mission during World War II, identified with authority, even during the Vietnam era, when three presidents lied to us and our military commanders continuously reported false sightings of lights at the end of the long tunnel of war. The country had been good to Updike, so why should he — like those demonstrators who called their native land Amerika — turn against it? "Defending the war (or, rather, disputing the attackers of it) was perhaps my way of serving, of showing loyalty to a country that had kept its hackneyed promises — life, liberty, pursuit of happiness — to me."³¹ That America had *not* kept its promises to large sectors of its citizenry, or that the prosecution of a long, bloody war in Southeast Asia might *not* be the best thing for our nation — such thoughts seemed not to occur to Updike, so insistent was he to defend, rhetorically, his country against the verbal attacks from soft liberals. Even the Cold War made sense to Updike, defining the world in Manichean alternatives. "Athens and Sparta, light and shadow. Ours was the distinctly better mousetrap."³²

Updike's political values, which affirmed John F. Kennedy's Cold War vision of a "long twilight struggle" against forces of darkness, were sustained by a religious vision in which good and evil contend. Though he had married into a New England Unitarian family, which celebrated light, reason, and political liberalism, something in Updike, values and visions derived from his early religious training, rebelled.

Updike's Pennsylvania Lutheranism represents "a theological animus; down-dirty sex and the bloody mess of war and the desperate effort of faith all belonged to a dark necessary underside of reality that I felt should not be merely ignored, or risen above, or disdained." Updike subscribes explicitly to "a dark Augustinian idea." He affirms the notion of Original Sin. "'In Adam's Fall / We sinned all,' began that seminal American text, the *New England Primer*," he notes admiringly.³³ All of this served to solidify John Updike's pro-war patriotism.

So it is not difficult to see why Wills, a sharp critic of Nixon's war policies, saw *Rabbit at Rest* as a fair occasion to attack Updike for mindless, pro-American sentimentality. Wills would not march behind Harry Angstrom as Uncle Sam while a resurrected Kate Smith blessed America in recorded song. "Updike began with the aim of saying hard true things about what is wrong with America," argues Wills. "By succumbing to his own stylistic solipsism, Updike ends up exemplifying what is wrong."³⁴

Updike, of course, has a different memory of how the Rabbit series began. When he was in his mid-twenties, he conceived a work of fiction composed of two novellas that articulated alternative visions and life patterns: "One would be the rabbit approach — spontaneous, unreflective, frightened, hence my character's name, Angstrom — and the second was to be a horse method of coping with life, to get into harness and pull your load until you drop."³⁵ *Rabbit, Run*, then, began as an experiment in point-of-view and present-tense narration, not as a parable of the American character at mid-century; a later novel, *The Centaur*, showed the "horse method." On *Rabbit, Run*, Updike reports: "Although the first novel had had a few overheard news items in it, it wasn't really in a conscious way about the 50's. It was just a product of the 50's."³⁶ For all that, the novel became a telling period parable.

The Harry Angstrom of *Rabbit, Run* is twenty-six, a MagiPeel salesman, unhappily married to pregnant and alcoholic Janice, and the neglectful father of a son, Nelson; Rabbit is also a reveler in his own lost glories of high school basketball. When he stops to play a pickup game with some neighborhood lads, he feels again the impulse to transcend his own limits — *to fly past the nets*, as James Joyce's autobiographical alter ego put it. For Rabbit, "that old stretched-leather feeling makes his whole body go taut, gives his arms wings. It feels like he's reaching down through years to touch this tautness."³⁷ His spirits lifted by this transcendent moment, Rabbit attempts escape from the ordinariness of his given life. He gets in his car and heads south, "down, down the map into orange groves and smoking rivers and barefoot women."³⁸ That is, Rabbit, irresponsible and self-seeking, runs toward a romantic vision, a projection of his own needs, a Florida of his imagination, not an actual place.

Rabbit moves through 1950s America with the same instinctive spontaneity that characterized his former moves on the basketball court. When he stops for gas, a farmer sees he has no route mapped out and warns Rabbit, "The only way to get somewhere, you know, is to figure out where you're going before you go there." Rabbit, however, trusting in improvisation, is not convinced: "I don't think so."³⁹ Yet Rabbit's instincts are not, as Updike contrives his plot, trustworthy. Rabbit takes a sudden left turn, following his impulses, and fittingly finds himself on a curving dirt road, a lover's lane that leads to a dead end. Thus Updike, in *Rabbit, Run*, plotted a closed world, one which circumscribed Rabbit, stopped him in his tracks. So this tentative rebel against fifties conformity turns around and goes home again. In *Rabbit*

at Rest he thinks about his sister, Mim, who at nineteen broke away from Brewer and ended up in Las Vegas. "Rabbit never could have made it out there. He needed to stay where they remembered him when."⁴⁰

But just as Rabbit, Anteus-like, never can wholly detach himself from his home ground, neither can he sink comfortably into it; that's the tension which makes him interesting. Back from his failed flight to Florida, Rabbit refuses to return to Janice and takes up with a former prostitute, Ruth. She likes him because, as she says, "You haven't given up. In your own stupid way, you're still fighting," though neither she nor Rabbit was sure just what it was he fought to find.⁴¹ The Reverend Jack Eccles, Episcopalian, like the farmer at the gas pumps, tries to discover where Rabbit is going. But Rabbit, a bush-league mystic, cannot say; he will learn by going where he has to go. "Somewhere behind all this . . . there's something that wants me to find it." The Reverend Eccles, who counsels parishioners during rounds of golf, treats Rabbit's quest vision ironically: "It's the strange thing about you mystics, how often your little ecstasies wear a skirt."⁴² For Eccles, Rabbit is "monstrously selfish," worshipping his "worst instincts." But Updike sets himself on the side of the seeker. Rabbit knows there is something *there* there, waiting for him, and finds evidence for his vision in a perfect golf shot.

Stricken; sphere, star, speck. It hesitates, and Rabbit thinks it will die, but he's fooled, for the ball makes his hesitation the ground of a final leap: with a kind of visible sob takes a last bite of space before vanishing in falling, "That's *it*!" he cries and, turning to Eccles with a smile of aggrandizement, repeats, "That's it."⁴³

Rabbit's visionary moment of overreaching is echoed in Updike's luminous report, in "HUB FANS BID KID ADIEU," of the final home run by the legendary Red Sox left fielder Ted Williams in September 1960 against Jack Fisher, pitcher for the Baltimore Orioles. Here the lonely hero/artist figure performs a triumphant act, driving a sphere beyond boundaries, which illustrates the presence of grace — *it* — in an otherwise compromised world. If Rabbit Angstrom winds up like the legendary Casey, who struck out, Ted Williams did not.

Fisher threw the third time, Williams swung again, and there it was. The ball climbed on a diagonal line into the vast volume of air over center field. From my angle, behind third base, the ball seemed less an object in flight than the tip of a towering, motionless construct, like the Eiffel Tower or the Tappan Zee Bridge.⁴⁴

As in this prose poem on Ted Williams, *Rabbit, Run* registers a vision — patterns that embody aesthetics and values — from Updike's "angle." So, in *Rabbit, Run*, Updike was less concerned with typifying a decade or characterizing the state of the nation than he was with establishing a character, Harry Angstrom, who illustrates an impulse toward transcendence, a faith in transformation, even in the midst of his own failed and tawdry life. Updike's Rabbit has intimations of immortality from recollections of early childhood, from replications of epiphanies of excellence (as in the golf shot), and, as the Reverend Eccles wryly notes, from brief ecstasies that lie beneath skirts.

Rabbit, Run was composed in the late 1950s, before that decade took on self-conscious associations of smugness and order, which were symbolized by Ike's fondness for golf and hesitancy about foreign entanglements and before John F. Kennedy

got the nation “moving again” — into Cuba, outer space, and Vietnam! The 1960s, by contrast, *was* a desperately self-conscious decade, an era of preening extravagance. It was also a particularly disorienting decade for members of Updike’s generation — those relatively few who were born in the midst of the Great Depression, who remembered World War II with patriotic pride, who came of age in the age of postwar American affluence and assurance, who married young, reared children, and went about their careers, whistling while they worked, as though they were playing their prescribed roles in an American libretto. Then came an unscripted age, scored to rock-and-roll rhythms: the black and women’s movements, the Age of Aquarius, sexual revolution, political assassinations, Vietnam, dancing and demonstrating in the streets. As a result, *Rabbit Redux* was a much more deliberate act of representation of the national “distress,” as Updike calls it. “Suddenly it seemed to me that Rabbit Angstrom of Pennsylvania . . . might be the vehicle in which to package some of the American unease that was raging all around us.”⁴⁵

Rabbit, then, who began as a flawed visionary in *Rabbit, Run*, becomes a mere “vehicle” in *Rabbit Redux*; the solipsistic inwardness, which had constituted both his beauty and his monstrousness, was now overwhelmed by lurid occurrences of national import.

Ten years older, heavy and broken, Harry, as he was by then called, lived in a sterile housing development (Penn Villas) with his sour teenage son, Nelson, and a slimmed-down Janice, who was having an affair with Charlie Stavros, a slick car salesman. When Janice moved in with Charlie, Rabbit implausibly invited into his house two tenants: Jill, a rich, doped-up runaway teenager, and Skeeter, a black revolutionary who was hiding from the police. This combustible combination of characters and values exploded Harry Angstrom’s previously safe life: while he was making love to a neighbor, his house burned; Jill was killed in the fire; Skeeter ran; after witnessing these events, Nelson was marked for life; finally Janice returned, reestablishing a fragile stasis.

In *Rabbit Redux*, the weakest work of the tetralogy, Updike implausibly fused midlife Rabbit with the sexual-racial politics and violence of the sixties. Updike determined to “throw in,” as he tellingly puts it, an inventory of the era’s problems: “all the oppressive, distressing, overstimulating developments of the most dissentious American decade since the Civil War — anti-war protest, black power and rhetoric, teach-ins, middle-class runaways, drugs, and (proceeding eerily to its brilliant technological rendezvous through a turmoil of violence at home and abroad) the moon shot.”⁴⁶ In short, Updike overloaded the circuits of the novel with topical allusions; so the novel, like Rabbit, was overwhelmed, overturned like a skiff in a storm. Updike left the focused realism of *Rabbit, Run* for the blurred romanticism of *Rabbit Redux*.

It is as impossible to accept Harry Angstrom — a political reactionary, a timid solipsist — in this milieu as it would be to envision Archie Bunker at Woodstock! Still, Harry’s increasingly rich inner life — he is an American Leopold Bloom — *is* convincingly portrayed. While it strains credibility to see him reading Frederick Douglass and denouncing America’s racism, it is entirely convincing to see Rabbit begin to identify his personal condition and fortunes with his beloved country. “I learned,” Harry told his sister, “the country isn’t perfect.” But, Updike adds, “even as he says this he realizes he doesn’t believe it, any more than he believes at heart that he will

die.”⁴⁷ (In *Rabbit at Rest* Harry will accept the related notion of his own death and America’s imperfections.) With *Rabbit Redux*, Updike’s Rabbit books became parables for the state of the nation and Harry Angstrom became an American representative man. His private story counterpoints the public narrative of American successes and distresses during most of the second half of the twentieth century.

Increasingly, Updike identifies the fortunes of the nation with his hero: as Rabbit goes, so goes America. “America and Harry suffered, marvelled, listened, endured. Not without cost, of course.”⁴⁸ In *Rabbit Is Rich*, set in 1979, Updike juxtaposes Harry’s fortunes against the nation’s fate and counts the costs. While America is “running out of gas” (the opening words of the novel), figuratively and literally, during the Carter years, Harry (a “vehicle” indeed!) becomes a Toyota salesman on the Brewer lot owned by Janice and her mother, Mrs. Springer; he grows rich, full of himself, and takes his destined place, socially and economically, in American society, becoming a smiling public man.⁴⁹

Harry is at the top of his game. “A ball at the top of its arc, a leaf on the skin of a pond.”⁵⁰ In an extravagant symbolic moment, Harry and Janice make love on a bed strewn with Krugerrands earned from stock investments! However, Harry, finally at ease in Zion — carrying out his appointed golf rounds, still seeking God under skirts — knows it can’t last. He, as Jimmy Carter would soon be, is held hostage to fortune. What goes up must come down; what floats must sink. Though Harry celebrates becoming a grandfather, he knows it is the beginning of the end for him. “Through the murk he glimpses the truth that to be rich is to be robbed, to be rich is to be poor.”⁵¹

In *Rabbit at Rest*, the final work of the tetralogy, a novel set in the last year of the Reagan administration, it is Rabbit who is running out of gas in a nation of diminishing richness. Harry has the sympathy of his author. Reflecting on “Why Rabbit Had to Go,” Updike says, “It’s a depressed book about a depressed man, written by a depressed man.”⁵² For all that — the identification between the novelist and his hero, which Wills and others have noted — the novel in no way constitutes Updike’s unqualified defense of Harry Angstrom and his values, as Wills and others charge. Rather, Updike beautifully balances sympathy with satire, suggesting, as he does in the Uncle Sam scene, that Rabbit *is* America, in all its flawed flamboyance. It is, as Henry James said, “a complex fate” to be an American: Rabbit is buoyant with optimism, selfish, potent, improvisatory, dangerous, irrepressible, overreaching, fated. Everything he does, he now believes, is informed by “his faint pronged sense of doom.”⁵³

Furthermore, Rabbit, no longer the swift runner and artful dodger he was as a young man, looks at himself more honestly and critically than he ever had before. “Fifty-five and fading.” He sees his own swollen reflection in the Toyota showroom glass (“a giant ballroom”) and wonders what has become of him.⁵⁴ He is even able to admit to a selfishness that has allowed him to use others and be callous to his family. “His own son can’t stand to be in the same room with him. Ruth once called him Mr. Death.”⁵⁵

The novel opens with Harry Angstrom in the Southwest Florida Regional Airport, awaiting the arrival of Nelson and Pru, his daughter-in-law — a woman who excites lust in the aging Rabbit — and their two children — Judy (age eight) and Roy (age four). But Rabbit senses he may be awaiting “something more ominous and intimately his: his own death, shaped vaguely like an airplane.”⁵⁶ Rabbit had always sought, through flight, some undefined sense of wholeness, harmony, and radiance,

which he called *it*. Now *it* — death, a personification of the hollowness at the center of his ever-selfish being — seeks him.

Yet Rabbit is neither bitter about his state nor apologetic about his life. Indeed, he is teeming with wonder at all that is passing and he is rich with realizations. Rabbit explains the credo that guided his action when he tells his granddaughter why he did not park his car where an attendant directed him. “Whenever somebody tells me to do something my instinct’s always to do the opposite. It’s got me into a lot of trouble, but I’ve had a lot of fun. This bossy old guy was pointing one direction so I went the other and found a space,” just as he used to find quick openings on the basketball court.⁵⁷ But he now moves warily and tries to protect his granddaughter in ways he failed to protect Becky, his daughter, who had drowned in *Rabbit, Run*, or Jill, his young lover, who was burned to death in *Rabbit Redux*. Updike informs Rabbit’s every step with a sense of fragility, caution, wariness. Taking Judy for candy, he warns her to be careful on the escalator. “Easy does it, pick a step and stay on it. Don’t get on a crack.” At the bottom he says, “O.K., step off, but not too soon. don’t panic, it’ll happen, O.K., good.”⁵⁸

Rabbit’s best times are behind him and his days are nearly done. Weighted by a lifetime of self-indulgence, stuffed with junk foods he cannot deny himself, Rabbit, at 230 pounds, has trouble turning his head, “his neck stiff with fat.”⁵⁹ He is seized by chest pains and his vision is foggy. He is, as they say, a heart attack waiting to happen. Much like his beloved, decaying nation. “Everything falling apart, airplanes, bridges, eight years under Reagan of nobody minding the store, making money out of nothing, running up debt, trusting in God.”⁶⁰ A 747 is blown out of the sky over Lockerbie, Scotland, and Rabbit identifies with “those bodies fallen smack upon the boggy Scottish earth like garbage bags full of water.”⁶¹

Harry and Janice, having turned over management of the Toyota dealership in Brewer to Nelson, live in Florida half the year now, in Deleon (*Deelyun*, or “deal you in,” as the locals pronounce it), a town named in cynical allusion to the sixteenth-century Spanish explorer, Ponce de León, a forerunner of Rabbit, who sought eternal youth in the same place. But Rabbit’s Florida is strewn with junky businesses serving the elderly, a landscape laden in death imagery. “On the telephone wires, instead of the sparrows and starlings you see in Pennsylvania, lone hawks and buzzards sit.”⁶²

In their two-bedroom condominium in Valhalla Village, on the fourth floor of a housing unit overlooking a golf course, a dwelling for them and other migratory “snow birds,” Harry, now given to Proustian reveries, remembers things past and contemplates the end. He is taking his last look around and Updike is there to show him the way. Finally Rabbit learns the route on his life map. When Harry takes his grandchildren on a tour, “he unfolds a map he carries in the glove compartment. *Figure out where you’re going before you go there*: he was told that a long time ago.”⁶³

Part of the charm and the horror of Harry Angstrom and his exemplary life is that he has not, as Ruth long ago noted, given up. He *still* thinks that “there’s something that wants me to find it.” The indescribable *it*, he hopes, is nothing less than a vision of divinity and purpose, a fusion of the lonely *I* with God — at least a clarification of life’s mysteries. Rabbit thinks he still might discover *it* within the arbitrary rules of games or by transgressing social and sexual norms in pursuit of his little ecstasies.

Rabbit’s vision clears on the golf course near his Deleon condo, where he plays

with three wise men, as he believes them to be — three Jewish retirees, men who accept their lives as Rabbit, that funky searcher, never can.

Always, golf holds out the hope of perfection, of a perfect weightlessness and consummate ease, for now and again it does happen, happen in three dimensions, shot after shot . . . All you have to do is take a simple pure swing and puncture the picture in the middle with a ball that shrinks in a second to the size of a needle-prick, a tiny tunnel into the absolute. That would be *it*.⁶⁴

But Rabbit searches for meaning in ways other than replaying the games of his youth. Throughout *Rabbit at Rest*, Harry reads, a few pages each night, Barbara Tuchman's *The First Salute*, a book about the Dutch role in the American Revolution. Tuchman's comments obviously also apply to America under Reagan; they allow Updike to filter a larger vision of national decline through Rabbit's semiconscious haze: "Fantasies about America produced two strongly contradictory conclusions that in the end came to the same point of injecting some caution into the golden dreams."⁶⁵ Could America become one nation? Were its people too self-indulgent? Such speculations help Harry get to sleep, but they also point us to Updike's larger thematic purposes.

Then Harry has his inevitable heart attack. While he is sailing with Judy, their boat overturns and Harry, in a truly heroic moment, drawing upon all his instinctive and improvisatory gifts, rescues his granddaughter from drowning and gets her back to shore before he collapses. (In *Rabbit, Run*, Rabbit abandoned Janice, who accidentally drowned their baby, Becky, an event that haunts Harry and Janice for the rest of their lives.) "Whatever it is, *it* has found *him*, and is working him over," Rabbit decides, after his heart attack.⁶⁶ Life is a game of elimination, he concludes, wondering who next is *it*.⁶⁷

Recuperating in Penn Park, in Brewer, Pennsylvania, Rabbit revisits scenes of his youth, taking his long goodbye and confronting new troubles. Nelson has, in their absence, ruined the family business, run up a massive debt to drug dealers, and nearly destroyed himself with a cocaine addiction. Cocaine is Nelson's *it*, his quick trip out of a miserable world, as he suggests when he admits his addiction to his mother. "I love coke, Mom. And it loves me. I can't explain it. It's right for me. It makes me feel *right*, in a way nothing else does."⁶⁸

Nelson, his father's son, is another representative man, a personification of the thirty-something, self-indulgent, financially and personally overextended hustling men of the Reagan era. Nelson had plunged his family into the crimes of the 1980s — fraud and debt from overextended credit, his company books cooked by a book-keeper who is dying of AIDS. Yet Nelson has his own faith in America as a rescuing God. "It's *easy* to be rich," he tells his father, "that's what this country is all about."⁶⁹ Nelson, who lacks Rabbit's redeeming charm, reveals a future in which self-destructive American men meet their dour fate and foreshadow greater national miseries.

Nelson takes on unmanageable burdens, but for Harry this is a time of letting go. He visits Thelma Harrison, with whom he has been having an affair for a decade, since they first made love in a Caribbean wife swap in *Rabbit Is Rich*; now she is dying of lupus. She gives him a Diet Coke and Harry reflects on a larger design of diminishment. "First they take the cocaine out, then the caffeine, and now the sugar."⁷⁰ Harry, who has turned fifty-six by this time, is more cautious, feeling more

mortal. Though Thelma wants to, he does not want to make love with her. He worries about AIDS. (Ronnie, her husband, Rabbit's former high school teammate, has slept around.) "Love and death, they can't be pried apart any more."⁷¹

Rabbit undergoes angioplasty, making his temporary stay against death. In the hospital he continues to settle his affairs. His nurse, Annabelle Byer, may be his daughter by Ruth. She is kind to him, asks him if he wants to see her mother, but Rabbit passes up the chance to see his former lover, the woman he has sought for years. A time to love and a time to die. When Thelma and Ron Harrison visit him in the hospital, she says there is a time for everything and this is the time for her to give up. Despite the presence of her husband, she kisses Harry goodbye.

Lost opportunity is not only a personal but also a national condition, as Updike makes clear when Rabbit reflects on George Bush, president-elect. "Harry misses Reagan a bit, at least he was dignified, and had that dream distance; the powerful thing about him as President was that you never knew how much he knew, nothing or everything, he was like God that way, you had to do a lot of it yourself. With this new one you know he knows something, but it is a small thing."⁷² *Rabbit at Rest* is a parable about the diminishing promise of American life, perhaps about the betrayed promise of all life. (Did Updike find renewed national purpose in Bush's quick devastation of Iraq in 1991?)

Yet in the midst of death, Updike implies, there *is* life. Out of mutual need — each feels abandoned by a spouse — Pru and Harry, staying in the Springer house, come together in sex. While Nelson is in a drug rehabilitation center and Janice is taking real estate classes, Harry and his daughter-in-law form a brief union, transgress acceptable norms and decencies to give each other solace and passing pleasure. "Her tall pale wide-hipped nakedness in the dimmed room is lovely much as those pear trees in blossom along that block in Brewer last month were lovely, all his it had seemed, a piece of paradise blundered upon, incredible."⁷³

Blessed by the incredible once again, for a while Rabbit seems his old self, reborn. He takes over management of the car lot again. As the Toyota ad put it, "Who could ask for anything more?"⁷⁴ Harry plays the role of Uncle Sam in Brewer's Fourth of July parade. But he cannot long escape death images. Thelma dies. Then Mr. Natsume Shimada of Toyota arrives, like a grim reaper. Shimada speaks in a comic accent, but he bears a serious message, not only for Harry, but for America. "We produce better product for rittle man's money, yes? You ask for it, we got it, yes?" But "America make nothing, just do mergers, do acquisitions, rower taxes, raise national debt. Nothing comes out, all goes in — foreign goods, foreign capital. America take everything, give nothing. Rike big black hole." Shimada sees Americans as jolly, undisciplined people, living in a country full of dog shit, the nation Rabbit had adored and exploited. Shimada blames Janice and Harry for being in Florida instead of watching over Nelson's management of the firm.⁷⁵ When Shimada takes the Toyota dealership away from the Angstroms, he removes the economic bubble that has lifted them to giddy heights. They are on their own, in free-fall.

Nelson returns, filled with the higher power rhetoric of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. With Nelson back, Janice wants Harry to stay away from the lot. "We'll be fine," she says, but, Updike adds, "she lies."⁷⁶ Things continue to come apart. Nelson, who at first wanted to start a treatment center at the lot, wants to sell motorcycles. Harry warns there is another economic depression coming.

Janice wants to sell the Penn Park house to pay their debts and for them all to live together in the Springer house.

Harry's troubles come to a head when Janice phones him from the Springer house, where Nelson and his family live, saying that Pru has told them that she and Harry slept together. Janice will never forgive him for what he did; she calls it "monstrous."⁷⁷ She insists that he drive over to "process" all this, but Harry packs and heads South, replicating his failed journey of escape in *Rabbit, Run*. Now as then he listens to the radio — oldies songs like "Vaya con Dios" and "It's Magic." He looks for the garage where the farmer had told him he should know where he was going. "Well, now he did. He had learned the road and figured out the destination."⁷⁸ This time Rabbit knows where he is going, and Updike allows Rabbit finally to transcend the limits of his commonplace life, though it is the only life he will ever have. Only death is waiting for him to find *it*.

Unrepentant Rabbit runs, completing a journey to Florida he began thirty years before, but this time there is no turning back. On the long drive, then alone in his Deleon condo, Rabbit has time to think and comes to some conclusions that seem to have Updike's endorsement. Updike's stay-at-home hero has finally surpassed his limitations, come to understand *it*, which he finds to be "incredible" or, as Shimada put it, "Rike big black hole." That is, Updike holds Harry Angstrom up to criticism for his selfishness as a husband and father, as a poor caretaker of his talents and a violator of his body, but Updike allows him the dignity of a tragic realization. Rabbit had been "reared in a world where war was not strange, but change was: the world stood still so you could grow up in it. He knows when the bottom fell out." When Kroll's, a huge, hometown department store, closed, while Rabbit was a boy, "Rabbit realized the world was not solid and benign, it was a shabby set of temporary arrangements rigged up for the time being, all for the sake of money. You just passed through, and they milked you for what you were worth, mostly when you were young and gullible. If Kroll's could go, the courthouse could go, the banks could go. When the money stopped, they could close down God Himself." Now Springer Motors will go. And soon, so will he. All things pass. "Nothing is sacred."⁷⁹

Not only does Thelma die, but Barbara Tuchman, chronicler of the American mission, dies as well. Then Baseball Commissioner Bartlett Giamatti dies of a heart attack. Mike Schmidt of the Phillies decides to retire. "I like the way he went out," Rabbit says, "quick, and on his own nickel."⁸⁰ Even the demise of the Cold War makes Rabbit plaintive: "It's like nobody's in charge on the other side any more. I miss it, the cold war. It gave you a reason to get up in the morning."⁸¹

In *Rabbit at Rest*, John Updike posits a parable of national decline and fall. Rabbit, a petty Gatsby, has not fulfilled his early promise, and the nation he loves has turned sour. At least Rabbit decides to go out on his own nickel — he has his final heart attack while playing basketball with a black young man on the outskirts of Deleon. Thirty years before, early in *Rabbit, Run*, he had played in another pickup game, mourning the loss of great days gone. Now he reaches out for *it* one last time. "Up he goes, way up toward the torn clouds. His torso is ripped by a terrific pain, elbow to elbow. He bursts from within; he feels something immense persistently fumble at him, and falls unconscious to the dirt."⁸² He is not dead at novel's end, but he is close enough to count out of the game.

Harry Angstrom embodies Updike's portrait of a failed and fallen America. Rabbit fulfilled the promise of American life — athletic prowess, marriage and a

family, sex, and money — and it now promises to kill him. “Enough” is the final word of the novel. Harry (“Rabbit”) Angstrom, representative American man, is done in by his own fulfilled dream of success, his wretched excess.

Brian Moore’s *Lies of Silence*, a novel in the genre of the political thriller, portrays Michael Dillon, a thirty-one-year-old resident of contemporary Belfast, in a “moment of crisis,” arrested, between worlds, unable to mature or regress, a dangling man. Dillon’s crisis seems, at first, private and predictable. In a fictional version of Belfast, Dillon is a husband and a hotel manager of the Clarence, on the Malone Road (in actual Belfast, the Wellington Park is located on the Malone Road), but this is not the life he wanted. “He was a failed poet in a business suit.”⁸³ Unsurprisingly, though he is married to Moira, age thirty-three, Dillon is in love with Andrea, age nineteen. Moira, who grew up on the Falls Road, hates living away from Belfast, but Andrea, who is from Canada and a former Queen’s University Belfast student, is ready to flee Belfast whenever Dillon can break himself of the city’s hold.

Dillon’s middle-class and midlife crisis turns suddenly and dramatically public. With melodramatic bravura, Moore has Dillon decide to tell Moira he is leaving her, only to be prevented by the appearance in his life of political terrorists, the IRA.

The Dillons live in North Belfast, far from “the image of the city [familiar] to the outside world: graffiti-fouled barricaded slums where the city’s Protestant and Catholic poor confronted each other, year in and year out, in a stasis of hatred, fear and mistrust.”⁸⁴ In his neighborhood, Catholics and Protestants live at peace, side by side. But Dillon cannot so easily escape murderous Belfast. IRA men, figures masked in woolen balaclava helmets, materialize like a bad dream and take the Dillons hostage. They explain that Michael, in his car, is to deliver a bomb to the hotel, a bomb designed to kill the Reverend Alun Pottinger, Orange Order propagandist, Moore’s fictionalized portrayal of the Northern Ireland Protestant majority’s propagandist, the Reverend Ian Paisley. Pottinger will be speaking before the Canadian Orange Order at the Clarence. Moira will be held hostage while Michael delivers the bomb. “She needn’t think that bein’ a Catholic from the Falls is goin’ to save her neck,” says an IRA man of Moira. “So, mind what you say, the pair of you.”⁸⁵ That is, as the saying goes in tense Northern Ireland, *Whatever you say, say nothing!*

Lies of Silence is a novel in which an Irish representative man cannot break out of the debilitating heritage of his divided nation.⁸⁶ Dillon is a servant to his betters — hotel clients and the hotel’s American owners — and a feckless dreamer. He maintains his “lies of silence” by betraying his wife, but then conforms to the national lust for martyrdom by threatening to identify a kidnapper and, by so doing, exposes himself to IRA assassins. Finally he *is* a martyr, killed by the IRA, though he had by then decided *not* to inform.

Dillon’s conditions of arrested adolescence — his desire to escape the responsibilities of married love through romance with a younger woman, his hankering for poetry rather than practicality, his wish to run away from his given life to an imagined felicity elsewhere — are all traits enforced by the special conditions of Belfast, as Moore imagines it.

As Michael Dillon drove the bomb from North Belfast, through center city, to the hotel near Queen’s, he was intensely aware of “this ugly, troubled place which held for him implacable memories of his past life.” He drove past the Catholic boarding

school where he had been caned, past the university where he had his failed dream of escape through poetry, past “those Protestant and Catholic ghettos which were the true and lasting legacy of this British Province founded on inequity and sectarian hate.” But he was still trapped, just as he had been as a boy, when he stared out the window “and imagined himself in some aeroplane being lifted over that grey pig’s back of a mountain to places far from here.”⁸⁷

At the Clarence Hotel, Michael parked the car beneath the window of the room in which Pottinger was scheduled to speak, but then rebelled against his captivity and ran across the street to a shop and phoned the police, who cleared the hotel before the bomb exploded. Though Michael had no way of knowing it at the time, Moira was safe, for the IRA lads had left her shortly after Michael drove off with the bomb. But it seems that Michael had, by *not* carrying through with the proxy bombing, broken his ties with Belfast at last, particularly when the suspicious, enraged Moira refuses to go to London with him, where he will bring Andrea and take on a new job at another hotel.

At a farewell party at the Clarence, Dillon’s sense of the pull of place might reflect Moore’s own ambivalence toward Belfast.

This city, with its ugly streets, its endless rain, its monotonous violence, its Protestant prejudice and Catholic cant and, above all, its copycat English ways, incongruous as a top hat on a Tonga king — all of these things he had wanted to flee now lost their power to anger him. Instead in this crowded room filled with Ulster men and women he felt, as people must have felt in wartime, the fellowship of the besieged.⁸⁸

Michael need not have worried, for Belfast would not so easily be abandoned. Briefly, as Michael and Andrea, seemingly safe in England, share idyllic days in a Hampstead flat, he is lulled into the illusion that he might be able to start a new life. “Was it over? Was it possible, here in London, to slip back into the safe anonymous river of ordinary life?”⁸⁹ The Belfast police want him to return, to identify one of the kidnappers. Michael vacillates, first telling Andrea that he must “do the right thing,” then telling a newly concerned Moira that he will not testify. Dillon dangles between worlds and convictions. Then the IRA relieves him of the need to choose by gunning him down. Michael Dillon, a man who would have been another Stephen Dedalus, full of silence, exile, and cunning, becomes another Gypo Nolan, the pathetic betrayer in Liam O’Flaherty’s *The Informer*. In *Lies of Silence*, Brian Moore’s myth of Belfast is featured as a destructive place, particularly for its murderous and murdered young men.

Amongst Women, John McGahern’s beautiful novel, centers upon the final years of Michael Moran, a cantankerous, occasionally charming, old Irish Republican — a man who fought against British rule before the 1921 treaty divided Ireland, then fought again in the post-treaty Irish Civil War, a man who, in turn, has never ceased fighting the world around him, particularly the members of his own family, those who love him despite himself. “No matter how favourably the tides turned for him he would always contrive to be in permanent opposition.”⁹⁰ Like Paddy McGuire, the bitter farmer in Patrick Kavanagh’s poem *The Great Hunger*, McGahern’s Moran was one with his miseries, except for those rare moments of rapture when he was alone with his fields. But

at the end of the day, he was more the victim than the lord of all he surveyed. "Instead of using the fields, he sometimes felt as if the fields had used him."⁹¹

In the late 1950s, Moran is an aged man, living on a farm in the west of Ireland with his second wife, three daughters, and one son — another son having fled the sting of his father's hard hand and sharp tongue. After his failed struggle for a united Ireland, Moran was disillusioned by the "crowd of small-minded gangsters" who ran the Republic.⁹² All he came to care for was his family, but he fouled his own nest with his bitterness. Moran distrusted, as much as he relied upon, the hope embedded in the bones of the women he dominated. In time, each of his children fought his and her way out of their father's dour world, finding new lives in Dublin and London, though all but one of them returns home for renewal of their defining ties to family and place — Moran's farm, Great Meadow, outside Carrick, in the west of Ireland. McGahern shows how Moran's strengths were gradually passed on to his long-suffering wife and daughters and became their heritage, while Moran's sons turned away from their imposing father as a model. *Amongst Women* is a tribute to the women of Ireland who come into their own in our time, replacing the driven men who founded a nation.

Just below the surface of this realistic novel, we can detect the faint outline of a symbolic pattern. Moran represents the hard life and harder heart of an Ireland that was quickly fading, Yeats's "great hatred, little room." His women both embody the mythic Irish role of sacrifice, particularly for Rose, his noble wife, and represent, for his daughter, the new sense of identity for women in Ireland, the emergence into a new world of self-reliance and authority. Though McGahern does not flinch at portraying the self-consuming passions of Moran, the novel shows proper respect for a man who, however misguided, fought for his nation and believed in his church and his family. Indeed, the novel is a literary act of mercy in its compassion for characters caught in the nets and nettles of the hard life that Ireland offers its citizens. When Moran rails at his firstborn, Luke, who left his home and never returned, Rose urges Moran to "do the generous thing," but that is beyond him.⁹³ Some critics said much the same, and not without just cause, after reading McGahern's early fiction, which was unrelenting in its flaying of Ireland, but *Amongst Women* is an eloquent statement of reconciliation.

McGahern, Ireland's finest living writer of fiction, has long imagined Ireland as a prison in which his characters are confined with lifetime sentences, though in *The Pornographer* he redefined Ireland as a haven in a lawless world.⁹⁴ In *Amongst Women* McGahern goes to the heart of the country to look at the destructive elements and hidden strengths in traditional Irish life.

The novel shows the redemptive element in traditional Irish family life, rooted in a dear, perpetual *place*, surrounded by fields; the Morans are sustained by unquestioning faith, illustrated by their nightly recitation of the Rosary, each member saying a decade. In Irish country life, cohesion is beautifully embodied in field work, as when all members of the family join in gathering the hay into sheaves. Or when they all go together, squeezed into a car, to midnight Mass on Christmas Eve. "Once they crossed the bridge the church appeared like an enormous lighted ship in the night. There was something wonderful and moving about leaving the car by the roadside and walking together in the cold and darkness towards the great lighted church"⁹⁵ However confining it might have been, a sense of coherence resided in the community. In the town, Moran's visiting daughters were greeted warmly on Saint

Stephen's Day. "'You're home! You're home for Christmas!' and hands were gripped and held instead of shaken to show the strength of feeling."⁹⁶

Though McGahern welcomes the new age of wider individual opportunities, a sense of regret for lost clarity in the hard pastoral life of western Ireland suffuses the novel. Just before his death, reluctant to let go, Moran rises, walks the fields, takes his last look around. "The meadow . . . was no longer empty but filling with a fresh growth, a faint blue tinge in the rich green of the young grass. To die was never to look on all this again. It would live in others' eyes but not in his."⁹⁷ McGahern shows that these fields — and Himself, man of the house, in them — will live in the eyes of the women who, quite literally, survived him. And in the eyes of the readers of *Amongst Women*, a novel of a troubled and troubling man of Ireland.

Robert Bly's *Iron John: A Book About Men* is a book about male initiation, although, according to Bly, it in no way denigrates women or resists the insights of the women's movement. The "Wild Man" Bly admires is no macho rapist. Rather, he is one "who has examined his wound, resembles a Zen priest, a shaman, or a woodsman more than a savage."⁹⁸

To make his point, Bly retells, interprets, and amplifies, with examples drawn from mythology and other folk tales, "Iron John," a tale first set down by the Grimm brothers around 1820, but the story could be thousands of years old. In the tale a boy loses a golden ball, which rolls into Wild Man's cage. Wild Man promises to return the ball only if the boy steals the key to the cage from beneath his mother's pillow and frees Wild Man. This the boy does, setting in motion a series of adventures (an initiation rite), which eventually brings him to manhood. "The Wild Man here amounts to an invisible presence, the companionship of the ancestors and the great artists among the dead."⁹⁹

For all that, Bly's Wild Man is no wimp. Indeed, Bly sets himself against the "soft male," that is, the modern male who has been both chastened and enlightened into tenderness and passivity by women. So for all its antimacho consciousness, Bly's thesis retains trace elements of anger against what he presumes women (Mom again!) have done to men. Bly would preserve the male "instinct for fierceness," but not "the instinct for aggression." For Bly, "in recent decades, the separatist wing of the feminist movement, in a justified fear of brutality, has labored to breed fierceness out of men."¹⁰⁰

However, Bly does not always make clear the line between positive fierceness and negative aggression. He urges men to heed the call of the Wild Man and leave "the busy life" (that is, the life of dutiful work and home commitment) behind. Bly praises but does not adequately illustrate "the positive side of male sexuality." Though the Iron John story ends in a marriage ceremony between the boy-become-man and a princess, Bly says little about the way manhood is affirmed through *fulfilling* the roles of worthy husband and father by living in the midst of the life we all know. For Bly, "every modern male has, lying at the bottom of his psyche, a large, primitive being covered with hair down to his feet. Making contact with the Wild Man is the step the eighties male or the nineties male has yet to make . . . Contact with Iron John requires a willingness to descend into the male psyche and accept what's dark down there, including the *nourishing* dark."¹⁰¹ Sadly, such assertions make more sense around a campfire, or between the pages of a book, than they do in the midst of a busy life lived within a complex society. Bly provides a map of psy-

chic and spiritual escape, but he says little about how a man should get through the day in his given life. *Iron John*, then, is still another American wish-fulfillment book in which the adolescent hero lights out for the territories.

The works discussed in this article portray men who journey away from their ordinary lives, guided by various versions of the Wild Man, into initiation rites, searching for some undefinable *it*. Some of them find plausible new lives based upon old deceptions. Paul de Man was a fraud all his life and, consequently, promoted a theory of interpretation that justifies deceit. Harry Angstrom, a failure as a husband, lover, and father, became a bloated, foolish, self-consuming solipsist in *Rabbit at Rest*. But, through Updike's marvelous, inside, present-tense narrative, Rabbit retains the redeeming courage of his own convictions, the candor to see who he was, and the rashness to pursue what he wanted, even when that was meretricious.

Patrick Bateman, Bret Easton Ellis's monstrous creation, is a perfect illustration of Bly's thesis that modern capitalism encourages its young to perpetuate the occasion of ersatz initiation through various means of thrill seeking. In *American Psycho*, sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll are insufficient distractions for the jaded psyche of young Bateman, who turns to sadistic thrill killings. Though he inhabits a more subtly executed house of fiction, the same can be said of Parker Jacoda in Paul Theroux's *Chicago Loop*.

Sooner or later — only at the very end for Rabbit — these American men, arrested adolescents all, abandon their responsibilities as husbands, as fathers, as responsible citizens, in failed quests to create new lives, new selves. Taken together, they certainly do not live up to their responsibilities as protectors of the earth, which is what Bly says the Wild Man should be. Rather, these men, real and imaginary, embody the wilfulness, insensitivity, angry and powerful sides of men. What is admirable, to varying degrees, is the candor and artfulness of these male authors who successfully expose the dark half of the male psyche. What is wondrous, too, is the redemptive grace occasionally found in these figures who refuse to settle for things-as-they-are.

Perhaps McGahern and Moore, Irish writers, present their compromised fiction heroes with more sympathy because these novelists more persuasively illustrate the shaping hand of cultural-historical influence on their fictional characters and therefore blame them less than American novelists, who present fictional heroes who like to think that each man is the author of his own destiny. Moore's Michael Dillon tries to fly past the nets of responsibility, planning to leave his wife, family, and country for a new love from the New World, but IRA men intrude to remind him of his local commitments. Even then Dillon leaves Belfast, seeking a renewed self in England, but the ties that bind him to home — Belfast as the quotidian! — are far-reaching. Moore presents a world in which men are trapped between a stone and a hard place; interestingly, the women around Dillon survive and grow, while he is killed.

John McGahern's Irish world is even more enclosing, for his representative man, Michael Moran, an embittered former rebel, a petty tyrant who rules his farm and family with an iron hand, will not let go of destructive old ways, though it drives his sons away. His women, wife and daughters, suffer even more; however, at the end of their father's days, they grow strong through their resistance. As in Moore's *Lies of Silence*, McGahern's *Amongst Women* does not conclude with the death of the male protagonist; rather, both novels turn their attentions to the surviving women. The fictional heroes of these novels by Moore and McGahern are men who are defined by their reactions to social contexts and redeemed by the devotion of their women.

They have a far narrower range of choice to impose shape and meaning than do their American counterparts. Thus their manhood, more circumscribed, is more plausibly portrayed.

More than thirty years ago, Leslie Fiedler, in *Love and Death in the American Novel*, suggested that American fiction, like American life, is “charmingly and infuriatingly ‘boyish.’” As a result, our literature insufficiently deals with mature social arrangements; instead, child- and adolescent-centered, “the American novel is pre-eminently a novel of terror.” As we see from the American novels here examined — the two Irish novels tell a different story — little has changed since Fiedler wrote:

Our great novelists, though experts on indignity and assault, on loneliness and terror, tend to avoid treating the passionate encounter of a man and woman, which we expect at the center of a novel. Indeed, they rather shy away from permitting in their fictions the presence of any full-fledged, mature women, giving us instead monsters of virtue or bitchery, symbols of the rejection or fear of sexuality.¹⁰²

The representative men portrayed in these books have much to answer for, but most of the writers who portrayed these men deserve praise for their candor about the male animal. 🐘

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Robert Frost, “The Gift Outright,” in *The Poetry of Robert Frost*, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), 348.

Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), 24.

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Shaun O’Connell, “The Infrequent Family: In Search of Boston’s Literary Community,” *Boston Magazine* 67, no. 1 (January 1975): 44–47.

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